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Abstract 
In contemporary moral philosophy, altruism holds a place of prominence. Although a complex 
idea, the term seeps into everyday discourse, by no means confined to the esoteric language of 
philosophers and psychologists. Altruism for many is synonymous with morality. Noble actions 
are carefully scrutinized to find evidence of self-interest and, in the rare cases where the hero’s 
motivations are pure, praise flows unchallenged.  
 The current environment, so disposed to altruism, is peculiar when examined in the 
context of past moral debates. The concept of altruism would puzzle an ancient Greek or Roman, 
who understood morality as the highest form of self-interest. Ancient ethics’ inability to 
convincingly argue for self-sacrificing action, such as political service, illustrates the disconnect 
between ancient and modern moral paradigms. How, then, did this radical change come about? 
 This work endeavors to trace, if not exhaustively, at least the major points along this 
development. To explain moral discourse’s shift in the direction of altruism, I focus on two ideas 
in particular: the Kingdom of God and the Kingdom of Ends. We find that, with the introduction 
of these concepts, there are growing misgivings about self-interest’s role as the basis for 
morality. Christianity, especially the Augustinian strand, breaks from ancient philosophy in 
saying that earthly well-being should be abandoned in pursuit of a higher goal—the Kingdom of 
God. Kant’s moral philosophy makes even further strides towards altruism. His moral kingdom 
does not depend, as does Christianity, on the hope of future rewards. 
 Yet, despite the innovations in their approaches, Augustine and Kant fall short of what 
can be called true altruism. Ultimately, their normative arguments are unable to fully overcome 
self-interest’s influence. All of Augustine’s misgivings about self-love do not stop him from 
claiming that serving the Lord brings about great benefits. Although Kant never makes such an 
explicit concession to self-interest, his problematic account of pure reason’s ability to motivate 
moral action is an unsatisfactory alternative. Kant’s description of reason fails to achieve 
universality and objectivity, leaving it little hope of surviving the skeptic who questions reason’s 
moral authority. The only other option—allowing self-interest a motivational role in normative 
action—seems unavoidable. 
 Augustine and Kant provide insight into the nature of altruism. In short, they show that 
the prospects of formulating a coherent, normative argument for altruism are bleak. Unable to 
appeal to self-interest, arguments for altruism have no motivational force on certain individuals 
and thus they fail. But though altruism proves untenable as a moral ideal, that does not in itself 
negate altruism’s existence. Evidence suggests that, for certain individuals, altruism constitutes 
part of their standard expectations about the world. They do not need to be motivated to act 
altruistically because for them such action is as natural as, say, driving on the right side of the 
road. Rather than denying altruism, I want to suggest that we should think about it in descriptive, 
not normative, terms. 
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Introduction 
“Nobody is this nice.” 
  — Elaine, Seinfeld 
 
Whether it is George, Jerry, Cramer, or Elaine, the main characters of Seinfeld spend each 
episode doing essentially the same thing—trying to maximize their self-interest while 
maneuvering through a complex system of societal norms. It is an economist’s dream world: 
self-interest governs their actions with rule-like regularity, so much so that one begins to think 
that any other way of acting is impossible. When the characters encounter individuals who do not 
fit this pattern, they are at a loss to explain them. A classic example comes from the episode 
entitled “The Raincoats,” in which Elaine’s boyfriend, Aaron, goes out of his way to make sure 
that Jerry’s parents enjoy themselves while in New York. Without anything apparently to gain 
from the Seinfelds, he gives them money, treats them to dinner, as well as takes them to an art 
exhibit and a play. Dumbfounded, Elaine and Jerry unsuccessfully try to make sense of Aaron’s 
actions:  
ELAINE: I know they're your parents, Jerry, and they're very nice people. But 
don't you think it's odd that a thirty-five year old man is going to these lengths to 
see that someone else's parents are enjoying themselves? I mean don't you find 
that abnormal? 
 
JERRY: It is a tad askew.  
 
ELAINE: I mean they're your parents and you don't do anything, so why is this 
stranger doing it? 
 
JERRY: I've hardly been out to dinner with them. 
 
ELAINE: See! See! I can't even say anything, you know, because all he's really 
doing is being nice but—but nobody is this nice. This is like certifiably nice.  
 
JERRY: You're right. He's insane. 
 
ELAINE: Yes, he's insane. That's what I think. 
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 Niceness in the absence of personal gain eludes explanation. Even small acts of altruism have no 
room in the Seinfeldian universe—except, that is, as incomprehensible aberrations. 
 For quite some time, we have been living in a Seinfeldian universe, or at least that is what 
the experts say. Although the longstanding consensus recently has started to crack, the orthodox 
view in the social sciences during the twentieth century was that self-interest lurks behind all 
human actions. F.Y. Edgeworth sums up the bedrock of economics in his assertion that “the first 
principle of Economics is that every agent is actuated only by self-interest.”1 The same outlook 
has dominated in psychology and psychiatry, which, according to Donald Campbell, “not only 
describe man as selfishly motivated, but implicitly or explicitly teach that he ought to be so.”2 
Political science, in its efforts to be a “science,” has also leaned heavily on models grounded in 
self-interest, such as the much celebrated rational actor model. To explain human behavior, the 
social scientist inevitably turns to self-interest. Serious science has had little room for altruism 
and the unquantifiable warm fuzzies it evokes.   
 Despite its successes, however, the self-interest paradigm prevailing in the social sciences 
gave rise to discontent. First of all, in their quest for parsimony scholars simplified a wide range 
of actions full of nuance. Is helping behavior always a case of seeking some sort of reward? In 
instances of sacrificing for another, the single currency of self-interest strikes many as an 
inadequate descriptive tool. One may persist in calling all helping actions self-interested by 
adopting the following definition: whatever is an actor’s final choice constitutes that which is in 
her self-interest. This definition has the effect of making every action an instance of self-interest. 
                                                 
1 F.Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics: An Essay on the Application of Mathematics in the Moral Sciences 
(London: C.K. Paul & Co., 1881), 16, quoted in Amartya K. Sen, “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory,” in Beyond Self-Interest, ed. Jane Mansbridge (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 25. 
2 D.T. Campbell, “On the Conflicts between Biological and Social Evolution and between Psychology and Moral 
Tradition,” American Psychologist 30 (1975): 1104. 
- 2 - 
 But such an approach to human behavior robs many helping actions of their essential meaning—
namely, their other-regarding orientation. Suffice it to say, the wide spectrum of human 
motivation fits uncomfortably within the narrow confines of the self-interest model.  
 A perhaps more significant barrier blocking the self-interest model from achieving 
consensus is altruism’s firm status as a moral ideal.3 The idea that altruistic acts have special 
moral value permeates common sense beliefs about morality. A common response to apparent 
acts of kindness is, “What does the person helping stand to gain from her action?” Those whose 
deeds are deemed truly altruistic become symbols of virtue for their communities. Our heroes—
Gandhi, Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Martin Luther King, Nelson Mandela, the firefighters who rushed 
into the World Trade Center—inspire admiration because of the incredible sacrifices they made 
for others. Altruism’s strong normative appeal undermines perspectives limited to self-interest.  
 There exists, then, a certain discontent with the Seinfeldian worldview in which a selfish 
motive lies behind every action. Part of this discontent may be due to biological factors: altruism 
is hard-wired into us, as some evidence suggests,4 so we get irritated when scholars try to 
explain it away. Another factor that is just as important, if not more so, is culture. The idea of 
altruism illustrates, more than anything, the way we think about actions. A thin line often exists 
between a self-interested and altruistic action. The dinner invitation we receive may be an 
attempt to curry favor or a gesture of genuine concern for our well-being. Nevertheless, under 
the intense scrutiny of moral inquiry the difference between these two superficially similar 
actions becomes magnified. In this light, self-interest ceases to be unavoidable and rather 
becomes a questionable source of motivation.  
                                                 
3 Elliot Sober, “The ABCs of Altruism,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love: Science, Philosophy, & Religion in 
Dialogue, ed. Stephen G. Post et al. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 25. 
4 Part IV: The Science of Altruism, in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Post et al., 249-350; see also “Evidence for 
Altruism on a Descriptive Level” in Part III below, 95-112.  
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  The Western tradition in particular has a long history of scrutinizing the moral character 
of motivations. Altruistic motivation lacked moral value throughout most of Western moral 
thought, but after tortuous debate it eventually rose to a position of moral authority. It is this 
story—altruism’s development into a normative ideal—that is the focus of this study. As we 
shall see, the debates of the past have helped to ensure that, despite sustained efforts to ignore, 
forget about, or simply reject the possibility of altruism, altruists were never relegated to a 
lunatic fringe but rather remain paradigms of moral behavior. Past debates in Western thought, 
seemingly disconnected from the world of today, in fact hold the key to explaining widespread 
acceptance of altruism as a moral ideal. Up against a cultural tradition that enshrines altruism, 
Seinfeld’s take on human motivation seems to miss the mark.  
  
The Paradox at the Heart of Altruism 
The fierce attacks altruism has endured are unsurprising given how elusive coherent explanations 
of the concept prove to be. Scholars and lay people alike struggle to fully comprehend altruism’s 
nature. The concept is so full of nuance that it takes on an almost ethereal quality. When 
reflecting on altruistic action, one finds it difficult, perhaps even impossible, to imagine acting 
for a reason other than one’s own subjective desire or interest. The mere act of deliberation can 
bring one’s own projects and interests flooding into the imagination, pushing to the side any 
thoughts of the other. As a result, the idea of altruism often collapses in one’s mind after the 
slightest analysis. Understandably, the possibility of altruism remains controversial even after 
centuries of debate. 
 Altruism proves paradoxical in nature because it demands self-abnegation while at the 
same time purporting to be something of value for which to strive. If altruism is laudable and 
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 good, as many assume, how does altruistic action entail sacrifice? In other words, does not 
altruistic action ultimately benefit the altruist? Rather than being altruistic, the altruist has the 
appearance of realizing an enlightened form of self-interest. The slightest admission of benefits 
accruing from other-regarding actions—likely if they have moral value—immediately raises 
doubts about “altruistic” motivations.  
 The difficulties encountered in explaining altruism become even more acute when trying 
to convince others to adopt it. For someone who believes that people should be altruistic, 
formulating a persuasive, coherent argument is a daunting task. The common strategy of 
emphasizing the beneficial effects of a certain course of action will not work in this instance. 
Drawing attention to altruism’s benefits will at best convince someone to change their actions for 
self-interested reasons, but in no way will it lead someone to altruistic behavior.  
 This paradox—arguing for altruism causes it to collapse—besets all those who take on 
the challenge of defending altruism. It is this peculiarity about altruism that reoccurs again and 
again in debates about its moral status. In fact, as altruism starts to become synonymous with 
morality, the problems associated with arguing for altruism begin to plague moral arguments in 
general.5 Morality strikes one as the highest good, yet someone who consciously seeks out 
morality’s benefits seems to misunderstand the point of being moral. A means-ends approach to 
morality does not value morality as such but rather the goods it brings about, which raises 
questions about one’s commitment to moral action. So in both the case of altruism and morality, 
the following puzzle arises: the goal—being altruistic or moral—becomes unattainable once one 
focuses on it. Whether or not this puzzle can be solved is at the heart of the altruism debate, for a 
solution is a necessary prerequisite for a normative conception of altruism. 
 
                                                 
5 See, e.g., H. A. Prichard, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?” Mind 21 (1912): 21-37. 
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 Defining Altruism and Normativity 
Before continuing forward, it is important to define two terms that are salient throughout this 
investigation: altruism and normativity. Both of these terms invoke general notions yet at the 
same time elude clear-cut definitions. Altruism in particular is fraught with ambiguity since a 
wide variety of disciplines have adopted the term without much concern for preserving a shared 
meaning. The term appears frequently in the context of biology, philosophy, and psychology, 
resulting in a multiplicity of definitions. (This point is evident in the unwritten obligation, carried 
out almost invariably, that an author must define altruism before using the term.) In biology, 
altruism normally refers to actions that hurts an organism’s fitness—i.e. ability to pass its genes 
on—while benefiting the fitness of other organisms.6 This definition excludes considerations of 
motives, understandable since we cannot ask a rat or a giraffe what was on its mind when it acted 
a certain way. By contrast, in psychological analysis, whether in philosophy or psychology 
proper, altruism turns entirely on the question of motives. Non-selfish interests motivate 
altruistic action, which stands in contrast to self-interested action. With regards to psychological 
altruism, specific actions are relevant only to the extent that they reveal the motivations 
underlying them.  
 Since this study focuses on the altruism’s development in Western thought, which has 
tended to focus on it terms of human motivation, our definition will refer to the version of 
altruism used in philosophy and psychology (unless otherwise stated). This clarification by itself, 
however, does not go far enough. Even within philosophy and psychology there are competing 
definitions of altruism. Of course, no definition is necessarily right—one can define a term 
however one wants. It nevertheless is important to capture to the greatest extent possible shared 
                                                 
6 Richard Dawkins, The Selfish Gene, new ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 4; and Sober, “The 
ABCs of Altruism,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al, 17-18. 
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 notions about altruism. With this in mind, our definition of altruism will follow the prevailing 
opinion in philosophical and psychological literature, namely, that altruistic action starts with 
motivation whose ultimate goal is improving the welfare of others rather than one’s own.7  
 This conception of altruism has a long history, stretching all the way back to the 18th 
century when Joseph Butler introduced it to the Rolls Chapel in London. Although the word 
altruism was not in Butler’s lexicon, his characterization of benevolence would become the 
foundation for modern conceptions of altruism. Butler refuses to give in to the tautology that all 
action must be self-interested since some personal desire lies at the bottom of all motivation. 
There could be, he points out, “affections in human nature, the object and end of which is the 
good of another; this is itself benevolence.”8 Although a benevolent affection or desire still 
originates in me, it is not self-interested because its end is another’s welfare, not my own. 
Butler’s description of benevolence matches well with understandings of altruism both in the 
field of moral psychology and in commonsense moral beliefs. For these reasons, it will serve as 
our definition of altruism from hereafter.  
 Besides Butler’s definition, another popular definition of altruism focuses on the sacrifice 
it involves. Kristen Renwick Monroe adopts such a definition in her book, The Heart of 
Altruism: “[A]ltruism [is] behavior intended to benefit another, even when this risks possible 
sacrifice to the welfare of the actor.”9 Although Monroe’s definition appears to compete against 
Butler’s, I want to emphasize their continuity with each other. If I act altruistically, as defined by 
                                                 
7 See Daniel C. Batson, The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1991), 6; Alasdair MacIntyre, “Egoism and Altruism,” in The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, vol. 
2, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1967), 462-466; Sen, “Rational Fools,” in Beyond Self-Interest, ed. 
Mansbridge, 31 (Sen uses the term “commitment” rather than “altruism” but expresses the same concept); and 
Sober, “The ABCs of Altruism,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al, 18-20. 
8 Joseph Butler, Fifteen Sermons, in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, ed. J.B. Schneewind (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002), I, 6.  
9 Kristen Renwick Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1996), 6. 
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 Butler, that means the interests of others motivate me. To act in such a manner, I must put aside 
my own interests to a certain extent. That may involve something as simple as putting down a 
book so as to open the door for a stranger whose hands are full; or it may involve a more 
significant commitment, such as giving up one’s life-long dream of being a writer so as to care 
for a chronically ill friend. These cases of altruism are drastically different, yet they do share one 
thing in common—a clear element of sacrifice. An altruist must sacrifice her interests, whether 
absolutely or to a degree, when interests other than her own motivate her. Therefore instead of 
offering contrasting views on altruism, these two definitions complement each other by 
highlighting different aspects of altruistic action. Butler’s definition focuses on the goal of 
altruistic action, whereas Monroe’s focuses on what the actor sees as the consequences of such 
an action.  
 Admittedly, there could be exceptions in which Butler’s and Monroe’s definitions do not 
directly coincide. For example, my personal desires and the desires of others may motivate me to 
carry out the same action. Such cases do not demand sacrifice since nothing forces me to give up 
pursuit of my interests while acting in the interests of others. My motivation is therefore mixed. 
We, however, will ignore this complication for several reasons. First of all, an outside observer 
watching mixed motivation in action finds it impossible to tease out the altruistic element of such 
motivation with any certainty; purely self-interested motives could have produced the exact same 
action. The standard test for altruism therefore must look at how one acts when one’s own 
interests conflict with those of others. We reasonably deem as falling short of altruism those 
individuals who forsake the interests of others whenever they cease to coincide with their own 
interests. A second reason to disregard mixed motivations is that, simply put, this sort of 
motivation fails to capture our attention. How often, after all, do we need to convince individuals 
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 to act in a way that helps both themselves and others? What fascinates us is those instances in 
which someone serves another despite standing nothing to gain. It is this sort of behavior that 
consistently ends up at the center of debate. Thus instead of depriving altruism of its meaning, 
limiting it to cases of pure altruistic motivation involving sacrifice brings out its nature more 
fully. Equating Butler’s and Monroe’s definitions of altruism turns out to be one of those rare 
simplifications that facilitates debate with little loss to the substantive meaning its trying to 
express. 
 One of the few terms able to rival altruism in nuance and ambiguity is normativity. 
Generally the term normative is understood in relation to its antonyms, descriptive and positive: 
the normative refers to how things ought to be, whereas the descriptive refers to how things are. 
When applied to individual actions, normativity tells us how we ought to act. As Christine 
Korsgaard puts it, “The normative question is a first-person question that arises for the moral 
agent who must actually do what morality says…. You … ask the philosopher: must I really do 
this? Why must I do it? And his answer is his answer to the normative question.”10  
 So normativity answers the question, What morally ought I to do? Before moving on, we 
need to unpack some of the meaning bound up in the moral ought, even if in rather a cursory 
manner. It is safe to say that ought expresses a value judgment. In invoking ought, the moral 
actor asserts value for a certain action, whether that be because of intuition, the dictates of 
reason, God’s will, or some other reason. A more tricky issue is whether ought implies can. 
Completely disjoining ought from can proves problematical because it leads to the destruction of 
ought as a tool in moral discourse. If ought and can are unrelated, claims invoking ought will 
lose any and all influence over people’s action. Hearing the word ought will not make an action 
any less impossible, so what’s the point of listening to moral arguments at all? Believing in the 
                                                 
10 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 16.  
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 viability of moral discourse—otherwise, why engage in it?—this study will operate under the 
assumption that ought implies can, at least when considered in isolation. There may be situations 
in which multiple conflicting oughts arise, making it impossible to carry them all out.11 But at 
least in the abstract, ought implies can. After all, it seems unfair to tell someone making 
minimum wage that they ought to contribute a million dollars to a hospital. Making this demand 
of Bill Gates, on the other hand, is easier to justify. What a moral actor ought to do is closely tied 
with her capabilities.  
 With a better understanding of the moral ought, we are now in a position to further clarify 
normativity’s meaning. A normative claim that something ought to be done expresses both value 
and possibility for a certain action. These features of normativity translate into three 
requirements for a claim to be normative: (1) it references something of value; (2) it possesses 
motivational content; and (3) its motivational content is translatable to others. The first 
requirement is more or less straightforward, but the second and third requirements call for further 
explanation. The second requirement guarantees that an action is possible from a first person 
perspective; without motivational content, the link between belief and action is severed. The 
third requirement also guarantees the possibility of an action, this time with regard to others. 
Being able to translate motivational content means that a normative argument can motivate 
others, creating oughts for them. It is this last requirement that proves the most elusive. 
 These requirements for normativity are especially important for evaluating normative 
arguments for altruism. As is usually the case, the third requirement—being able to translate 
one’s motivation to another—presents particular difficulties for those arguing for altruism. 
Showing that one ought to be altruistic unsurprisingly is no easy task.  
                                                 
11 Bernard Williams, “Ethical Consistency,” in Problems of the Self: Philosophical Papers, 1956-1972 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1973), 166-86. 
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 What Are We Looking For? 
Debates about altruism span the long, rich history of Western thought. The relatively recent 
coinage of the term altruism superficially hides this fact. The actual term first appeared in French 
as altruisme in the writings of Auguste Comte around the middle of the 19th century.12 But 
despite altruism’s relatively short history as a word, the idea it captures—action motivated by 
concern for the welfare of others—surfaces much earlier in moral and philosophical writings. As 
early as the fourth century BCE, Aristotle took up the question of altruism in a chapter of his 
Nicomachean Ethics. “There is … a puzzle,” he writes, “about whether a person should love 
himself or someone else most of all; for people criticize those who like themselves most, and call 
them by the derogatory term ‘self-lovers.’ Indeed, it does seem that the bad person does 
everything for his own sake, the more so the more wicked he is.”13 Aristotle expresses concerns 
about self-love but ultimately concludes that “we ought to be self-lovers,”14 a point his 
contemporaries and immediate successors accept without debate. Later we will go into detail on 
why Aristotle came to the conclusion he did. What is important here is that he felt compelled to 
address questions about the moral quality of self-interested motivation. These issues to which 
Aristotle spoke would continue to occupy people’s minds from the time of the ancients into the 
Modern Age. Before the word altruism existed, terms like of benevolence, charity, self-love, and 
self-interest were bandied around in lively debate. In tracing altruism’s development in Western 
thought, we therefore will have to look beyond the term introduced by Comte.  
 As for the sorts of context in which altruism turns up, one of the most common is in 
arguments for self-sacrificial action. When attempting to convince others to sacrifice for others, a 
                                                 
12 Thomas Dixon, “The Invention of Altruism: Auguste Comte’s Positive Polity and Respectable Unbelief in 
Victorian Britain,” in Science and Beliefs: From Natural Philosophy to  Natural Science, ed. D. Knight and M. Eddy 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 196. 
13 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1168a. 
14 Ibid., 1169b. 
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 disputant can opt for one of two strategies. First, she may argue that there is only the appearance 
of sacrifice: after truly understanding an action, one will realize that it ultimately benefits 
oneself. So, for example, military service makes exacting demands, even at times one’s life, yet 
the praise and psychic goods associated with honorable service outweigh its costs. Such an 
argument tries to minimize the obvious physical risks and appeal to more subtle elements of self-
interest. Second, she may ignore appeals to self-interest, and instead argue that an objective 
standard requires a certain action. She may believe moreover that the action in question will lose 
its value and moral worth if tainted by self-interest. In this case, one serves one’s country 
because living in a community creates obligations that must be honored; the soldier who serves 
in search of glory entirely misses the point. This second approach to justifying self-sacrificial 
behavior raises altruism up as a normative ideal. Undoubtedly, an appeal to altruism is a hard sell 
to make—especially to someone facing a sacrifice as great as risking one’s life.  
 For most of the history of Western thought, appeals to altruism have been rare. 
Normative conceptions of altruism were virtually nonexistent in ancient ethics because it 
operated in a eudaimonistic framework, in which personal happiness or human flourishing 
constituted the highest good. The eudaimonistic framework stayed largely intact with the arrival 
of Christianity, except that now heavenly happiness replaced earthly happiness as the highest 
moral goal. Both outlooks emphasized the goods rightful action provides, leaving little room for 
altruism in moral discourse. How, then, did altruism ever gain a foothold as a normative ideal?  
 Alasdair MacIntyre provides a guidepost on where to look for this change in his seminal 
work, After Virtue: “It was in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries that morality came 
generally to be understood as offering a solution to the problems posed by human egoism and 
that the context of morality came to be largely equated with altruism. For it was in that same 
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 period that men came to be thought of as in some dangerous measure egoistic by nature.”15 
Altruism developed into a legitimate moral option when the egoistic side of human nature was 
seen as too depraved to provide moral guidance. Of course, negative views of human nature had 
been around well before the 17th and 18th centuries. Saint Augustine, after all, produced the 
account of wretched, fallen man par excellence during the closing stages of the Roman Empire. 
The key difference, however, lies in changing views towards God. Augustine was sure that God 
would guarantee a harmonious relationship between his commands and human happiness. 
Enlightenment thinkers, on the other hand, had increasing doubts about God’s position as an 
omnipotent care-giver who assiduously looks over his creation. These doubts about God 
translated into doubts about the close link traditionally thought to exist between morality and 
happiness. A god detached from the world, much less a universe without a god, cannot ensure 
that moral action will always result in happiness. In this chaotic world, most famously depicted 
in Candide, the best one can hope for is to act rightly without like Voltaire’s miserable characters 
losing a butt-cheek or drowning in the process.16 With God relegated to the sidelines, those 
distrustful of self-love had no other choice but to put their full faith in moral standards 
demanding altruism. 
 Immanuel Kant’s ethical theory proved to be the most influential and enduring account of 
normative altruism. He argued that rationality created certain requirements for action, which, 
among other things, included altruistic action of treating others as ends in themselves. The 
central role of reason in his theory illustrates his belief in the need for and possibility of a secular 
moral theory. To be sure, Kant was no atheist. Nevertheless, his Kingdom of Ends was not a 
reformulation of the previous moral ideal, the Kingdom of God, but instead represented a new 
                                                 
15 Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1984), 227-28. 
16 Voltaire, Candide and Other Stories, trans. Roger Pearson (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), V, XII.  
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 moral ideal in itself. This new kingdom, emphasizing duty rather than heavenly rewards, marked 
the culmination of altruism’s development into a moral ideal. Altruism’s rise, however, raised as 
many questions as it did answers. By making reason the motivational foundation of altruistic 
action, Kant provided a shaky foundation for normative altruism. If reason by itself fails to 
motivate, altruism’s normative status collapses—after all, a moral ideal incapable of motivating 
is useless. The coherency of altruistic motivation continues to be the most pressing concern in 
debates about altruism’s normative status. Lacking a convincing account of altruistic motivation, 
altruism’s development into a normative ideal has always seemed somewhat incomplete.  
 
Roadmap of What’s to Come 
In the pages that follow, we will trace altruism’s development into a normative ideal, as well as 
reflect on the coherency of this outcome. Guiding our investigation is the conviction that past 
cultural debates are inextricable from current ones. The past shapes the way we think, defining 
the problems we confront in the present.17 By examining past debates about altruism, this study 
endeavors to diagnose the causes of current confusion surrounding the concept, before then 
proposing a solution for how to move beyond this confusion.   
 The argument takes place in three stages. Part I, “Towards a Problem: The Ancient 
Debate over Public Life,” shows why altruism clashed with ancient ethics by focusing on the 
question of whether or not the wise man should go into politics. This concern about public 
service was essentially a question about altruism. Politics offered little to the wise man seeking 
the goods of contemplation, yet by making the sacrifices demanded by politics he could greatly 
benefit the community. Almost invariably, ancient thinkers counseled against entering politics. 
Christian thinkers, specifically Saint Augustine, eventually offered a solution to the ancient 
                                                 
17 MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 349-69. 
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 debate over public life. Augustine argued that political service provides an opportunity to serve 
the Kingdom of God, thus offering a compelling reason for Christians to take on the burden of 
public service. It was a step in the direction of altruism, but by no means an all out embrace of it 
given the salient place of heavenly rewards in Christian thought.  
 Part II, “Self-Love’s Fall from Grace: How Normative Altruism Developed Out of the 
Augustinian Tradition,” looks at how self-love became controversial as a basis for morality after 
the rise of Christianity. Augustine’s despairing account of human nature particularly shaped the 
debate on self-love. Augustine saw the vast majority of self-love as corrupt; only a very specific 
self-love leading to love of God was good. Self-love’s stock fell further when religious wars and 
growing skepticism created doubts about God’s role in reconciling morality with happiness. 
Moral action and self-love became estranged from each other, forcing the philosophers of the 
day to look elsewhere for a new starting point for morality. The result was Kant’s moral theory, 
which, though problematical in places, remains the most influential argument for normative 
altruism. 
 Finally, Part III, “The Problems with Normative Altruism,” reflects on some of the 
problems plaguing normative conceptions of altruism. Neither Kant nor his successors have 
succeeded in providing a coherent account of altruistic motivation. By looking at the insoluble 
difficulties involved in motivating others to act altruistically, I suggest that we should reject the 
idea that altruism is normative. Regardless of its normative limitations, however, there is strong 
evidence that altruism is a very real phenomenon. I therefore reach the conclusion that, instead of 
thinking of altruism as a normative ideal, we should rather think of it as a descriptive 
phenomenon. 
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  One thing not found below is a defense of altruism’s value. This study operates on the 
assumption that there is widespread appreciation for altruism. When shifting through descriptive 
evidence for altruism in Part III, we will look at the basis for human beings’ strong attraction to 
altruism, but there is no justification for this basic attraction. Altruism’s appeal is ingrained into 
human nature, which in turn makes it to an extent unavoidable. Perhaps this aspect of altruism 
justifies its value. Perhaps it does not. Since not everyone shares the view that altruism is worthy 
of value, it is foolish to believe that everyone will accept this assumption. I am fairly confident, 
though, that most individuals will find the assumption acceptable, given how pervasive positive 
views towards altruism are in Western culture. 
 For those who do consider altruism to be a potential source of value, it is my hope that 
this study will prove of some practical value when confronting the question of altruism in one’s 
own life. Inevitably, occasions arise when our focus turns to our own motivations. At these 
moments altruism ceases to be the subject of abstract philosophical debate and becomes a very 
real problem we cannot avoid. Does morality demand that I be altruistic? Although it may be too 
ambitious a goal to fully resolve this question, in the end hopefully we will come away with a 
better sense of the direction of an answer. At the very least, the study forces us to reflect about 
the proper place for altruism in life, which in itself counts as a success.  
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Part I 
Towards a Problem: The Ancient Debate over Public Life 
                                                
“You must therefore each descend in turn and live with your fellows in the cave…” 
  — Plato, The Republic, 520c 
 
Benjamin Constant seemed to be on to something when he made his famous speech 
distinguishing ancient and modern conceptions of liberty.1 We moderns, Constant argues, tend to 
focus on individual liberty. We would rather be left to ourselves rather than be hassled with 
politics. It is hard to argue with his point, especially after more votes were cast during a finale of 
American idol than for any United States president—ever!2 We can only imagine ancient 
reactions to reality TV, but we can be sure that they would have found such political apathy 
appalling. As Constant explains, the ancients valued political liberty above all else. They were 
willing to make sacrifices in their personal lives so as to maximize their ability to participate in 
decision-making in their community—their source of identity and pride. Missing, though, from 
Constant’s speech was mention of one important ancient exception: an eccentric bunch of 
individuals known as philosophers. 
 While most ran off to the glorious activity of public service, philosophers kept their 
distance. Politics understandably piqued many people’s interests, given its promise of wealth, 
honor, and power. Philosophers, though, were content to contemplate, investigate, and problem-
solve far away from positions of power. They had little interest in politics because it took them 
away from their preferred activity of contemplation, and, moreover, because its constant 
intrigues threatened their virtue. This refusal to go into politics, though understandable, created a 
dilemma. Philosophers knew that, as wise men, they were best suited to solve the problems 
plaguing their communities. By refusing to make the sacrifices demanded by politics, they let the 
 
1 Benjamin Constant, “The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with that of the Moderns,” in Constant: Political 
Writings, ed. Biancamaria Fontana (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 307-28. 
2 Mark Sweeny, “American Idol Outvotes the President,” Guardian Unlimited, 26 May 2006, <http://www.guardian. 
co.uk/international/story/0,,1783339,00.html> (26 July 2006).  
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 rest of the community down. Fully aware of this regrettable consequence, the consensus among 
philosophers did not budge: the wise man stays out of politics.  
  Philosophers’ attitudes towards politics illustrates how self-sacrificing actions—which 
political action inevitably was for the wise man—presented an insurmountable obstacle to the 
ancient moral framework. The central concept driving ancient ethics was the concept of 
eudaimonia. The moral life was that life achieving eudaimonia or, in other words, a life 
characterized by happiness and human flourishing. Starting from this belief, it was very difficult, 
if not impossible, to formulate a moral argument incorporating altruism into it. For this reason, 
the wise man typically did not act altruistically and go into politics but instead did what was best 
for himself. A truly compelling argument for political service would not appear until after the 
arrival of Christianity. Specifically, Augustine overcame Christianity’s strong pacifist roots to 
argue that politics provides the wise man with an opportunity to serve the Kingdom of God. By 
shifting the emphasis from an earthly to a heavenly ideal, earthly sacrifices started to make moral 
sense, as they were part of a higher purpose. 
 
Eudaimonia and Ancient Ethics  
To understand why public life was so problematic in ancient ethics, we first have to look at the 
basic structure in which moral discourse took place. The sorts of arguments found in ancient 
moral philosophy were notably different from those of today because they all ultimately 
appealed to the same principle, eudaimonia, roughly meaning happiness but perhaps best 
translated as human flourishing. All arguments, then, operated on the same plane: if one was able 
to show that a certain way of life best conduced to eudaimonia, that argument carried the day. 
This general consensus on the goal of morality sets past thought apart from contemporary moral 
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 discourse, where now one can start from any of a number of paradigms—deontology, 
existentialism, intuitionism, utilitarianism, virtue ethics—and still make a respectable moral 
argument. By no means should ancient thought be characterized as uniform, for in fact we find 
among the ancients a great diversity of opinions with regards to the moral problem. But, when it 
came to defining the limits of moral discourse, the ancients were able to reach a rough 
consensus.   
 Aristotle sums up best eudaimonia’s flexible yet bounded nature. “Most people,” he 
writes, “agree about what [the highest good] is called, since both the masses and sophisticated 
people call it happiness, understanding being happy as equivalent to living well and acting 
well.”3 But, as in all things, the devil is in the details. Although they agree that happiness is the 
goal, there is fierce disagreement over what happiness actually consists of. Aristotle therefore 
must qualify his statement above with the following: “[People] disagree about substantive 
conceptions of happiness, the masses giving an account which differs from that of the 
philosophers.”4 Once one gets beyond the initial agreement on the aim of life, understood 
broadly as happiness, all semblances of moral consensus quickly disappears. Otherwise, without 
such disagreement, Aristotle and the other ancient philosophers would have had little incentive 
for taking up the question of morality in their writings.  
 Given the underlying agreement about the goal of morality, the same basic approach 
characterizes ancient moral arguments: Let me show you what true happiness is. There is no 
need to demonstrate that happiness is good, for everybody already agrees on that. Thus in the 
Symposium Diotima can respond to Socrates’ claim that good things make us happy by saying, 
“there’s no need for a further question about a person’s reason for wanting to be happy. Your 
                                                 
3 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. and ed. Roger Crisp (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 1095a. 
4 Ibid. 
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 answer seems conclusive.”5 For an argument to be convincing, it has to clearly demonstrate that 
the life in question is indeed happier than the alternatives. Only in this way can a philosopher, or 
anyone for that matter, clinch his or her argument. The question at the heart of any ancient 
enquiry into morals is always, How am I to live well? This focus differs greatly from modern 
enquiries, which instead gravitate around the abstract question, What is right?6  
 This distinction between ancient and modern conceptions of morality is essential for 
understanding why altruism was missing, for all extensive purposes, in ancient thought. In the 
question, What is right? personal happiness is irrelevant to morality. Some independent objective 
standard commands the individual to act in a certain way; moral action consists of obeying this 
command irrespective of its consequences on one’s personal well-being. Since one obeys the 
command solely because it is right, self-love does not come into the equation and thus makes 
altruistic motivation a real possibility. But the question in ancient ethics, How am I to live well? 
raises personal happiness up as central element of morality. Of course, in pursuing happiness one 
does not have to entirely ignore the needs of others. Many of the ancients in fact emphasized the 
importance of cultivating meaningful relationships with others, in which other-regarding actions 
were indispensable. But ultimately an individual engages in such relationships because of the 
benefits they bestow. Morality always remained for the ancients the highest form of self-love. As 
Aristotle tells us, “the good man should be a self-lover.”7
 This claim by Aristotle captures the consensus within ancient thought, making clear that 
the ancients did not equate morality with altruism. Despite Aristotle’s unequivocal affirmation of 
self-love, certain scholars still have tried to adduce evidence of altruism from ancient writings. 
                                                 
5 Plato, Symposium, trans. Robin Waterfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 205a. 
6 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics: A History of Moral Philosophy from the Homeric Age to the 
Twentieth Century (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), 84. 
7 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1168a. 
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 Charles H. Kahn, for example, suggests that the idea of altruism is found in the writings of 
Aristotle despite appearances to the contrary. Specifically, he focuses on Aristotle’s views of 
friendship.8 Kahn locates altruism in the claim in the Nicomachean Ethics that a friend does or 
wants good for the other’s sake.9 Kahn admits that this altruistic element of Aristotle’s theory of 
friendship operates alongside an egoistic element.10  Such a concession is necessary since 
Aristotle derives friendship from love of self,11 in addition to praising friendship as one of the 
highest goods possible in the world.12
 If Aristotle’s characterization of friendship is at least partially altruistic, as Kahn 
contends, friends will seek out each other’s interests even in instances when self-love gives no 
reason to. Otherwise, valuing a friend’s interests for his own sake proves to be subservient to 
self-love. To make this determination, we need to find an instance in which friends’ interests do 
not coincide with each other. Fortunately, just such a case appears in the Nicomachean Ethics 
VIII.7. Here Aristotle takes up the question of whether or not friends should wish one another the 
highest good—to be a god. Sure the friend who becomes a god will have it made, but the other 
friend will lose out. Since gods have better things to do than hanging out on the weekends with 
mere mortals, the human in the relationship will forever lose a friend, one of the greatest goods 
in life. What, then, should a friend do? Should he be altruistic, wishing his friend to be a god, or 
does he rather opt for the selfish option that keeps his friend mortal and close by?   
 Aristotle comes down on the side of the option guided by self-love. A friend wishes good 
to his companion, Aristotle tells us, but within certain limits, “since it is for himself most of all 
                                                 
8 Charles H. Kahn, “Aristotle and Altruism,” Mind 90 (1981): 20-40; see also Julia Annas, “Plato and Aristotle on 
Friendship and Altruism,” Mind 86 (1977): 532-554.   
9 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1166a. 
10 Kahn, 24. 
11 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1166a-b, 1168a-1169b. 
12 Ibid., 1155a. 
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 that each person wishes what is good.”13 Aristotle’s assertion, then, that we value the good of a 
friend for his own sake comes with the following qualification: we only engage in such behavior 
when it contributes more broadly to a friendship that benefits us. On Aristotle’s view, the costs 
and benefits of actions for a friend become lost in the love permeating a meaningful friendship; 
in fact, one has to forget about costs and benefits to enjoy the incredible goods offered internal to 
a friendship. Yet once it becomes clear that these goods are no longer forthcoming, such as when 
a friend stands to become god, one ceases to have a reason to value the goods of a friend for his 
own sake. Thus anything done for a friend remains subservient to self-love. By taking this view, 
Aristotle is not a heartless in his view of friendship, seeing it as only another way to reap 
personal benefits. Instead, with the concept of eudaimonia guiding his moral thinking, he is well 
aware of friendship’s advantages and honest in sharing them—perhaps more so than is true 
today. Aristotle remains faithful to the eudaimonistic framework by eschewing altruism in favor 
of self-love as the foundation of his theory of friendship.     
 Aristotle’s writings on friendship provide just one glimpse into how the idea of living 
well, achieving eudaimonia, dominated ancient thinking about morality. Eudaimonia’s pervasive 
influence also turns up in the Greek word for virtue, arete, which means excellence or the best 
that one can do. It needs to be pointed out that arete has a broader meaning than our modern 
conception of virtue. Arete refers to objects that are not strictly moral as well, since things 
outside of the sphere of morality (i.e. human behavior) also have excellences. The arete of a 
horse, for instance, is running fast.14 When applied to human beings, their specific aretai are 
those things that are essential for a happy, flourishing life—that is, essential for the most 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 1159a. 
14 Roger Crisp, “Introduction,” in Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, xiv; Philippia Foot, “Virtues and Vices,” in 
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1978), 2. 
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 excellent human life.15 Virtue and happiness, then, were inseparably linked together in ancient 
Greek thought.  
 The same conception of virtue continued to hold sway over the inheritors of the Greek 
philosophical tradition, the Romans. The Latin word for virtue, virtus, has essentially the same 
meaning as the Greek arete: virtus consists of whatever leads to true personal happiness.16 Thus 
throughout the pre-Christian period there was little debate on the general meaning of virtue. 
When speaking of virtue, without fail the Greek, Hellenistic, and Roman writers referred to those 
traits that directly benefit the person possessing them. 
 Despite virtue’s set meaning in ancient thought, it gave way to a wide variety of 
arguments. It would be a mistake to conclude that, since the ancients agreed that virtue led to 
happiness, they shared the same opinions on how to live virtuously. As we have already 
mentioned, there can be conflicting views on what happiness consists of, which in turn leads to 
disagreements about the nature of virtue. Disputants may arrive at diametrically opposed 
positions on the content of virtuous living, even though they start from the same premise—virtue 
is that which leads to happiness.  
 Such is the case in Plato’s Republic. Socrates’ opponent in the Republic, Thrasymachus, 
makes an impassioned argument for “[t]yranny … wholesale plunder, sacred or profane, private 
or public.” Tyranny more than anything, he claims, is a virtue, since it “brings the highest 
happiness to its practitioners.”17 From a eudaimonistic point of view, Thrasymachus makes a 
valid and, indeed, forceful argument. After all, how often does one see a tyrant in want, unable to 
meet his basic needs? Hardly ever if he is as ruthless and rapacious in oppressing the people as 
                                                 
15 A. W. H. Adkins, “The Connection between Aristotle’s Ethics and Politics,” Political Theory 12 (1984): 45-48; 
and Kathleen V. Wilkes, “The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics,” in Essays on Aristotle’s 
Ethics, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkely: University of California Press, 1980), 354-56.  
16 Robin Campbell, “Introduction,” in Seneca, Letters from a Stoic (New York: Penguin Books, 1969), 15. 
17 Plato, The Republic, 2nd ed., trans. Desmond Lee (New York: Penguin Books, 2003), 344a-b. 
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 Thrasymachus recommends. Socrates obviously disagrees, and spends the rest of The Republic 
trying to convince us that Thrasymachus gravely errs in his prescription for happiness. 
Thrasymachus’ tyrant is not happy at all, Socrates tells us, because he becomes a slave to his 
unbridled passions and desires. The truly happy man could not be more different: reason, the 
highest element within him, orders his soul and keeps his desires in check. In this way, he keeps 
his desires from impeding him in his ascent to eternal truth, the Good. Such an individual 
achieves the pinnacle of human existence, and on Socrates’ view is far happier—729 times 
happier, to be exact—than the tyrant.18 By taking much different views on the nature of 
happiness, Socrates and Thrasymachus consequently disagree on what constitutes a moral life.  
 A eudaimonistic approach certainly allowed for a diversity of moral arguments, but it 
also had its limits. A framework centered on personal happiness and well-being necessarily left 
little room for arguing that self-sacrifice in itself is valuable. The obstacles posed by self-
sacrifice were especially salient in ancient debates about public service. Arguments advocating 
for the sacrifices demanded by politics inevitably butted up against the walls of the 
eudaimonistic framework. Without any alternatives, the issue stymied ancient moral debate. 
 
Plato and Aristotle 
The first stop in our survey of ancient philosophy takes us to ancient Greece. Out of the milieux 
from which ancient political thought sprung, it is here that we find the setting most hospitable to 
political participation. The Greek polis was politics on a small level, where the average citizen 
felt a palpable connection with the political activities in his community. It was nothing out of the 
ordinary for him to play a role in decisions that directly impacted how the body-politic governed 
itself. Unlike the expansive empires of the Hellenistic and Roman worlds, in which the 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 571a-592b. 
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 individual felt lost, in the polis the lives of its citizens existed in close proximity to and even 
overlapped with the day-to-day operations of government. Politics was not some distant 
operation but a real part of their lives. 
 The polis is the reference point for all of Plato’s and Aristotle’s discussions, reflections, 
and conclusions on politics. For them, the polis and its cozy surroundings are politics. Given this 
environment, a favorable treatment of political service is understandable, even expected. After 
all, such a political environment is more inviting than most: there is no unbridgeable gulf 
between the citizen and government, as it is part of his immediate community. Plato and 
Aristotle, then, seem to have good reason to praise the virtues of political service. Yet, as any 
reading of the Republic and Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics makes clear, they are reluctant to 
recommend a life in the public sphere. In fact, the conclusion they both reach—politics takes one 
away from the highest good, contemplation—undercuts any appeal that public service may have. 
If it is indeed the case that politics forces one to give up one’s pursuit of the highest good, what 
reason does the wise man have to enter politics? It is this problem more than any other that 
baffles Plato and Aristotle. Both recognize that politics is necessary for the good of the state, yet 
it proves virtually impossible to convince others to sacrifice their well-being in service of the 
state. Bound by the eudaimonistic framework, Plato and Aristotle fail to find a compelling reason 
for political service. 
 In his Republic, Plato approaches the decision of whether or not to enter politics from the 
viewpoint of the virtuous philosopher. The views of the philosopher, the wise man, are the only 
ones that interest Plato. He is well aware that, for many people, politics holds tremendous appeal. 
Those with a materialistic conception of the universe, for example, who want nothing but wealth, 
honors, and pleasure, find in politics a means to acquiring all that they desire. Plato uses the 
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 character of Thrasymachus to illustrate this perspective. Thrasymachus is effusive in his praise 
for political action: by manipulating the machinery of the state, one obtains practically limitless 
material goods. One’s goal thus should be to seize power, no matter what one has to do. Such an 
argument does not impress Plato, who insists we look beyond it for true answers on how best to 
live. On Plato’s view, Thrasymachus’ system of values causes him to miss the mark. Obsessed 
with material possessions, he gives no consideration to the goods of pure reality, which are tasted 
only after intense study and thought. These goods transcend those of the material world; 
experiencing them constitutes the peak of human happiness. The philosopher enjoying such 
happiness exemplifies the highest existence. It is only from his perspective—the true 
perspective—that one arrives at an accurate assessment of the harms and benefits of political 
action.  
 Tension clearly exists between the life of the philosopher and the life of politics, so much 
so that on Plato’s account the two are irreconcilable in almost all circumstance. Political 
participation fails to advance the philosopher’s goals, and in fact it often puts them in grave 
danger. Specifically, the corruption (arguably) inherent in politics threatens the philosopher’s 
virtuous, happy existence. Politicians seek gains in wealth and territory, and are willing to do 
anything it takes—lie, steal, kill—to achieve these aims. Plato’s philosopher seeks instead the 
Good, embodied in such concepts as reason and justice. He never harms anyone, for this would 
be contrary to justice’s aim of benefiting others.19 His beliefs, goals, and entire philosophy share 
nothing in common with the realm of politics. Although he is capable of bringing an end to all 
the troubles of the state—indeed of humanity itself!20—he stays away from politics. And who 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 335d. 
20 Ibid., 473d. 
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 can blame him? Who would listen to him when his ideas are so radically different from those 
dominant in politics?  
 Plato compares the plight of the philosopher to a navigator surrounded by a crew 
obsessed with power. While the crew plots and fights amongst each other, finally lavishing 
praise on the brute who wrests power away from the captain, the navigator sits idle. With his 
knowledge of the stars and winds, he alone knows how to guide the ship. He does not dare speak 
up, however, since the sailors are “bound to regard the true navigator as a word-spinner and a 
star-gazer, of no use to them at all.”21 A philosopher, with his radical ideas about justice, would 
look like a fool among people who disregard it entirely.   
The problems facing philosophers do not stop here. Beyond suffering humiliation in 
politics, they would risk destruction to both body and soul. “[I]f they’re not prepared to join 
others in their wickedness,” Plato laments, “and yet are unable to fight the general savagery 
single-handed, they are likely to perish like a man thrown among wild beasts, without profit to 
themselves or others, before they can do any good to their friends or society.”22 Whether they 
fight for virtue or yield to the wickedness of the state, political action would take away 
everything dear to them. Due to its deleterious effects, such action is contrary to virtue. The only 
recourse for philosophers is to “live quietly and keep to themselves, like a man who stands under 
the shelter of a wall during a driving storm of dust and hail.”23 Virtue lies in a quiet life guided 
by reason, outside of politics and free from its vices. 
Plato rules out political participation in a corrupt state. More generally, the philosopher 
avoids politics altogether, since all states are corrupt according to Plato. The only circumstance 
in which a philosopher will participate in politics is if an ideal state like that outlined in the 
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 Republic happens to comes along—which Plato himself concedes is unlikely.24 But even the 
limited claim that philosophers rule in the ideal state is controversial. Before ruling philosophers 
come to know the ultimate bliss: they free themselves from their chains, climb out of the false 
reality of the cave, and discover the true nature of things in the world above. Totally immersing 
oneself in this new reality constitutes the peak of eudaimonia, for nothing else can compare. 
Forcing philosophers to then return to the cave in all its wretchedness strikes one of the 
Republic’s interlocutors, Glaucon, as an illegitimate demand. “[T]hat will not be fair,” he 
protests. “We shall be compelling them to live a poorer life than they might live.”25  Plato, 
speaking through Socrates, counters by insisting that the philosophers return because they owe it 
to their community, whose education system made possible for them the pleasures of philosophy. 
Regardless of which side of the argument is correct, one thing is clear: philosophers do not want 
to return to the cave, otherwise there would be no reason to compel them back into the world of 
darkness and shadows.26  
 Understandably, Plato’s claim that the philosopher is obliged to return to the cave sparks 
fierce debate among interpreters of the Republic. If justice is in one’s interest as Plato says, why 
should there be any hesitation on the philosopher’s part about doing the just thing and returning 
to the cave to rule one’s fellows? Plato seems to be suggesting one of two things: (1) that the 
philosopher lacks a good reason to rule because doing so is not in his self-interest; or (2) that 
justice is not always in one’s self-interest. Either way, Plato’s argument is in serious trouble. If 
(1) is the case, Plato’s ideal state theoretically crumbles as it is left without a ruler. This has the 
further consequence of showing that the well-being of a group is at times incompatible with the 
well-being of the whole; after all, the other classes in the state will be worse off when the 
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 philosopher abandons them to seek his own good of a contemplative existence. Justice thus 
becomes relative, a claim Plato wants to refute, not affirm. If (2) is rather the conclusion we 
draw, then Plato fails to answer Thrasymachus’ challenge. The Republic proves to be a 
disappointment because it is unable to give a good reason to be just, its primary goal. 
 Several attempts have been made to save Plato from having to make either of these 
concessions so devastating to his argument that justice accords with self-interest. We will look at 
three such attempts, the first of which is by C.D.C. Reeves. Reeves makes the argument that the 
philosopher returns to the cave because, despite appearances to the contrary, it is in his self-
interest. Although contemplation is the philosopher’s ultimate good, he cannot achieve it without 
the prior good of a stable polis. Such a state of affairs only comes about, Reeves writes, when 
philosophers rule: “For if they do not rule, the Third Polis will be torn part by civil war. And 
without that polis, even philosophers cannot be reliably happy throughout life.”27 To support his 
claim, he quotes the following passage from the Republic: “It is hard to realize that there can be 
no happiness, public or private, in any other polis [i.e. a polis ruled by the philosopher].”28 
Reeves therefore reaches the conclusion that philosophers “rule for themselves as well as for 
others.”29  
 Reeves’s rather simplistic solution confronts several problems. First of all, if we accept 
Plato’s claim at 473e without qualification, as Reeves does, Plato is committed to saying that 
there is no happiness in the world. After all, the ideal state possessing happiness does not exist, 
and according to Plato probably never will. But what about those who do philosophy in less ideal 
states? Are they not happy in their contemplative activities? Plato suggests that philosophers can 
                                                 
27 C.D.C. Reeves, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1988), 202. 
28 Plato, The Republic, 473e. 
29 Reeves, 202. 
- 29 - 
 still be happy in corrupt states, writing that “they see the rest of the world full of wrongdoing, 
and are content to keep themselves unspotted from wickedness and wrong in this life, and finally 
leave it with cheerful composure and good hope.”30 Read in the context of this passage, 
Socrates’ claim that happiness is found only in the ideal state appears to be a bit of hyperbole in 
the midst of debate. 
 So if we accept that the philosopher can be happy in less than ideal states—which seems 
reasonable enough and has textual support—Reeves’s interpretation falls apart. Knowing that he 
can achieve happiness without going into politics, the philosopher seeking his self-interest surely 
will stay out of politics. He would best realize his goal of contemplation by staying as far away 
from political intrigue as possible, not by expending the enormous energy required to mold the 
political system according to his goals. For self-interest to explain the philosopher’s return to the 
cave, we must define it in a manner different than Reeves.  
 Richard Kraut puts forward a definition of the philosopher’s self-interest different than 
Reeves’s, which leads to an alternative solution. Instead of limiting self-interest to the activity of 
contemplation, he defines self-interest as acting justly. Such an approach seems to accord with 
the Republic’s general project of showing that justice accords with self-interest. Kraut admits 
that this particular act of justice, returning to the cave, looks as if it conflicts with the 
philosopher’s interests when Plato talks of having to compel the philosopher to carry it out. But 
in this case compulsion does not mean that ruling goes against the philosopher’s interests. As 
Kraut writes,  
the claim that an act is a necessity is entirely compatible with its being in one’s 
best interests. Surely what explains that talk of necessity and constraint in this 
passage is the point that it is not up to the philosophers to do whatever they think 
best in this situation. They are not free to act in any way whatsoever because, in 
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 light of the great benefits they have received, they owe it to the city to make an 
equivalent return.31  
 
Having shown that one can be compelled to do something in one’s interest, Kraut goes on to 
show that ruling actually is in the philosopher’s interest. By promoting harmony and order in the 
city, the philosopher helps to transform the city into an imitation of the realm of the forms, the 
epitome of justice. Such action accords with the interests of philosophers because, 
“understanding the entire argument of the Republic for the thesis that justice coincides with self-
interest, they will come to see that in fact they will not be sacrificing their good by holding 
political office.”32  
 But wait a second. Is not Plato’s argument, as interpreted by Kraut, circular? He says the 
philosopher rules because he knows that justice is in his self-interest, and since ruling is just, it is 
in his interest to rule. Yet the first assumption—justice is in his self-interest—is what Plato is 
trying to prove. Thrasymachus will not grant this assumption. What Plato has to do is show how 
specific acts of justice benefit the person carrying them out; only in this way can he establish that 
justice equals self-interest. Kraut’s mistake is to take this point for granted at this stage in the 
dialogue. In fact, Plato’s silence on the beneficial effects of ruling for the philosopher signals a 
failure to answer Thrasymachus’ challenge. Plato goes on and on about the beneficial effects 
ruling has on the state, but Thrasymachus could care less. He wants to know something else. In 
the words of Adeimantus: “Prove to us … not only that justice is superior to injustice, but that, 
irrespective of whether gods or men know it or not, one is good and the other evil because of its 
inherent effects on its possessor.”33 Plato accepts this challenge. Yet in the passage on returning 
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 to the cave, Plato seems to be trying to elude this very challenge. Kraut’s interpretation does little 
to show otherwise. 
 Another problem with Kraut’s reading is that, if imitating the forms through ruling is in 
one’s interests, one should desire to rule regardless of whether one owes it to the community.34 
Kraut, however, wants to say that the philosopher only descends when the community has 
provided him with some good. He seems to be shifting between two definitions of justice. In one 
instance, justice is imitating the order and harmony of the forms; in another, it is upholding our 
obligations to others. Of course, the two definitions overlap to a great extent: keeping our 
obligations produces a harmonious society similar to the realm of the forms. But if we are to 
define justice strictly as imitation of the forms—which Kraut does in the majority of his article—
that commits the philosopher to ruling even in states that have not helped him. Although he does 
not have an obligation to the people in such states, he still will try to bring about the realm of the 
forms in their communities. Such an act is just and, if Kraut is to be consistent, in the 
philosopher’s interest.  
 A solution more creative and thoughtful than Reeves’s or Kraut’s comes from Alan 
Silverman. It specifically has the advantage of fully addressing—more so than the previous two 
interpretations—the philosopher’s sense of regret when having to rule. If ruling is 
unquestionably in the philosopher’s interest as Reeves and Kraut contend, why does he need to 
be compelled, why does he hesitate? According to Silverman, the philosopher hesitates, not 
because “he leaves behind contemplation, but [because] he cannot expect to achieve the truly 
fine goal of everyone being a philosopher.”35 The ignorance inherent in human beings 
necessarily prevents the philosopher from making everyone else into philosophers. He returns to 
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 the cave to remove the blinders from his fellows’ eyes, yet Plato knows that some will resist. His 
job always will remain incomplete, and thus he hesitates to begin a job at which he knows he 
will fail. In the end he accepts the task because “his knowledge of the Good bid[s] him to 
descend.”36  
 The problem with Silverman’s reading is that it is too inconsistent with the text. First of 
all, Silverman plays down the role that giving up contemplation plays in the philosopher’s sense 
of regret. “[A] philosopher,” he writes, “is not doomed to stare at a single Form because it is the 
best, and does not have to contemplate in order to be living or doing philosophy. So his regret 
[from having to rule] cannot I think be that he gives up philosophy.”37 Whether philosophy 
encompasses ruling is debatable. What is clear, however, is that Plato considers contemplation 
the pinnacle of pleasure. After contemplating the forms, philosophers “are unwilling to involve 
themselves in human affairs, and … their minds long to remain in the realm above.”38 
Obviously, the philosopher cannot but feel regret when forced to give up such transcendent 
pleasure. Second, Silverman’s interpretation commits him to saying that the philosopher will rule 
in a variety of circumstances rejected in the Republic. For Silverman, the demands of the Good 
lead the philosopher to rule even in imperfect cities.39 Plato, however, is very clear that a 
philosopher only has a reason to rule in a city that has brought him up as a philosopher.40  
 Therefore neither Reeves, Kraut, nor Silverman solves the paradox of why the 
philosopher must be forced back into the cave. This inability to adequately explain the passage is 
to be expected, for only after accepting the lack of a solution does the paradox begin to make 
sense, even if it does not go away. Justice and self-love do not ultimately coincide for the 
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 philosopher returning to the cave because the two concepts remain separate in Plato’s mind. To 
ensure that both converge on all points, he would have to equate justice with self-love as 
Thrasymachus does. Most of the time Plato is able to convincingly show the benefits of justice 
(traditionally understood), yet there are occasions where he is forced to try to fit a round peg in a 
square hole. That is exactly what happens when the question of ruling comes up. Plato realizes 
that the activity of ruling never accords with the philosopher’s interests, and thus the reason for 
the tension in the passage. More so than any other place in the Republic, he shows that 
something beyond self-love—justice—must inform the philosopher’s actions, as well as our 
own. He does not draw unnecessary attention to this point because he is operating in a 
eudaimonistic framework. According to its rules, a moral position is convincing if it shows that 
the action in question benefits its possessor. By diverging from this characterization of morality, 
Plato gestures towards the idea of altruism. To be sure, it is not much more than a gesture: he is 
talking about ruling in an ideal state that does not exist. In the real world, the philosopher has no 
obligation to help others through political engagement. Nevertheless, this baby step by Plato is 
still important when looking at the development of altruism in Western thought.  
The obstacles besetting Plato’s discussion of political service also prove insurmountable 
for his pupil Aristotle, despite fundamental differences in their philosophies. On the surface, 
Aristotle’s thought is much better suited for making an argument for public service. Plato’s 
philosophical system leaves little room for politics from the outset, since pursuit of the Good 
overshadows all other concerns. Aristotle rejects Plato’s characterization of the Good, and 
instead prefers to see the world in terms of a plurality of goods.41 Precisely, there are three 
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 groups of goods: “those called external goods, goods of the soul, and goods of the body.”42 
Similar to Plato, Aristotle believes the goods of the soul to be superior, but he breaks with his 
mentor in his insistence that such goods by themselves are insufficient for happiness. One 
achieves the goods of the soul only through virtuous activity, which in turn requires certain 
external goods. Happiness, then, “obviously needs the presence of external goods as well [as 
virtuous activity], since it is impossible, or at least no easy matter, to perform noble actions 
without resources. For in many actions, we employ … friends, wealth, and political power.”43 By 
defining happiness in a broader manner than Plato, Aristotle allows a greater role for activities 
outside of contemplation—such as politics—in his view of the good life.   
 Aristotle makes clear that politics offers goods that are not merely beneficial but essential 
to human happiness. As Aristotle famously writes in the Politics, “man is by nature a political 
animal.”44 A political community exists “for the sake of a good life,”45 and it is only in such an 
environment that human beings flourish. Aristotle expresses this same idea in the Ethics, writing, 
“one’s good will presumably not exist without … a political system.”46 Politics provides a 
foundation for human life; without such a foundation, all of the higher goods in life prove 
unattainable. 
 Of course, Aristotle’s claim that politics is vital for human well-being is not necessarily 
the same as claiming that one should enter politics. Aristotle certainly affirms politics’ 
importance, yet it is unclear to what extent it should be a part of the individual’s life. Some 
commentators contend that Aristotle does in fact consider public life to be valuable and one of 
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 several existences suitable for the wise man.47 Most of the evidence for this point of view comes 
from the Ethics. First of all, Aristotle spends nine out of the work’s ten books detailing how to 
act virtuously in our interactions with others, which shows the importance he places on achieving 
excellence in interpersonal relations. Public service falls under this general focus since it 
represents one level on which we interact with others. Moreover, in certain places Aristotle goes 
as far as to explicitly praise the sacrifices involved in political life. “[T]he good person,” he 
writes, “does a great deal for his friends and his country, and will die for them if he must; he will 
sacrifice money, honours, and in general the goods for which people compete, procuring for 
himself what is noble.”48 This passage suggests that living nobly and happily, at least in part, 
consists of service to one’s country. Does Aristotle, then, represent an exception in ancient 
philosophy, somehow finding a way to show that political life is worthy of the wise man? 
 Despite the occasional evidence supporting this conclusion, it does not hold up in the 
context of Book X of the Ethics. It is here that Aristotle outlines the highest existence humanly 
possible, a life of contemplation. For many readers, Aristotle’s recommendation that we should 
strive to be like gods, passing our lives in meditation, comes as a shock given the down-to-earth 
quality of Books I-IX. The conclusions reached in Book X seem aloof and disconnected from the 
rest of the ideas expressed in the Ethics. Due to the incongruity of Book X, those who prefer the 
Aristotle of Books I-IX are often reticent to accept its conclusions. 
 Although Book X does seem out of place, certain clues in the earlier books do hint at 
what is to come. Enquiring into what life is truly happy, Aristotle admits that certain people 
believe it to be a life in politics: “Sophisticated people, men of action, see happiness as honour, 
since honour is pretty much the end of the political life.” But their conclusion strikes Aristotle as 
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 unsatisfactory: “Honour … seems too shallow to be an object of our inquiry, since honour 
appears to depend more on those who honour than on the person honoured, whereas we surmise 
the good to be something of one’s own that cannot easily be taken away.”49 Politics offers its 
practitioners goods, mostly honors of various sorts, yet they fall short of the highest goods. These 
goods are too easily lost and depend too much on others for them to serve as the goal of human 
existence. Aristotle feels compelled to look beyond the inferior goods of politics to something 
more certain, more meaningful—hence the conclusions of Book X. 
 The central message of Book X is that “the life in accordance with intellect is best … 
pleasantest [and] happiest.”50 Aristotle reasons that since the goods of intellect are more certain 
and more ultimate—that is, they do not lead to any higher goods—they constitute the end of 
human existence. In contrast, he finds that a life of virtuous activity towards others is only 
“happy in a secondary way.”51 Among virtuous activities, Aristotle singles out “those in politics 
and war,” writing that “they involve exertion, aim at some end, and are not worthy of choice for 
their own sake.”52 Lives characterized by these sorts of actions remain somewhat incomplete 
because they lack certain goods essential for human flourishing. To achieve “complete 
happiness,” one instead looks to a life of contemplation, whose pleasures are incomparably better 
than those of other activities.53
 As the end of human existence, intellect raises one almost to the level of a god. Indeed, 
according to Aristotle, intellect is the most divine element found in human beings.54 By 
cultivating the intellect, a human being becomes like a god, whose existence consists entirely of 
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 contemplation. It would be foolish to believe that the gods do anything else, such as just, 
courageous, generous, or temperate acts. Since they are entirely independent, the gods have no 
reason to engage in virtuous activity with others. They reject such activity in favor of 
contemplation, achieving an existence that surpasses all others in happiness. Although no human 
being can ever attain this level of happiness, those who imitate the gods in their life come closest 
to it.55 For this reason, Aristotle issues the following challenge: “We ought to … take on 
immortality as much as possible, and do all that we can to live in accordance with the highest 
element within us; for even if its bulk is small, in its power and value it far exceeds 
everything.”56 That means, of course, preferring contemplation over justice, courage, generosity, 
temperateness—in sum, those qualities essential to social and political life.  
 Aristotle also uses the Politics to further his belief that contemplation is superior to 
virtuous activity towards others. Specifically, his preference for monarchy57—the form of 
government demanding the least involvement in public life—flows naturally from his affinity for 
a contemplative existence. Hans Kelsen convincingly argues this point in his article, “The 
Philosophy of Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy.”58 Monarchical government 
requires little if no involvement of its citizens in government activities, thus allowing unfettered 
pursuit of intellectual endeavors. Such an environment suits quite well a philosopher like 
Aristotle, and it easy to understand why he is attracted to it. Convinced of contemplation’s 
unrivaled superiority, he longs for a political system that least interferes with it. So though 
human beings need politics, Aristotle essentially argues that they are best off when it makes the 
least demands on them. 
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  Having shown that Aristotle finds political action, and virtuous action in general, to be 
inferior to contemplation, the question remains whether such a conclusion is reconcilable with 
Books I-IX of the Ethics. This question has long been a source of debate among classicists and 
philosophers. A particularly persuasive account of the inconsistencies in the Ethics comes from 
J.L. Ackrill. Although Ackrill is unable to reconcile Books I-IX with Book X, he best explains 
why they cannot be reconciled. Ackrill recognizes that, for Aristotle, both virtuous and 
contemplative activities are good for their own sake. It therefore would be a mistake to believe 
that virtuous action is good only to the extent that it promotes contemplation. Another suggestion 
is that Aristotle understands contemplation and virtuous activity as commensurable with each 
other: an individual trades a little of the former for much of the latter and vice-versa. But as 
Ackrill points out, this solution also fails: “[H]ow can there be a trading relation between the 
divine and the merely human?”59 By claiming that contemplation is incomparably superior to 
virtuous activity, Aristotle cannot reconcile the two without slipping into extremism. After all, “a 
man who really believed in the supreme importance of some absolute could not continue to live 
in much the same way as the others.”60 Nowhere in Aristotle’s writings—or in philosophy in 
general, for that matter—does one find a way to overcome this obstacle. 
 The tension in Aristotle’s thought, then, never really goes away. One thing remains clear, 
however: Aristotle’s students in no way would take away from his lectures the message that they 
should throw themselves full-heartedly into political life and sacrifice their well-being for that of 
the state. It is true that there would be no doubt in their minds that politics provides certain 
goods. But rather than understanding them as goods to be sought out, they would see politics and 
everything it offers as necessities that human existence forces upon them. No one would go out 
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 of their way to obtain such inferior goods, yet that is what political life requires. Such a decision 
does not make sense because it would take them away from their true goal in life, philosophic 
contemplation. Political life may indeed offer an existence that is good to a secondary degree, 
but that begs the question: Why would anyone choose it over the best life? Suffice it to say, 
Aristotle’s teachings are ill-suited for spurring political action among its adherents. 
 Like Plato, Aristotle ultimately rejects public life as a viable option for the wise man. The 
sacrifices required by public life prove unpalatable to both because they preclude the possibility 
of a happy, flourishing life. The politician misses out on the joys of contemplation—he is too 
busy frantically trying to meet the community’s endless needs. And, making politics even less 
attractive, politics is rife with temptation, corruption, and criminality, all of which work together 
to destroy the virtue of even the strongest of characters. Faced with the dangers and sacrifices 
inherent in politics, the wise man invariably responds, “No thanks.” Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
agreement on this point, in spite of their fundamental philosophical differences, suggests that 
self-sacrificing actions are problematic not only for certain ancient philosophers but for ancient 
philosophy in general. This shortcoming in ancient philosophy will become further evident as we 
turn to the dominant philosophical beliefs of the Hellenistic and Roman periods. 
 
Epicurus and the Stoics 
As a changing political and social environment gave way to new approaches in philosophy, the 
problem of public life still lingered. Hellenistic and Roman philosophers, most notably the 
Epicureans and the Stoics, followed Plato and Aristotle in taking up the issue of public life in 
their writings. And like their predecessors, they, too, failed to make a persuasive argument for 
the wise man to enter politics. Such inertia should not come as a surprise, given that the 
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 inheritors of the Greek tradition kept the eudaimonistic framework intact, adding few 
innovations of their own. Eudaimonia remained the goal—a goal incompatible with self-
sacrificing actions such as political service. The continued lack of viable solutions illustrates 
ancient philosophy’s inability to overcome the obstacles posed by political service.  
 The most outright and unapologetic rejection of public life in ancient thought came from 
Epicurus and his followers. Their rejection of politics flowed naturally from the basic principles 
of Epicureanism. The heart of Epicurus’ teaching is quite simple: minimize pain and maximize 
pleasure. Epicurus places the emphasis on the former of these tenets, because the discomfort of 
pain tends to outweigh the joys of pleasure. In fact, pursuing lofty pleasures often has the effect 
of plunging one into pain and distress. Pleasures requiring arduous work end up having a 
negative net effect on an individual’s well-being, and are to be avoided just as pains are. A 
simple life, then, without grand ambitions provides the individual with the largest possible share 
of eudaimonia. Here one finds “freedom of the soul from disturbance,” which for Epicurus 
constitutes “the goal of the blessed life.”61 Content with the pleasures well within their grasp, 
Epicurus and his followers delight in a tranquil existence.  
Critics of Epicureanism have tended to peremptorily dismiss it “as a lazy-minded, 
shallow, pleasure-loving, immoral, or godless travesty of real philosophy.”62 In particular, they 
disparage its complete lack of concern for finding and cultivating a higher element in human 
beings—rather that be in the social, political, or spiritual realm. Whereas philosophers have the 
reputation of pushing human thought and action to new extremes, Epicurus counsels his disciples 
to content themselves with what is quotidian and easy. Whether Epicureanism’s modest goals 
merit criticism or not, it is important to recognize the tremendous appeal Epicureanism had in the 
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 ancient world. The sect had a large number of adherents, with the vast majority of people 
remaining loyal after joining.63 Epicureanism promised a concrete and attainable good—
avoiding pain—and thus offered a practical approach to those seeking eudaimonia. As long as it 
resulted in the ultimate good of eudaimonia, which many followers of Epicurus could vouch for, 
it accomplished everything that one could ask of a philosophical system. The moral teachings of 
Epicurus represented a formidable position that no ancient opponent could take lightly. 
Those anxious to reap the benefits of Epicurus’ wisdom would learn quickly that, to 
realize a happy, flourishing existence, they must keep their distance from political life. Because 
of the dangers and worries rampant in politics, Epicurus counsels his disciples to eschew public 
life. According to one of his disciples, Epicurus says explicitly that the wise man will not 
“participate in civic life.”64 Elsewhere he goes as far as to equate politics to a prison.65 On 
Epicurus’ view, it is an apt analogy: the enormous responsibilities of politics weigh down on the 
public servant and prevent him from partaking in the pleasures found in a simple life. Epicurus’ 
stricture against political service appears to be absolute, although the following quotation raises 
the possibility of occasional exceptions: “[T]he wise man … will serve a monarch, when the 
occasion is appropriate.”66 In reality, however, this passage presents no serious challenge to his 
general denouncement of public life. After all, how often does an “appropriate” occasion—that 
is, one free from anxiety and exacting demands—present itself in politics? Such occasions are 
rare, and even when they do occur they involve too little effort to be able to effect change in the 
community. Epicureanism sides against the type of self-sacrificing action that governments need 
most urgently.   
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  Epicureanism’s unambiguous rejection of public life strikes some as an attack on the 
social and political order. Plutarch, for instance, decries the effects of Epicurus’ teachings, 
saying that he urges his adherents “to avoid public life and express disgust for those who 
participate in it, abusing the earliest and wisest lawgivers and urging contempt for the laws, 
providing there is no fear of beatings and punishment.”67 Plutarch certainly exaggerates to make 
a point. It is doubtful that the disciples of Epicurus were as awful citizens as Plutarch makes 
them out to be. Nevertheless, Plutarch is correct in his characterization of Epicureanism as 
opposed to public service, as well as in his belief that such advice has potentially deleterious 
results for the community. If the wise man refuses to govern, the community is left with inferior 
rulers who screw things up either as a result of incompetence or more nefarious characteristics 
such as greed. It is essentially the same paradox that troubles Plato: the best ruler, the wise man, 
has no desire to rule.68 Plutarch has reason to worry, for a lack of wise rulers renders government 
vulnerable to the corrupt and criminal elements of society.  
Stoicism, Epicureanism’s philosophic rival, ostensibly placed greater value on public 
service. The reason for this difference derives from the Stoics’ emphasis on virtue, not pleasure, 
as the key element in the best life.69 Whereas Epicurus rejects public service because it does not 
promote pleasure, the Stoics contend that service to the state constitutes an important part of 
virtuous activity. If this is the case, the wise man finally would have an incentive for going into 
politics. Yet, as even the Stoics reluctantly recognize, arguments attempting to reconcile public 
life with the quest for virtue fail to be persuasive; they inevitably turn out to be nothing more 
than smoke and mirrors. In the end, the Stoic philosopher shrinks from politics just as any good 
Epicurean would.   
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 Cicero, the Roman senator and Stoic philosopher, takes on the difficult task of showing 
that public service accords with a virtuous and excellent life. Drawing on his Stoic beliefs and 
Roman views on citizenship, Cicero formulates in On Duties one of the best known arguments 
for public life in antiquity. Stoicism’s emphasis on the beneficial social effects of political action 
leads him to conclude that those who engage in politics “lead lives more profitable to 
mankind.”70 Cicero’s claim that public life is “more suited to grandeur and fame”71 stems from 
his tremendous love, characteristic of a Roman, for glory and the patria. From these two beliefs, 
Cicero raises the state up as “the dearest thing” to the individual,72 joining together self-interest 
with the interests of the state. If the interests of the individual—i.e. virtue—coincide with the 
state’s interests, it follows that serving the state is compatible with virtue. He drives home this 
point by continually repeating, “[W]hatever is honorable is beneficial,”73 seemingly surprised 
that anyone could ever imagine a conflict between virtue and public service. “It turns out 
conveniently,” Cicero writes, “that a situation could not arise where it would benefit the republic 
for … a man to perform a [dishonorable] deed.”74 The state’s well-being is the individual’s 
primary concern, since a thriving state brings about personal happiness. Clearly, then, one serves 
one’s country and always acts in its interests. 
At the heart of Cicero’s argument is a gross simplification, from which it cannot recover.  
Cicero portrays love of country as individuals’ top priority, but this claim simply is untrue. Even 
for patriotic Romans, certain interests trump those of the state—namely, their desire for glory. 
The Romans loved their country and were eager to serve it precisely because it provided a means 
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 to glory.75 From this one cannot conclude, as does Cicero, that all actions benefiting the state are 
glorious. An example given by Cicero illustrates this point. He argues that a disgraceful act, such 
as dancing in the forum to raise money for the republic, is not disgraceful since it benefits the 
state.76 One can imagine the response of a proud Roman: “Demeaning oneself to dance in 
public—that’s virtue?” Cicero’s argument is embarrassingly weak, and it is easy to see why. 
Regardless of the benefits one’s actions have for the state, if one ends up humiliated—the 
unavoidable result of lowering oneself to dance in public—the ancient paradigm cannot call such 
action virtuous. Virtue is the object of praise, not belittlement and insults. 
Cicero’s argument encounters further difficulties when we consider the wise man’s 
response to it. From the wise man’s point of view, Cicero makes a problematical claim when 
speaking of the state as if it embodies the highest good. The state, a mere shadow of reality, pales 
in comparison to the higher goods of the soul. For a Stoic, these goods are found in the virtues of 
prudence, courage, temperance, and justice.77 At times one is able to cultivate these virtues in the 
service of the state, but only a fool would believe that political activity always yields these 
virtues. Indeed, we have seen that the general opinion among the ancients is that, more often than 
not, politics threatens rather than promotes one’s virtue. Because Cicero’s argument places 
material goods over those of the soul, the wise man will find it just as unsatisfactory as 
Thrasymachus’ argument. Cicero, like those who came before him, fails to give the wise man a 
compelling reason for political service.78  
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  Seneca’s piece “On the Private Life” exposes in a convincing manner the shortcomings in 
Cicero’s argument. As with all the Stoics, Seneca values public service per se. Nevertheless, 
Seneca is at pains to stress Zeno’s qualification for public action: one “will go into public life, 
unless something interferes.”79 In a manner reminiscent of Plato, Seneca draws attention to the 
moral perils rampant in politics. All governments, even those most admired, pose dangers to the 
wise man. Athens provides ample evidence for this point: in what was jewel of Greece, they 
killed Socrates, a harmless old man, out of envy. Problems also abound in the great city of 
Carthage, where cruelty and justice are ubiquitous. No matter where the wise man is, politics 
puts him in a treacherous position. Seneca thus reaches the fatalistic conclusion that the wise 
man will shun public service in all circumstances:  
Were I to go through each commonwealth, I would not find one that could endure 
the wise man or be endured by him. But if no commonwealth is to be found of 
the kind that we imagine, retirement becomes a necessity for all wise men, 
because the one thing which could be preferred to retirement nowhere exists. If 
someone says that sailing is best and then says that you should not sail on a sea 
where shipwrecks regularly occur and there are often sudden storms to sweep the 
helmsman off course, he would be telling me, I think, not to weigh anchor.80  
 
The rough seas of politics are no place for the wise man. 
 Epicureanism and Stoicism represented new perspectives within the eudaimonistic 
framework. Once again, however, the ancient framework yielded the same result: public life 
proved incompatible with the wise man’s existence. It is safe to say that we have found a pattern. 
Epicureanism’s and Stoicism’s inability to formulate a convincing argument for political action 
was yet another manifestation of eudaimonia’s incompatibility with self-sacrifice. As was true 
with their predecessors, this limit inherent in ancient moral thought constrained Epicurus and the 
Stoics in their philosophies. 
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 A Solution from an Unlikely Source 
If the wise man sat around and twiddled his thumbs while listening to the Greeks and Romans 
argue about politics, the message of a Jewish pacifist telling him to hate the world would appear 
unlikely to rouse him to action. This radical pacifist, of course, was Jesus, whose message would 
spread like few others in history. In its original form, Jesus’ “good news” had little to do with 
politics. As a member of a marginalized group, Jesus lacked much of a reason to concern himself 
with political power; the Romans made sure they took care of that. It thus comes as a surprise 
that Jesus’ message laid the groundwork from which later thinkers would formulate an argument 
for engaging in political action. The new ideal Jesus introduced—the Kingdom of God—would 
play a major role in finally convincing the wise man to jump into politics and endure its costs. It 
is a result few could have predicted. 
 The development towards a solution about political service began in the backwaters of 
Judea with Jesus proclaiming the coming Kingdom of God. This new concept, original to the 
sayings of Jesus, serves as the centerpiece of what most scholars agree to be, at its heart, an 
apocalyptic message.81 From what the Gospels tell us, Jesus warned that the current order was in 
its final death throes, after which would come the Kingdom of God. This kingdom to which 
Jesus pointed would exist not in heaven as many Christians believe today, but rather would 
revolutionize all aspects of this world—the oppressed would be set free, the crippled would 
walk, the blind would see, and the poor and weak would rule. There was no time to waste, for the 
Kingdom would be here at any moment.82 In one sweep it would wipe away the oppressive 
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 structures pervading society. To ensure that one was with the Kingdom and not against it at the 
decisive moment in history, Jesus urged constant preparation.  
 Since the Kingdom of God would turn everything on its head, preparation for it 
necessarily involved living in a way directly contrary to the ideals dominant in the world at the 
time. Honor, glory, wealth, military achievement—all of these supported a social system that the 
Kingdom of God sought to replace. One risked losing the Kingdom by pursuing these goods 
esteemed by society. Love of God and service to others, at times to the point of absolute 
annihilation, provided the only path to the Kingdom. For the true follower of Jesus, then, all else 
paled in comparison to those activities paving the way for the Kingdom. One’s status vis-à-vis 
the rest of society should not matter because, simply put, it meant nothing. There were more 
important things to worry about, as Jesus tells his followers: “[d]o not worry about your life, 
what you will eat or what you will drink, or about your body, what you will wear…. For it is the 
Gentiles who strive for all these things; and indeed your heavenly Father knows that you need all 
these things. But strive first for the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things 
will be given to you as well.”83 In the book of Mark, Jesus makes the same point about giving up 
the concerns of the world but in starker terms: “[W]hoever wants to save his life will destroy it, 
and whoever will destroy his life for my sake and the sake of the good news will save it.”84 
Happiness in this world, the focus of the pagan philosophers, had to be left behind in favor of 
promoting the Kingdom. Because of its transcendent value, the Kingdom of God demanded 
one’s total commitment, regardless of what the world offered. 
 Jesus’ radical rejection of the world had direct implications for engagement in public life. 
Substantial portions of the Jesus movement saw his message, and understandably so, as leaving 
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 little room for exercising earthly power and authority. The concerns of the world would bring 
believers down and take them away from God. One early group in particular, the Gnostics,85 
embodied this position. They interpreted Jesus’ message as an offer of gnosis or secret 
knowledge, which would open the door to the divine. The material world provided nothing of the 
sort, and thus Gnostics sought to escape from it. They found themselves at odds with early 
church institutions closely tied to the local community and its earthly concerns. When the 
Church should have been leading people to gnosis, community problems were causing it to lose 
focus. Instead of throwing oneself wholly into the problems of the world, Gnostics recommended 
imitating the solitary seeker of truth, oblivious to the world and its endless distractions.86     
 Although typically more open to public engagement than the Gnostics, those strands in 
Christianity that eventually became known as orthodox also tried to limit their worldly 
entanglements. Participating in local church institutions was one thing, collaborating with the 
powers that be another. One gave to Caesar what was Caesar’s, but only so as to avoid having to 
deal with him and his cronies any more. Those that went further and directly participated in 
earthly institutions compromised the Kingdom of God’s ideals. Political power relied on 
deception, greed, coercion, and violence—all behavior antithetical to the kingdom Jesus 
proclaimed. This kingdom celebrated groups ill-suited for political power, such as the meek, the 
peacemakers, and the persecuted.87 Throw in Jesus’ command to love one’s enemies and turn the 
other cheek,88 and it is easy to see why many Christians shied away from politics. On their view, 
the Kingdom’s ideals were incompatible with the exercise of worldly power.    
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  One of the early Church fathers, Tertullian, gave voice to Christian apprehensions about 
political engagement. In his writings, Tertullian targets, among other things, the morally dubious 
nature of military service. In formulating his argument against it, he does not have to construct 
radical reinterpretations of scripture; Christ’s teachings give him all the ammunition he needs. 
“Shall a Christian,” he asks, “be free to walk around in a sword, when the Lord has said that 
whoever takes the sword shall perish by the sword? … Shall he administer chains and 
imprisonment and torture and punishment, though he will not even take vengeance for wrongs 
done himself? … Shall he carry a banner in rivalry to Christ’s?”89 For all three questions, 
Tertullian answers with a resounding no. The question of military service is clear cut: if one 
takes the “decisive step of assuming military duties … [t]he line is crossed in transferring one’s 
name from the camp of light to the camp of darkness.”90 Military service is a grave sin,91 a 
pitfall in one’s devotion to Christ. The broader implications of Tertullian’s condemnation of 
military service are hard to miss. If bearing arms for the state is a sin, there is no justifiable 
reason to become involved in the machinery of the state, the massive organization behind 
military service and the violence it entails. For the Christian, then, the state and all that it 
embodies are diametrically opposed to one’s walk with God.92 Tertullian captured the 
widespread view in Christian circles that the state was a tool of Satan and that devout Christians 
must steer clear of it in the interest of their soul.93
                                                 
89 Tertullian, The Military Chaplet, in From Iranaeus to Grotius: A Sourcebook in Christian Political Thought, 100-
1625, eds., Oliver O’Donovan and Joan Lockwood O’Donovan (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing 
Co., 1999), 27. 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid., 28. 
92 Tertullian: Apology, De Spectaculis, trans. Gerald H. Rendall, Loeb Classical Library (New York: G.P. Putnam’s 
Sons, 1931), XXXVIII, 3, quoted in Herbert Deane, The Political and Social Ideas of St. Augustine (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1963), 10.   
93 Deane, 7. 
- 50 - 
  The uneasiness over political service expressed by Tertullian would remain an 
inescapable element of the Christian tradition. During the Renaissance, long after Christians 
began to occupy positions of power, the tension between Christianity and politics continued to be 
a matter of concern. One of the classic explorations of this problem in Christian thought is 
Thomas More’s Utopia. In writing the book, More seems to have drawn his inspiration from 
Seneca’s denouncement of politics in “On the Private Life.”94 The true Christian, like Seneca’s 
wise man, avoids public service because of its perils. The lone exception for the virtuous 
Christian is the land of Utopia—literally “Nowhere”—that More describes in the book. Here the 
people live happily and justice rules. The virtuous participate in politics without fear, while only 
the wicked worry about their safety. The irony, of course, lies in the title Utopia: such a land 
does not exist.95
 Book I of Utopia offers an explanation of the dangers of politics, reminiscent of those of 
Plato and Seneca, only now in Christian form. The world traveler and philosopher, Hythloday, 
decries the governments of Europe, which stand in sharp contrast to Utopia’s. War and conquest 
dominate the discussions of the courts of Europe, as kings scheme with their councilors over how 
to extend their dominion. The theme of conquest reappears when they turn to domestic matters. 
Finding methods to extract wealth from the people is far more important than looking out for 
their welfare. If, in such an environment, Hythloday tried to convince the king that the people’s 
interests are more important than wealth or new lands, he would meet a fate similar to that of 
Plato’s philosopher: “I’d be promptly thrown out, or merely treated as a figure of fun.”96 Given 
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 the corrupt nature of government, Hythloday regrettably concludes that “there’s no room at 
Court for philosophy.”97  
 The fictional Thomas More contends that Hythloday could introduce justice into the 
Court; he just would have to be tactful. But Hythloday refuses to give in. Being “tactful,” as 
More suggests, would go against Christian teachings and violate his conscience: “If we’re never 
to say anything that might be thought unconventional, for fear of its sounding ridiculous, we’ll 
have to hush up, even in a Christian country, practically everything that Christ taught. But that 
was the last thing he wanted.”98 Moreover, regardless of how diplomatic one is, one still cannot 
hide one’s opinions at Court. Ultimately, “[y]ou have to give open support to deplorable policies, 
and subscribe to utterly monstrous resolutions.”99 So the lone believer in justice inevitably ends 
up corrupt. There are no two ways about it, concludes Hythloday: “By associating with them 
you’ll either lose your own integrity, or else have it used to conceal their folly and 
wickedness.”100 Only in Utopia—in other words, nowhere—can a Christian take part in 
politics.101
Echoing More’s doubts about Christianity’s compatibility with politics was his 
contemporary Niccolò Machiavelli. Machiavelli shares many of Moore’s same concerns, but he 
approaches them in a radically different manner in his Discourses on Livy. In place of More’s 
despairing tone, Machiavelli unleashes a scathing attack against Christianity for what he sees as 
its deleterious effects on the state. He places the onus on Christianity for Europe’s inability to 
achieve the glory and greatness of his model state, republican Rome. Whenever Christians rule, 
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 the primary tenets of their faith—“humility, abjectness, and contempt of things human”102—
render them ineffectual in government. Christians stand in sharp contrast to the Romans, who, 
inured to brutality by their bloody and ferocious animal sacrifices, readily slaughtered for the 
nation. The nature of the Roman religion, in combination with the cultural importance of military 
glory, created an environment conducive to political action. Christianity’s emphasis on living 
peacefully and humbly has the opposite effect, creating men “capable more of suffering than of 
doing something strong.”103 The result, writes Machiavelli, is disastrous for politics: “This mode 
of life … seems to have rendered the world weak and given it in prey to criminal men, who can 
manage it securely, seeing that the collectivity of men, so as to go to paradise, think more of 
enduring their beatings than of avenging them.”104 Christians cannot effectively defend the state, 
let alone take the vigorous action necessary to lead it to greatness. 
 Machiavelli does make a feeble attempt to rehabilitate Christianity by saying that a 
misinterpretation of scripture lies at the root of its incompatibility with politics. Yet, as a simple 
reading of the Gospels makes clear, Machiavelli faces an impossible challenge in making this 
argument. Machiavelli wants to shift the focus to the Old Testament, which he believes to be 
capable of reconciling one’s love of God with one’s love of country, as the Roman religion was 
able to do. There is some truth to this claim. The Hebrews were far more comfortable with 
killing for the nation than was any hero of the New Testament. Since they believed that God had 
entrusted their land to them, they were willing to defend it at all costs. But the obvious problem 
for Machiavelli is that he simply cannot disregard the New Testament. Jesus’ teachings on 
mercy, humility, love, and peace are arguably the most basic elements of Christianity. To ask 
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 Christians to jettison these beliefs is to ask them to reject Christianity altogether. Unable to part 
with these beliefs, Christianity was at an impasse. 
 Given the concerns of thinkers as diverse as Tertullian and Machiavelli, the Kingdom of 
God seemed to be an ideal ill-suited for encouraging political action. The pacifist elements 
scattered throughout Jesus’ message made political action a morally dubious choice. The new 
moral ideal offered by Jesus, however, did have one thing working for it with regards to politics. 
For pagan philosophers, the primary obstacle standing in the way of political service was that it 
took away from one’s happiness on earth. Jesus the apocalyptic preacher, on the other hand, 
urged his followers to care nothing for this world, even to go as far as destroying their life. 
Politics’ negative consequences on earthly happiness were thus no longer a problem for the 
Christian.  
 The problem for Christians rather was its effects on their well-being in relation to the 
Kingdom of God. The corruption and violence inherent in politics presented a grave threat to the 
Christian’s soul. Unsurprisingly, early Christianity for the most part took it for granted that one 
stays out of politics. Since few Christians had access to politics, it was an easy decision to make. 
Constantine’s conversion in the 4th century CE, however, changed the problem entirely, forcing 
Christians to reevaluate their position on public service. Instead of using them as torches for his 
banquets,105 Caesar now was holding power out to them. Some Christians saw in this offer the 
opportunity to further the program of social change outlined by Jesus—“to bring good news to 
the poor … to proclaim release to the captives and recovery of sight to the blind, to let the 
oppressed go free, to proclaim the year of the Lord’s favor.”106 Showing that political service 
could indeed advance the Kingdom turned out to be arguably the most important achievement in 
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 Christian political thought. We turn next to the writings of the figure primarily responsible for 
this achievement, namely, the African Bishop Saint Augustine. 
  
Augustine’s Reconciliation of the Two Cities 
To best understand Augustine’s views on politics, one first has to understand the man and the 
context in which he lived. As the bishop of Hippo, Augustine was a leader in his community. He 
dealt both with the spiritual and earthly problems of his flock, and in fact the two were intricately 
intertwined with each other. His duty was to care for those in his community, whether that 
involved an earthly matter such as poverty, a heavenly matter such as baptism, or a less clear-cut 
matter such as war or death. In sum, he operated comfortably within both the heavenly and 
earthly cities. 
 Simply fleeing from the world therefore was not an option for Augustine. His position as 
bishop forced him to throw himself fully into the problems of the world, a point that comes out 
again and again in his letters. For example, in one letter he urged his fellow church leaders to act 
immediately to put a stop to a grisly slave trade wrecking havoc in their communities. Slave 
traders were descending on the African coast, where they would abduct members of the local 
population to sell overseas. Augustine insisted that the Church do everything in its power to help 
these unfortunate victims because, if it did not help, no one would.107 In another instance, 
Augustine went beyond the institutions of the Church to petition a military commander by the 
name of Boniface for help. At the time, Africa was under the very real threat of a Vandal 
invasion. The dire security situation led Augustine to take the unlikely step of persuading 
Boniface, who was considering joining a monastery, to remain in his military post. The death of 
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 his wife, a pious Catholic, had stirred in Boniface a desire to dedicate his life wholly to God. It 
was a noble desire, but Augustine, ever the realist, convinced him that at the moment God most 
needed him to defend the churches of Northern Africa.108 Augustine earlier had assured him that 
his military exploits could serve the Lord, going so far as to make the claim—one that must have 
made Tertullian turn in his grave—that “one who serves as a soldier, using arms for warfare, can 
be acceptable to God.”109 Far from shying away from the affairs of the world, Augustine was up 
to his elbows in them. 
 The pressing concerns endemic to Augustine’s responsibilities as bishop provided him 
with an acute insight into the relationship between heavenly and earthly matters. Augustine was 
thus ideally positioned to examine the role earthly actions, such as political service, play in the 
broader scheme of serving God. He tackles this project in his masterpiece, the City of God—“a 
book,” in the words of the eminent Augustine biographer Peter Brown, “about being other-
worldly in the world.”110 The goal of the book is to investigate what sort of relationship a 
Christian should have vis-à-vis the world. Driving much of Augustine’s thinking on this subject 
is Jesus’ concept of the Kingdom of God. For Augustine, Jesus’ ideal kingdom becomes the city 
of God or the heavenly city. But despite the changes in terminology, the basic features of the 
Kingdom of God remain. Augustine’s heavenly city is not a wholly other-worldly phenomenon, 
but exists in part on earth through the true Church. This firm link between the two cities allows 
the heavenly city to serve as a guide to earthly actions. From this foundation Augustine shows 
that, because of their consequences for the heavenly city, Christians have a reason to take on the 
problems and sacrifices arising in the earthly city—even in the controversial sphere of the state.  
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  Augustine locates the link between the two cities squarely in Jesus’ summary of the law: 
love your God and love your neighbor.111 More than anyone before him, Augustine puts special 
emphasis on these two commandments.112 These commandments have the effect of linking the 
two cities together in a way that the sharp divisions between them begin to become blurred. The 
first command, love your God, primarily concerns the heavenly city; and the second, love your 
neighbor, primarily concerns the earthly city. Yet at the same time the focus of the two 
commands merge into one since serving others on earth glorifies God in heaven. As the 
foundation for the Kingdom of God, Jesus’ summary of the law brings out an important aspect of 
this kingdom: earthly matters have heavenly consequences. With this relation in mind, Augustine 
sees no reason to deprecate the affairs of the world as necessarily opposed or irrelevant to the 
heavenly city.  
 In addition to establishing the connection between the two cities, Augustine further lays 
the foundation for his argument by discussing the purpose of the heavenly and earthly cities. For 
Augustine, both cities seek out peace above all else.113 Although Jesus did not put it in exactly 
these terms, his description of the Kingdom of God implies as much. His entire program sought 
to end people’s suffering—in other words, to bring peace.114 The peace we seek, on Augustine’s 
view, comes in a heavenly form and an earthly form. Heavenly peace is without doubt superior, 
as only it is capable of bringing about true contentment. But earthly peace still has an important 
role, since it facilitates Christian’s quest for heavenly peace. The distant goal of heavenly peace 
naturally becomes less prominent in one’s mind when constantly eluding death or searching for 
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 basic necessities. The benefits of earthly peace do not end there, however. Beyond creating an 
environment conducive for seeking heavenly peace, the advancement of earthly peace has 
internal goods of its own, such as providing a small taste of the ultimate goal. Those committed 
to Christ’s teachings continually draw closer to heavenly peace in their efforts to bring peace on 
earth to the oppressed. In Augustine’s words, that part of the heavenly city on earthly pilgrimage 
“lives a life of righteousness … having the attainment of [heavenly peace] in view in every good 
action it performs in relation to God, and in relation to a neighbor.”115 With every act of service 
one furthers the cause of peace and, more generally, the Kingdom of God whose end is peace. 
 Because of earthly peace’s importance for the Kingdom of God, political action provides 
a legitimate opportunity to serve it. Governments have at their disposal the tools most essential 
for achieving peace. Preventing foreign invasion is the most obvious way for a government to 
provide peace, but other ways include protecting the poor and resolving disputes in a just 
manner. For peace ends not only with foreign invasion; rather it ends whenever the vicissitudes 
of life plunge individuals into misery and prevent them from meeting their most basic needs. 
Recognizing government’s power to resolve these problems in a positive manner, Augustine 
concludes that government can be a force for good, which in turn leads to the conclusion that 
Christianity and politics are indeed compatible with each other. 
 Augustine sees room for Christians to work in public life, but only under the condition 
that their motives are pure. Unlike the Thrasymachuses of the world, true Christians do not seek 
out public office for the honor and power it provides. These earthly goods are only means to 
achieving the higher goal of promoting “the well-being of the common people.” Christians have 
good reason to advance this goal, on Augustine’s view, since it “is according to God’s 
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 intention.”116 Christians, then, can serve God in politics as long as they pursue his aim of caring 
for the welfare of others. The conscientious Christian now has a reason to enter politics—no 
small feat on Augustine’s part.   
 Still, certain obstacles stand in the way of a full justification of public service. The most 
obvious challenge to Augustine’s argument is Christ’s command to react to turn the other cheek 
in the face of violence. Political service may help others in one’s community, as Augustine 
argues, but that does not make the Sermon on the Mount go away. Any Christian contemplating 
political service will have to confront the question: Can I honestly remain faithful to Christ’s 
message while bearing the sword—a necessary element of politics?  
 Although Augustine does not take up this question in the City of God, it does come up in 
other places in his writings. In Augustine’s correspondence, his friend Marcellinus, a high 
ranking Roman official, forces him to address the uneasy relation between Christianity and 
violence. Marcellinus is concerned that Christ’s command to turn the other cheek prevents 
Christians from being able to take the sorts of actions necessary to be a good citizen. Because of 
their emphasis on justice, the ethics of citizenship condemn those who “allow an enemy to steal 
something from him,” as well as those “unwilling to inflict evil, in the form of just war, as 
recompense for the ravaging of a Roman province.”117 It is this sort of passivity in the face of 
evil that seems to flow naturally from Christian beliefs. As both a military man and a Christian, 
Marcellinus has reason for concern.    
 In his response to Marcellinus, Augustine says that the command to turn the other cheek 
is to be interpreted figuratively. Correction would be impossible if one literally interpreted 
Christ’s teachings as a ban on inflicting harm in all cases. Augustine finds such an interpretation 
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 problematical because helping others often involves an element of correction. The more 
figurative interpretation he opts for eliminates this difficulty by equating “turning the other 
cheek” with having benevolence in one’s heart. According to this interpretation, even actions in 
which “we return evil for evil” are pleasing to God as long as benevolence guides us.118 More 
than simply demonstrating the compatibility between Christianity and citizenship, Augustine’s 
figurative interpretation of Jesus’ command opens the door for a justification of war: “If the 
earthly commonwealth observes Christian precepts in this way, then even wars will be waged in 
a spirit of benevolence; their aim will be to serve the defeated more easily by securing a peaceful 
society that is pious and just. For if defeat deprives the beaten side of the freedom to act 
wickedly, it benefits them.”119 Marcellinus’ worries turn out to be unfounded. Christians are well 
suited for the responsibilities of citizenship, as they even participate in war when circumstances 
demand it.  
 Augustine explores in greater detail the tension, both believed and imagined, between 
Christianity and violence in the dialogue On Free Choice of the Will. Here a fictional Augustine 
and his interlocutor Evodius discuss what makes returning violence for violence problematical. 
Despite the pain violence causes, it only deprives one of temporal goods. Such goods are 
perishable and thus vastly inferior to those that are eternal (later determined to be a good will and 
the cardinal virtues of which it consists).120 By defending oneself against the loss of perishable 
goods, one shows an “inordinate desire” for such goods. Of course, the temporal law will never 
condemn someone for acting in self-defense, but that is beside the point. The fictional Augustine 
and Evodius want to know what the eternal law commands. Since this higher law commands 
                                                 
118 Augustine, “Letter 138,” in Augustine: Political Writings, ed. E.M. Atkins and R.J. Dodaro, 38. 
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 devotion to eternal goods, both find self-defense at odds with it. Evodius asks, “How can 
[individuals acting in self-defense] be free of sin in the eyes of that law, when they are defiled 
with human blood for the sake of things that ought to be held in contempt?”121 The fictional 
Augustine generally agrees, adding the qualification that self-defense may be permissible in 
cases in which the reason for protecting perishable goods is their ability to advance eternal 
goods.122 But, even with this qualification, the conclusion of the dialogue is that those acting in 
self-defense typically are too attached to temporal goods and thus fall short of the standards of 
eternal law.   
 This conclusion gives the initial impression that any justification for politics rests on 
shaky ground. If simply defending oneself is rarely justifiable, the government’s job of 
defending a large group of people must be out of the question. Augustine finds this conclusion to 
be mistaken, however. Inordinate desire for temporal goods—the indefensible motive behind 
self-defense—does not motivate the public official. Instead, the public official punishes 
wrongdoing out of obedience to the law. “A soldier who kills the enemy,” points out Evodius, “is 
acting as an agent of the law, so he can easily perform his duty without inordinate desire…. The 
same can be said of all officials who by lawful order are subject to some higher power.”123 In 
what appears to be concern for others’ temporal goods, the public official’s focus is in reality on 
advancing the eternal good of justice. Self-defense and public service are therefore entirely 
different matters. Those acting in self-defense lose sight of the proper goal of human action, 
eternal goods. Those defending the state from injustice, on the other hand, advance these higher 
goods, and thus their actions accord with the basic thrust of Christianity. 
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  Augustine answers the challenges raised by the Sermon on the Mount, yet another 
formidable obstacle remains: the worry that politics corrupts and destroys. When answering 
concerns about the use of force, Augustine shows where his opponents’ are misguided in their 
thinking. Such an approach will not work against concerns about politics’ corruptive influence. 
Temptations and dangers are rampant in politics. Christians venturing into this suspect world do 
put their virtue at risk. Many therefore opt for avoiding these dangers altogether by limiting their 
service to others to the private sphere. Why take the risk?  
 Augustine openly admits that public life poses hazards to one’s well-being. He is under 
no illusions that such a life is easy, especially given his familiarity with Roman history and its 
long record of political corruption. Politics not only threatens the body and soul of public 
officials, but it also forces upon them problems that prove too great for the limited capacities of 
faulty human intelligence. Officials are blind to the true intentions behind actions, and thus are 
always imperfect in their judgment. Mistakes are unavoidable and often result in harm to the 
innocent. Augustine gives the example of a judge compelled to torture the innocent in his search 
for truth. Although current views on torture widely differ from those of Augustine, his basic 
point remains true: man’s ignorance leaves him in an impossible situation. “[T]he wise judge,” 
he writes, “does not [condemn and torture the innocent] through a will to do harm, but because 
ignorance is unavoidable—and yet the exigencies of human society make judgment also 
unavoidable. Here we have what I call the wretchedness of man’s situation.”124 The inescapable 
ignorance of the human condition, along with the inherent dangers of politics, renders public life 
unattractive. 
 Nevertheless, the pitfalls of public life in no way take away from its ability to advance 
the Kingdom of God—a point that Augustine steadfastly defends. In many cases the needs of 
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 others compel the Christian to overcome personal misgivings about politics and enter public life. 
Augustine paints just such a scenario: “In view of this darkness that attends the life of human 
society, will [a] wise man take his seat on the judge’s bench, or will he not have the heart to do 
so? Obviously, he will sit; for the claims of human society constrain him and draw him to this 
duty; and it is unthinkable to him that he should shirk it.”125 Serving the community and, in 
effect, the Kingdom of God demands personal sacrifices. Public service provides no personal 
benefits but instead is a source of constant torment. Faced with the obligation of exercising 
public authority without the divine wisdom it requires, the Christian official “cries out to God, 
‘Deliver me from my necessities!’”126 But, as did Christ, he humbly bears the cup placed before 
him. Augustine’s wise man sacrifices for the sake of the public good, neglecting personal desires 
in pursuit of something higher—the Kingdom of God.   
 
Conclusion 
Between the glory days of ancient Athens and the ignominious fall of the Roman Empire, the 
wise man’s attitudes towards politics underwent a transformation. Plato’s and Aristotle’s 
archetypical wise man shunned public serve. He knew better than to risk his body and soul in an 
activity that offered him absolutely nothing of value. Yet conceptions began to change with the 
arrival of Christianity. The change was by no means immediate, but with time politics became a 
real option for the wise man. Instead of offering nothing, politics offered that which surpassed all 
else in value—an opportunity to advance the Kingdom of God.  
 That Christianity preceded changing views towards politics is no mere coincidence. 
Christianity introduced the Kingdom of God as a new moral ideal. This other-worldly goal 
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 dethroned earthly happiness as the ultimate goal of moral action, providing more of a reason to 
make sacrifices on this earth. Augustine’s wise man decided to enter politics and endure its 
hardships because a higher goal demanded it. To be sure, altruism was still a ways off. Self-love 
remained the driving force behind the wise man’s actions, only now it was grounded in heavenly 
instead of earthly goods. Nevertheless, this change in focus was important, for it revolutionized 
how people thought about morality, most notably with regards to the value of sacrifice. Though 
not altruism, it was a step in that direction. 
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Part II 
Self-Love’s Fall from Grace:  
How Normative Altruism Developed out of the Augustinian Tradition  
                                                
“To punish man for original sin, God has let him turn his self-love into a god to torment him in 
every act of his life.” 
  — La Rochefoucauld, Maxims, 509  
 
Christianity never was content with one’s outward actions. On the Christian view, the most 
essential part of serving the Lord is the condition of one’s heart. Hence Jesus’ commandment to 
avoid not only the obvious sins of murder and adultery but also sins of the heart, such as hate and 
lust.1 Out of these teachings grew the Christian tradition’s obsession with evaluating 
motivations. Even outwardly beneficial actions had to be put under the microscope, for a sinister 
motive could disguise itself in any number of ways. The standard criterion for judging an 
action’s worth was whether earthly or heavenly goods constituted its ultimate end. Only the 
pursuit of heavenly goods was compatible with true Christianity. The pursuit of earthly goods 
was dangerous for Christians because it elevated base objects above the proper end of all actions, 
the Kingdom of God. Such motives were unquestionably bad, and Christian thinkers saw little 
reason to debate this point.  
 A more difficult issue to resolve concerning motivations was figuring out self-love’s role, 
if any, for the believer. Some forms of self-love were clearly out of the question, such as the 
desire to increase one’s earthly well-being through wealth, honor, sensual pleasure, or similar 
sordid pursuits. Still, a more subtle form of self-love confronted the conscientious Christian: the 
desire to increase one’s heavenly well-being. Although clearly superior to the self-love of non-
believers, this form of self-love bothered many Christian thinkers. By seeking heavenly well-
being, one’s own interests take precedence over love of God, which becomes a mere means to 
attaining future happiness. The French Catholic Archbishop François de Salignac de la Mothe-
 
1 Matt. 5:21-30 NRSV. 
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 Fénelon expresses this concern in his Maxims of the Saints. Fénelon recognizes that God’s offer 
of transcendent happiness motivates many Christians. “This is well,” he writes, “but there is 
something better. Such Christians are inferior to those who forget the nothingness of the creature 
in the infinitude of the Creator, and love God for His own glory alone.”2 Fénelon certainly 
makes a point, but his attempt to establish a pure love of God, disconnected from all forms of 
self-interest, exists in tension with fundamental Christian beliefs. References to heaven litter the 
scriptures, which rarely come with reservations about it serving as a source of motivation. It was, 
after all, Jesus himself who said “store up for yourself treasures in heaven.”3
 Heavenly rewards were simply too central to Christianity for it ever to achieve a coherent 
account of altruism. The best it could do was to disparage the diverse and sundry forms of 
earthly self-love, while at the same time carving out a respectable niche for heavenly self-love. 
This approach to self-love especially comes out in the writings of Augustine, who through his 
influence on the Protestant Reformation was able to shape theological and moral beliefs like few 
others in history. Augustine portrayed human nature as fallen and corrupt, God’s grace being its 
only hope for righteous action and happiness. By characterizing human nature in such negative 
terms, Augustine set the stage for the rise of normative altruism more than a millennium after his 
death. When religious wars and growing secularism weakened Europeans’ beliefs in God’s 
providence, Enlightenment thinkers felt pressured to justify morality in terms other than as the 
path to eternal communion with God. They dropped Augustine’s incentive for moral action, yet 
many continued to hold onto his despairing view of human nature. So though they saw 
themselves as moving away from Augustine, this giant in Western thought still controlled the 
direction of the debate. Their very Augustinian belief that human desires were unsuitable as a 
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 basis for morality led to one of two conclusions: either (1) that we should forget about traditional 
morality’s emphasis on pure motives because the corruptness of human nature makes them 
unattainable;4 or (2) that we should look for a new objective standard, independent of human 
nature, to ground traditional moral beliefs in the importance of pure motives. It was this latter 
approach, embodied in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant, which became the basis for normative 
arguments for altruism. 
 
Entangled in Self-love: Augustine’s Normative Argument 
Any passing familiarity with Augustine’s writings dispels any illusions that there is an altruistic 
bent to his thought. His works are brimming with references about how the greatest happiness 
lies in serving God. Even his justification for political service, outlined in Part I, does not rely on 
altruism. Certainly the Christian politician has to make sacrifices in the present, but they will pay 
off in the end in the form of heavenly rewards. The benefits of an action are never far from 
Augustine’s mind because, like his Greek and Roman predecessors, he is a eudaimonist. He 
carries on the ancient moral tradition of arguing that morality consists of those actions leading to 
happiness. He does add a new twist, however: happiness now has an otherworldly quality to it. 
Happiness on earth, the focus of the pagan philosophers, no longer frames moral discourse. In 
fact, those self-lovers who seek earthly happiness per se are depraved. The goal now is heavenly 
happiness, which consequently changes arguments about morality. To justify the moral value of 
obeying the Lord, Augustine points to the incredible heavenly happiness that it promises. The 
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 following quote from The Trinity succinctly captures his normative argument: “[I]f you cling to 
[God] in love, you will straightaway enter into bliss.”5
 Augustine finds it necessary to relocate the goal of moral action because, on his view, the 
approach of pagan philosophers is bound to fail. He begins from the premise that happiness 
requires wishing well and being able to fulfill one’s wishes.6 Due to past philosophers’ focus on 
earthly happiness, they encounter intractable difficulties in producing an account of moral life 
capable of meeting one’s desires to be happy. It is absurd, Augustine argues, for them to promise 
happiness when mortality necessarily prevents human beings from realizing their fundamental 
desire of continuing in a happy life.7 Perhaps pagan philosophers’ accounts of morality could 
provide temporary happiness, but nothing more. True happiness is found only in eternal life, 
since anything less results in unfulfilled desires. This move allows Augustine to introduce faith 
in Christ as essential for attaining happiness. Christianity’s offer of eternal communion with God 
means that one’s happiness never comes to an end, and thus it has the sole claim to true 
happiness. Christian faith succeeds where pagan philosophy failed by taking away the never-
ending longing characteristic of life and replacing it with a sense contentment.    
 The role that faith plays in Augustine’s account of happiness helps him to explain all the 
unhappiness in the world. A basic fact of Augustinian psychology is that everyone wishes to be 
happy.8 Yet if this is the case, why do so many people fall dreadfully short of their goal? For 
Augustine, the reason lies in people’s lack of faith. “All men have the will to be happy,” he 
writes, “but not all have the faith which must purify the heart if happiness is to be reached.”9 
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 Without this purifying faith, corrupt desires and despair about human mortality keep true 
happiness out of reach. The goal—happiness—is the same for everybody, but it is accessible 
only to those who trust in the Lord. 
 Although faith is the first step to happiness, Augustine rejects the notion that it 
instantaneously brings about a happy existence. Upon accepting faith, the believer embarks on a 
long and arduous journey in which she gradually works towards transforming her life into one 
pleasing to God—with, of course, the help of grace. Augustine’s normative argument, then, is 
incomplete as it stands. Augustine has shown that true happiness is possible only through faith 
and the guarantee of eternal life, but he has yet to establish the connection between happiness 
and the version of faith that he urges his reader to adopt. Taking this further step of spelling out 
how exactly we get from faith to happiness is essential for justifying his argument within a 
eudaimonist framework.  
 The link between faith and happiness, Augustine argues, lies in properly ordering one’s 
desires. If, by grace, one possesses true faith, this commitment to Christ will lead to the 
purification of one’s desires. Such purification is necessary because, as they stand, human desires 
are corrupt along with the rest of human beings’ fallen nature. The goal is to leave behind these 
base desires and arrive at a constellation of desires pleasing to God. With such purified desires, 
holy actions will become natural, bringing one closer to eternal bliss. As for the content of 
righteous desires, the matter is straightforward on Augustine’s view: righteous desires invariably 
put heavenly things above earthly things. “I am not saying that you should have no loves,” 
Augustine tells his congregation. “I simply want your loves to be properly ordered. Put heavenly 
things before earthly, immortal things before mortal, everlasting things before transitory ones. 
- 69 - 
 And put the Lord before everything, and not just by praising him, but also by loving him.”10 By 
loving God above all else, the believer realizes her true interests. Or, as Augustine likes to put it, 
“we love ourselves all the more, the more we love God.”11 Augustine essentially urges his 
readers to adopt the proper approach to realizing self-love. He thinks this approach to be the only 
viable one, since the pursuit of happiness—in other words, self-love—is an inescapable part of 
being human. 
 The majority of individuals, as Augustine is quick to point out, do not properly order 
their desires by putting God before everything. Instead, they usually follow their given desires, 
which lead them away from the universal goal of happiness. As a result, the paradox arises in 
which people think that they are pursuing happiness when in reality they are inflicting incredible 
harm on their interests. This paradox captures Augustine’s attention, and he rarely tires of 
driving the point home to his reader. Unsurprisingly, one of Augustine’s favorite verses is 
Psalms 10:6, which says that “the person who loves injustice hates his own soul.”12 He develops 
the idea that this verse embodies in The Trinity:  
[T]he man who does not love God, even though he loves himself, which is innate 
in him by nature, can still be said quite reasonably to hate himself when he does 
what is against his own interest, and stalks himself as if he were his own enemy. 
It is indeed a dreadful derangement that while everyone wants to do himself 
good, many people do nothing but what is absolutely destructive of themselves.13  
 
Our initial impulsion towards desiring happiness is completely natural and by no means wrong 
according to Augustinian psychology. The problems begin, rather, when an individual blindly 
follows her corrupted desires in the hope of achieving happiness. Normally she is unaware that 
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 she takes herself farther and farther away from intended goal. To avoid such a fate, “human 
beings must be told how to love, that is, how to love themselves so as to do themselves good.”14  
 This knowledge of how to properly order desires proves absolutely necessary for the 
pursuit of happiness because desires are naturally corrupt in humanity’s fallen state. 
Consequently, individuals tend towards the specter of happiness rather than true happiness. The 
false happiness that people seek out can take many forms, but invariably at its base is pride. 
Pride raises oneself above God in a perverse attempt to achieve happiness. The thought, so 
natural for fallen man, is that taking pleasure in one’s imagined greatness satisfies one’s 
continual longing for happiness. Yet the result could not be more to the contrary. Pride, the 
ultimate affront to God’s authority, always fails to achieve its goal because, as human beings, our 
greatness pales in comparison to the divine. Inevitably, by exalting ourselves we end up looking 
foolish. As Augustine writes in On Free Choice of the Will, “If someone … takes pleasure in 
himself and wills to enjoy his own power in a perverse imitation of God, he becomes more and 
more insignificant as he desires to become greater. This is ‘pride, the beginning of all sin.’”15  
 Augustine finds it impossible to overstate the pernicious effects of pride, since on his 
view the vice led to Adam’s fall and the subsequent corruption of all of humanity. Originally, 
man’s will and desires were pure, as they were guided by the love of God. The turning point 
came when man exalted himself by turning away from God and rejecting his dependence on him. 
This act of pride had the contrary effect than that desired, Augustine argues: “when [Adam] had 
turned towards himself his being was less real than when he adhered to him who exists in a 
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 supreme being.”16 Once again, Augustine seizes on the paradox that love of self, when not 
specifically guided by love of God, leads to the destruction of the self.   
 So far, Augustine’s argument is relatively easy to follow: we should avoid the pitfall of 
pride and cling to God, since if left to our own corrupt desires happiness will forever elude us. 
His argumentative strategy is thoroughly eudaimonist in nature—the promise of happiness serves 
as the primary motivating factor for acting on his counsels. The argument, however, becomes 
somewhat messy when Augustine’s condemnation of pride becomes conflated into a 
condemnation of self-love. To be sure, pride represents an improper form of self-love, and from 
his condemnation of pride it follows that certain manifestations of self-love are sinful. But 
Augustine is not always clear on this point. In fact, at times he equates pride with self-love, 
without qualifying the latter.17 One example comes in Augustine’s discussion of Adam’s 
downfall. Here he calls the proud “self-pleasers,”18 a term essentially synonymous with self-
lovers. Rather than attacking a specific form of self-love, he seems to be attacking self-love per 
se. If Augustine is indeed making such a claim, it presents potentially insoluble problems for his 
argument in favor of the Christian faith. It is, after all, an essentially eudaimonist argument with 
self-love at its foundation.  
The distinctive idea that self-love is essentially evil first appears in Augustine’s writings 
around 400 CE. It is at this time that he first equates self-love with the earthly city.19 Making a 
sharp distinction between the heavenly and earthly city, Augustine writes: “In one city love of 
God has been given first place, in the other, love of self.”20 According to Oliver O’Donovan, 
author of The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine, such a characterization of self-love 
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 represents a novel view on the subject within the Christian tradition.21 Augustine is carving out 
in the field of philosophical and Christian thought a new position on self-love. The question 
remains whether he full-heartedly embraces this position or instead drifts into it in a somewhat 
careless manner.  
Given Augustine’s undeniable eudaimonist views, it is unlikely that he intends to 
condemn self-love absolutely. He certainly can come across this way when he argues that self-
love only leads to the abasement of the self. These repeated references to the paradoxes of self-
love exist in tension with and even directly contradict his eudaimonist views—namely, that we 
naturally seek out our own happiness and that there is nothing wrong with doing so per se. 
O’Donovan suggests a way of making sense of this tension in Augustine’s thought. On his view, 
Augustine focuses on the paradoxes of self-love primarily for rhetorical effect.22 We thus should 
be cautious reading into Augustine’s philosophy all of the implications following from 
paradoxical references to self-love. Considering Augustine’s thought on the whole, it would be 
rash to conclude that he ever intends to denounce self-love in all its forms. After all, he often 
appeals to self-love, such as when he speaks of the eternal bliss promised to the righteous. 
O’Donovan’s reading takes into account these diverse views of Augustine, and thus is the most 
plausible. It is Augustine’s affinity for rhetorical flair that leads to an at times schizophrenic 
account of self-love.  
But though it is unlikely that Augustine holds the view that self-love per se is sinful, 
various elements in his writings encourage, at least ostensibly, this interpretation. In particular, 
Augustine’s despairing views about human nature fall in line with the view that there is 
something profoundly wrong about loving the self. After the Fall, the self’s nature became 
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 wretched and corrupt. If Augustine’s portrayal of the self is accurate, it follows that there is little 
reason to love it. The logical response is rather a sense of repulsion to the self. Such a sentiment 
runs throughout Augustine’s writings, and is especially pervasive in his Confessions. Here 
Augustine laments: “[H]ow sordid I was, how deformed and squalid, how tainted with ulcers and 
sores.”23 Suffice it to say, little about the human condition is worthy of love. 
For Augustine, the self is in such a corrupted state that it takes on a dark, impenetrable 
quality. Human nature exists in a state of total corruption, which as a result casts doubt about the 
moral standing of all aspects of the self. Even outwardly praiseworthy acts may have, for all we 
know, sinful motives at their base. After all, Augustine asks, “How can we know or see that it be 
not pride which governs the good deed? Where is the proof? We see the works: hunger is fed by 
compassion, but also by pride; strangers are entertained by compassion but also by pride; poverty 
is protected by compassion, but also by pride. In the works themselves we can see no 
difference.”24 Essentially, no aspect of the self is beyond moral questioning. One cannot be sure 
of one’s goodness because the depravity of sin infiltrates every aspect of one’s being. The only 
epistemological certainty is one’s depravity, not one’s goodness. Within such an outlook, it is 
understandable why Augustine issues paradoxical exhortations such as, “Learn to love yourself 
by not loving yourself!”25 Human beings’ corrupt nature demands that they turn away from it, 
even hate it. This rejection of the self is necessary for arriving at complete faith in the Lord, 
whose grace provides the only hope of redemption. In a strict sense, disdain for the self can be 
construed as a radical form of self-love because it represents the path to eternal communion with 
God. Nonetheless, it is a peculiar form of self-love that borders on self-hatred.  
                                                 
23 Augustine, Confessions, VIII, 7. 
24 Ibid., Ten Homilies on the First Epistle of St. John, in Augustine: Later Works, ed. John Burnaby (Philadelphia: 
Westminster Press, 1955), 8.9, quoted in Parrish, “Two Cities and Two Loves,” 217. 
25 Ibid., Sermo 96.2, quoted in Oliver O’Donovan, 108. 
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 Augustine’s misgivings about self-love leave his eudaimonist argument on shaky ground. 
Any hint that self-love fails as a moral guide is out of place within a eudaimonist framework, as 
it threatens to bring down the entire normative framework. To be sure, Augustine himself never 
rejected eudaimonism. Largely influenced by the Greco-Roman philosophical tradition, 
Augustine saw the eudaimonist approach as the only one available for justifying a moral 
position. Nevertheless, he clearly did more than simply operate within an existing framework: he 
altered it by portraying in greater nuance the concept of self-love, including many of its less 
desirable aspects. The questions Augustine raised about self-love went on to make a significant 
impact on the Christian tradition and moral philosophy more generally. Whereas pre-Christian 
philosophers could appeal unabashedly to self-love, thinkers after Augustine approached the 
issue more gingerly. Negative connotations towards self-love, first planted by Augustine, took 
hold and influenced debates about morality in both a conscious and unconscious manner. With 
time, these connotations grew, until finally reaching the point where self-love was seen as 
contrary to morality, rather than as a necessary part of it.  
 
Augustine Goes Secular 
If a certain German monk, paranoid about his salvation, had never issued his 95 theses in protest 
against the Catholic Church, Augustine’s standing in Western thought still would have been 
assured. Ever since Augustine’s death his works have been widely read. Nevertheless, the rise of 
Protestantism enlarged his sphere of influence in a dramatic way. Augustine, with his 
unflinching convictions about human corruption and the need for grace, was the darling of the 
Protestant movement. Seeing him as the one Church father whose theology got it right, Luther 
and other Protestants drew heavily on his writings when outlining their own position on 
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 religious, moral, and political matters. As an essential part of the Protestant program, 
Augustine’s views became a salient part of the debates occupying Renaissance and 
Enlightenment Europe.  
 It is ironic that Augustine’s influence took off when it did, considering that during this 
period there was a general move away from the God-centered, medieval outlook that Augustine’s 
thought epitomizes. Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers hoped to replace such an outlook 
with one that, though not necessarily excluding God, placed man at its center. Understandably, 
many saw as an obstacle to this project Augustine’s despairing views on the human nature. To 
open the way for a society centered on human interests, these reformers needed to rehabilitate 
human nature, which meant leaving behind the Augustinian picture of it. Realizing this goal, 
however, turned out to be easier said than done. Augustine’s views had insinuated themselves 
into moral thinking to such an extent that reformers in many cases found themselves 
unconsciously accepting them. This point is evident in their reluctance to associate self-love with 
morality. Even in the midst of growing secularism, then, Augustine’s characterization of human 
nature as fallen and corrupt continued to shape views on self-love. The main difference now was 
that the new secular view could no longer guarantee the redemption of self-love.  
 Our starting point for examining Augustine’s influence during the Enlightenment is 17th 
century France, where a splinter Catholic sect known as the Jansenists originated. Above all, the 
Jansenists dedicated themselves to living a holy life as spelled out by Augustine. Their practices 
and beliefs were so much in line with Augustine’s thought that many opponents labeled them as 
Protestants in disguise. The Jansenists turned to Augustine teachings largely because they were 
fed up with the lax moral practices within the Catholic Church, especially among the Jesuits.26 
                                                 
26 See, e.g, Blaise Pascal’s witty and forceful attacks on the Jesuits in The Provincial Letters, trans. A.J. 
Krailsheimer (New York: Penguin Books, 1967).  
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 Augustine’s emphasis on striving for purity in all aspects of life provided them with exactly the 
type of message they were looking for.  
 The Jansenists’ concern with purity led them, like Augustine, to constant introspection of 
the self. Such introspection meant thinking hard about the role of self-love in living a moral life 
pleasing to God. The conclusions that the Jansenists put forward about self-love closely follow 
those of Augustine. With Augustine, they share the concern that corrupt self-love or cupidity 
infiltrates all of our actions. Blaise Pascal, the most well-known of the Jansenists, paints an 
especially bleak picture. “All men,” he writes, “naturally hate each other. We have used 
concupiscence as best we can to make it serve the common good. But that is only pretence, and a 
false picture of charity.”27 The vilest of motives take the appearance of virtue so as to succeed 
within society. Often it is impossible to know whether pure or corrupt motives are at work, 
because “Nothing is so like charity as cupidity,” even though in reality “nothing is so 
contrary.”28 The essential difference between the two is that “cupidity makes use of God and 
delights in the world, whereas charity does the opposite.”29 Here Pascal directly draws on a 
distinction made by Augustine, which says that eternal things are to be enjoyed and earthly 
things used.30 By understanding charity as “delight” in heavenly things, Pascal and the Jansenists 
are still operating within Augustine’s eudaimonistic framework. Pascal’s wager further 
demonstrates this point: bet on God, for only he can promise infinite happiness in the form of 
eternal life.31
 One tension in Jansenist thought is that, while urging others to adopt charity, it admits 
that cupidity or depraved self-love operates just as well in achieving social harmony. The 
                                                 
27 Pascal, Pensées, trans. Honor Levi (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), XVII, 243.  
28 Ibid., XXXIV, 508. 
29 Ibid., LXI.  
30 Augustine, On Christian Teaching, I, 39. 
31 Pascal, Pensées, XLV. 
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 thought ultimately has its basis in Augustine, as we have already seen.32 The Jansenist Pierre 
Nicole seizes on this Augustinian idea in his essay, “Of Charity and Self-Love.” In it he explains 
how amazingly effective self-love is in attaining all the things that human beings value in this 
world. Although one might think that self-love gives way to fierce competition and social chaos, 
in reality it leads to the most perfect social harmony. Individuals realize their weakness and their 
consequent inability to realize their desire to dominate others. They thus cooperate, as it is the 
surest way to hang onto “the comforts of life.”33 Through the economic security generated by 
trade, self-love ensures that one lives as “peacefully, safely, and comfortably as if one were in a 
republic of saints.”34 If one by any chance is still not convinced of self-love’s benefits, Nicole 
goes on to show that it conduces to loyalty, kindness towards one’s enemies, and even “actions 
designed to mortify and destroy it.”35  
 When reading the essay, one is almost tempted to embrace self-love, given how 
beneficial its effects are. Nicole, however, warns against falling victim to this view. The real 
nature of self-love is hideous: “This tyrannical disposition, being firmly implanted deep in the 
hearts of all men, makes them violent, unjust, cruel, ambitious, obsequious, envious, insolent, 
and quarrelsome. In a word, it carries within the seeds of all men’s crime’s and profligacies, 
from the slightest to the most heinous. This is the monster we carry in our bosom.”36 It is this 
monster actuating society and all its parts, which is why the Jansenists want to retreat from 
society’s false virtue to a life of righteousness. 
                                                 
32 See p. 74 above, as well as Parrish, “Two Cities and Two Loves.” 
33 Pierre Nicole, “Of Charity and Self-Love,” in Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant, ed. J.B. Schneewind 
(New York: Cambridge University  Press, 2002), II.  
34 Ibid. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., I.  
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  In the Jansenist picture of self-love, like in Augustine’s, religious beliefs play a salient 
role. This emphasis on religion in moral thought, however, was beginning to fall somewhat out 
of favor. The Jansenists were writing during a shift towards adopting relatively neutral religious 
assumptions in moral argumentation. The change occurred for a variety of reasons, but above all 
it was a consequence of the religious wars plaguing Europe in the 16th and 17th centuries. The 
conflict produced greater variation in religious beliefs, which sent philosophers looking for 
general moral principals that everyone could agree on. For the most part they avoided extreme 
positions, such as atheism, that were outside the mainstream and likely to work against their 
argument. Instead, they incorporated generally held religious principles, while avoiding 
controversial sectarian doctrines. Hugo Grotius, the leading natural law theorist of the period, 
embodies this approach. Although God has a place in his theory of natural law, he tries to make 
him as uncontroversial as possible.37 Thinkers like Grotius did not embrace secularism in morals, 
yet their theories represented a step in that direction. 
 Once this shift was under way, thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes pushed the envelope 
towards secularism. Though not avowedly atheist, Hobbes’s uncompromisingly scientific 
approach to human behavior and social relations elicited that charge. He scrapped all 
explanations appealing to the divine, choosing to instead ground his theory in what he believed 
to be scientific facts about human nature. A strong determinism frames his understanding of 
phenomena in the world. Desires always direct action, “For as to have no desire, is to be dead.”38 
Following one’s desires, on this view, is neither good nor bad but simply how human beings act. 
Human beings constitute just another link on the causal chain, which is set in motion by desires. 
                                                 
37 J.B. Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 1998), 66-70. 
38 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), VIII, 16. 
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 Even when deliberating and believing themselves to consciously will one action over another, 
human beings in reality are following the last appetite in the deliberative process.   
On the surface, Hobbes views the realization of subjective desires—another way of 
saying self-love—as natural and morally neutral. His determinism limits his ability to moralize 
about human actions and suggest how they should be, since human beings are constrained to a 
causal chain from which they cannot escape. But, though Hobbes resists pronouncing on the 
human nature’s moral standing, certain morally charged assumptions strongly influence his 
account of this nature. This point becomes clear when Hobbes describes how human beings fare 
in the state of nature, that is, an environment where the lack of an overarching authority creates a 
state of anarchy. Hobbes envisions that individuals in the state of nature will see one another as 
enemies. They will seek to overpower one another, which leads to a war of all against all. The 
state of nature inevitably engenders conflict because of its anarchical nature: in the lack of 
anything powerful enough to keep human desires in check, human relations degenerate into 
violent chaos.  
Tucked away in Hobbes’s portrait of the state of nature are strong assumptions about 
human nature. Nothing about anarchy requires individuals to view each other as enemies.39 
Rousseau levels this charge against Hobbes when he argues that man in a truly natural and 
unprejudiced state responds to others with indifference.40 To arrive at his pessimistic views on 
the state of nature, then, Hobbes assumes more than anarchy—specifically, he attributes to 
human nature a desire to dominate and a sense of hatred towards others. It is a description of 
                                                 
39 Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International 
Organization 46 (1992): 402, 404-405. 
40 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin and Foundations of Inequality Among Men, in The Discourses 
and Other Early Political Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
1997), I, 35; Of the Social Contract, the Geneva Manuscript, in The Social Contract and Other Later Political 
Writings, ed. and trans. Victor Gourevitch (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), I, 2. 
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 human nature that bears a strong resemblance to the Augustinian portrait of fallen man. Surely 
Hobbes rejects Augustine’s explanation of human behavior in terms of the Fall. Nevertheless, the 
pervasive Augustinian idea that the self is depraved still appears to have an indirect influence on 
Hobbes’s thought. Man’s nature is so inclined towards conflict that only the Leviathan can save 
it. When taking the form of agreeing to a social contract, self-love does work as a basis for 
society—but just barely.  
Hobbes’s misgivings about self-love remain at best implicit in his writings. By no means 
does he condemn self-love. Such a condemnation would be quite bizarre and out of place, given 
that self-love drives the Hobbesian state. In it people come together to cede their power to the 
Leviathan, for only by taking this action will they escape the state of nature. Other philosophers 
with secular leanings, especially the French philosophes, shared Hobbes’s view that self-love 
functions as the basis for a harmonious society. Unsurprisingly, then, these secularly oriented 
philosophers tended to have positive views towards self-love, seeing it as morally praiseworthy 
or, at the least, morally neutral.41  
Bernard Mandeville constitutes an important exception. Like Hobbes and many of the 
philosophes, Mandeville strongly believed that self-love provided the only path to a well-
functioning society. Mandeville was not one to candy-coat his positions, as he even saw self-love 
in the form of vice—drinking, fornication, gambling—as a necessary part of a society’s 
economic success. His best known book, The Fable of the Bees, recounts the story of a beehive 
that thrived while engaging in vice but that soon collapsed once the “knaves turned honest.” 
Although few like to admit it, vice makes possible the comfortable existence we all cherish, 
whereas virtue renders it impossible.42 An interesting aspect of Mandeville is that, while praising 
                                                 
41 See, e.g., Claude Adrien Helvétius, in On the Mind, in Moral Philosophy, ed. Schneewind, II, 15.  
42 Schneewind, “Introduction: Bernard Mandeville,” in Moral Philosophy, ed. Schneewind, 388-89. 
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 vice and attacking virtue, he refuses to revise traditional moral vocabulary. He comes across as 
so scandalous in his writings because he is advocating for vice—without qualification. Self-love, 
Mandeville admits, leads to tremendous social benefits, yet this truth also will unsettle one’s 
moral sensibilities. 
Self-love and virtue are mutually exclusive on Mandeville’s account. It is a very 
Augustinian view—the only element missing from it is Augustine’s exception for heavenly self-
love. He discounts as moral any action motivated in the least by self-love. Even an apparently 
noble sentiment like pity turns out to be without moral worth because self-love enters into it. The 
person feeling pity  
has nothing to boast of but that he has indulged a passion that has happened to be 
beneficial to the public. There is no merit in saving an innocent babe ready to 
drop in the fire. The action is neither good nor bad, and what benefit soever the 
infant received, we only obliged ourselves; for to have seen it fall, and not strove 
to hinder it, would have caused a pain which self-preservation compelled to 
prevent.43  
 
Because of the over the top nature of his example, Mandeville comes off as if he is just poking 
fun at traditional—and more specifically, Augustinian—morality. Mandeville certainly is having 
some fun, but he is also making an important point: virtue is much rarer than we think. He makes 
his argument by employing the same method used by Nicole in his essay “Of Charity and Self-
Love.” Seeing an apparent act of virtue, Mandeville shows how self-love in all likelihood is at its 
base. If we accept Augustinian morality, we have to be honest with ourselves and recognize that 
most “virtuous” actions are just self-love in disguise. 
For the few virtuous individuals that do exist, Mandeville describes what they look like: 
“Such men as without complying with any weakness of their own can part from what they value 
themselves, and from no other motive but their love of goodness perform a worthy action in 
                                                 
43 Bernard Mandeville, The Fable of the Bees, in Moral Philosophy, ed. Schneewind, 395-96.  
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 silence.” Suffice it to say, “the world has … never swarmed” with theses individuals.44 
Mandeville paints virtue in such a way that it seems humanly impossible. But that may be just 
the point. Virtue demands that we go against our passions, interests, and desires—to act in a way 
so unnatural that it proves for most incomprehensible.45 Augustine himself admits the difficulties 
involved with turning away from oneself and to a virtuous life of serving God. This 
transformation can only take through supernatural grace. Mandeville denies any such grace, 
however, which puts the virtuous life beyond reach. It is a result that Mandeville finds perfectly 
acceptable, for it gives one good reason to be knave and accept vice with open arms.  
Mandeville represents one outcome of the secularization of Augustinian thought. Plagued 
by a corrupt nature but without a God to redeem them, human beings find morality to be 
impossible. Instead of fretting, figures like Mandeville suggest embracing whole heartedly one’s 
corrupt desires and inclinations. But not everyone finds this response satisfactory. For those 
wanting to preserve traditional moral beliefs in an environment where God is no longer a 
certainty, it is necessary to search for a basis for morality independent self-love. This second 
outcome of the secularization of Augustinian thought is where Kant comes into the picture.  
 
Kant’s Problematic Solution 
The ways in which one can approach Kant’s philosophy are virtually endless. The hoards of Kant 
scholars provide a smorgasbord of options to choose from. In our context, we want an approach 
that helps us locate, in the history of ideas, the connections between Kant’s moral philosophy 
and Augustinian moral thought. After this connection is made, we will have a more complete 
picture of altruism’s development into a normative ideal.  
                                                 
44 Ibid., 396. 
45 Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 327-29. 
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 The way we are going to approach Kant’s moral philosophy is one that is both familiar 
and on most accounts accurate. On this perspective, Kant’s moral philosophy represents an 
attempt to secure traditional morality in a world increasingly hostile to it.46 This approach suits 
our purposes here because it focuses on the connection between his thought and the Augustinian 
tradition, the traditional morality of Kant’s world. Living in Prussia all his life, Kant was 
immersed in the Protestant/Augustinian tradition. This moral outlook was under siege because of 
the Enlightenment’s emphasis on reason, which increasingly raised doubts about divine 
revelation serving as the foundation of the Christian religion.   
Kant, a child of the Enlightenment himself, was sympathetic to the concerns with 
traditional morality. Reason was the ultimate arbiter, and any version of morality worth holding 
onto had to pass reason’s demands. Kant, however, was confident that much of the content of 
traditional morality could pass any test of reason and that, moreover, it offered something of 
value to the Enlightenment world. By taking up the cause of traditional morality, Kant wanted to 
ensure that Enlightenment thinkers in their critiques did not throw the baby out with the bath 
water.  
To defend traditional morality, the Kantian project first has to depart from it in a radical 
way. Moral systems with Christian roots primarily justify themselves by appealing to the divine 
authority of the Bible. Kant cannot follow this pattern of justification and still appeal to the 
Enlightenment crowd, for it is this very aspect of traditional morality that they find so troubling. 
In turning to reason for justification, the question arises whether or not Kant can remain faithful 
to traditional morality. Replacing God as the bedrock of morality after all is no small move, 
                                                 
46 Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 488-89; Roger Scruton, Kant, Past Masters Series, ed. Keith Thomas 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 71-72; Roger J. Sullivan, Immanuel Kant’s Moral Theory (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), 4-6.  
  
- 84 - 
 especially in a Protestant context. Deeply ingrained in Protestantism is the idea, known as 
voluntarism, that God determines law and morality by fiat.47 Kant wants to deny this claim, 
showing instead that reason orders all of morality. He is able to redeem himself a bit, by finding 
room in his moral theory for God and other Christian concepts such as immortality. The 
existence of God and immortality of the soul are necessary conditions for the perfection of virtue 
demanded by Kant’s conception of morality, and thus a belief in these concepts play the role of 
making morality coherent.48 But this aspect of Kant’s theory at best covers over its fundamental 
differences with traditional morality rather than removes them. Reason still constitutes the most 
essential part of morality, without which the whole of Kant’s system crumbles. God, by contrast, 
is relegated to a secondary role in his moral system.49 More than tinkering with Christian 
morality centered on the Kingdom of God, Kant is proposing a new moral paradigm.   
Despite the fundamental changes adopted by Kant, he still succeeds in recovering much 
of the content of Protestant morality. Most relevant to our present purposes is what Kant’s moral 
philosophy shares with Protestantism’s distrust of human desires and self-love. Kant does not go 
so far as to accept the Protestant doctrine of Original Sin, which renders human nature utterly 
corrupt.50 But he does eschew attributing moral worth to the subjective desires and actions aimed 
at realizing them. On Kant’s view, only those actions motivated out of a sense of moral duty 
have intrinsic moral worth.51 There is much criticism of Kant’s concept of duty, so much so that 
it at times degenerates to the point of caricaturing his views. In defense of Kant, his concept of 
                                                 
47 Schneewind, The Invention of Autonomy, 8-9, 17-36. 
48 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, in Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, The 
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 duty does not lead to an absolute condemnation of self-love. In fact, he sees the pursuit of 
happiness as part of the moral life.52 Self-love is not contrary to morality but simply fails as a 
solid foundation for it.53  
Yet, even with these qualifications, the severe morality of Augustine or Nicole cannot 
help but come to mind when reading Kant. Reminiscent of Nicole, Kant holds that it is 
impossible to know whether an individual acts out of duty or self-love.54 For those actions 
resembling moral ones but done out of self-love, Kant denies that they are in any sense moral. 
He illustrates his claim by discussing beneficent actions done out of “an inner satisfaction for 
them.” “[I]n such a case,” Kant writes, “however it may conform with duty and however amiable 
it may be, [the action] has nevertheless no true moral worth but is on the same footing with other 
inclinations, for example, the inclination to honor.”55 This position resembles Augustine’s view 
that loving one’s neighbor without the purpose of loving God falls short of righteous action.56 
For Augustinians, righteous action lies solely in loving of God; for Kant, moral action lies solely 
in acting out of a sense of moral duty. In both cases, the desires and inclinations natural to human 
nature prove too unreliable to be a basis for morality. 
The true basis for morality, on Kant’s view, is reason. In its most fundamental form, 
reason tells us that one commits a logical error when one asserts and denies the same thing. Kant 
uses this dictate of reason, the principle of non-contradiction, to construct his moral theory. 
Morality in its essential form consists in keeping true to the principle of non-contradiction in 
one’s actions. Kant sums up this thought in his famous formulation of the categorical imperative, 
                                                 
52 Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals, in Practical Philosophy, 6:386; Groundwork, 4:399; see Sullivan, 202-203. 
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 known as the Formula of Universal Law: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I could 
also will that my maxim should become a universal law.”57 Reason, not self-love, issues this 
command. Since his normative argument has no need to appeal to self-love, Kant goes in a 
direction radically different from the Augustinians. Augustine and his followers try to convince 
others to serve God by arguing that such action will lead to the highest possible good, eternal 
communion with God. Kant, on the other hand, says that reason alone motivates moral action.  
If reason does indeed motivate moral action—and that is a big IF—Kant has no need to 
appeal to self-love when making his normative argument. As a result, he has overcome the most 
significant obstacle to normative altruism. Having shown that self-love is unnecessary to 
normativity, Kant goes on argue that reason demands that we care for the welfare of others. 
When we violate the categorical imperative, we make an exception for ourselves, saying it is 
okay for us to act one way while holding everyone else to a different standard. We usually act in 
this manner so as to pursue our own interests unfettered by the moral law. For instance, we know 
that lying is contrary to the categorical imperative because lies fail to work when everyone 
engages in them. Nevertheless, lying can serve as a shortcut to realizing our interests, and thus 
sometimes we lie. By condemning the lie, the categorical imperative makes sure that we do not 
use others as a means to advance our interests. The categorical imperative, then, has the 
following consequence: it forces us to take everyone else’s interests as serious as our own. Kant 
expresses this altruistic idea a bit less clearly in a reformulation of the categorical imperative: 
“act that you use humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at 
the same time as an end, never merely as a means.”58 In relations with others, the moral actor is 
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 to think of herself as living in a Kingdom of Ends.59 It is a new paradigm for morality—one that, 
uncontaminated by appeals to self-love, makes the boldest attempt seen thus far at justifying 
normative altruism. 
Kant believes that his categorical imperative succeeds in providing a rational foundation 
for traditional morality. Others, though, have been less convinced. More than 200 years of 
Kantian criticism has yielded diverse and sundry objections to Kant’s moral theory. I have 
nothing new to add to these objections, but will simply repeat a few of them. Kant wants us to 
believe that reason alone can motivate us to action. This position, however, clashes with the 
orthodox view that reason is instrumental: it only can function in the presence of a given goal. 
The principle of non-contradiction does not lead ineluctably to the moral law, argue the critics. A 
moral skeptic may use people as means without the slightest feeling of compunction or fear of 
contradiction. When asked if he approves of others using him as a means, he may reply by 
saying: “let them get on with it, if they want to: you are not going to find me moralising about 
it.”60 Our moral skeptic may even be a Nietzschean, who hopes that others relentlessly strive for 
glory and are not afraid to step on people in the process. In this way, glory becomes coveted and 
has more value. Certainly, the moral skeptic lives a life full of conflict. But this conflict does not 
entail contradiction, and thus the skeptic’s life—to Kant’s horror—is compatible with the 
categorical imperative. Unlike Kant claims, rationality does not demand that one strive for the 
Kingdom of Ends. Kant’s theory has difficulty standing up to these objections. Suffice it to say, 
the categorical imperative never was a slam-dunk among moral philosophers. 
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 Reworking Kant—and Altruism 
The problems in Kant’s theory have motivated a number of modern philosophers to look for a 
way around them. We will look at two particularly influential ones, Christine Korsgaard and 
Thomas Nagel, to see how their revisions try to salvage Kant’s argument for normative altruism. 
 Although a committed Kantian, Korsgaard concedes that the categorical imperative, as 
the Formula of Universal Law, fails to capture all of morality.61 Like many critics of Kant, she 
does not see how the principle of non-contradiction entails the need to strive for the realization of 
the Kingdom of Ends. Korsgaard nevertheless does believe that Kant’s idea of a Kingdom of 
Ends is the correct way to conceive of morality. Her primary challenge, then, is convincing us 
that the perspective of seeing oneself as a citizen of the Kingdom of Ends has normative value. 
In making this argument, she departs from Kant in an important way: she is willing to 
make egoistic appeals. This aspect of her argument comes out when trying to explain why we 
should choose to see ourselves as a member of the Kingdom of Ends. She argues that, as human 
beings, this normative perspective proves inescapable. Times inevitably arise when we are 
tempted to forsake this identity, such as when treating others as ends involves great personal 
sacrifice. The way that we motivate ourselves to remain true to our identity is by recognizing its 
incredible value. In Korsgaard’s words, our motivation derives from the realization that violating 
our identity would be “worse than death.”62  
The egoistic nature of this reason for maintaining our identity strikes some as 
unsatisfactory. Nagel, for one, does not see how such self-interested action could be moral 
action.63 One could defend Korsgaard with the following argument: If your identity consists of 
being altruistic—say, treating people as ends in themselves—then how is it egoistic to want to 
                                                 
61 Christine Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 99-100. 
62 Ibid., 247. 
63 Nagel, “Universality and the Reflective Self,” in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 206-207. 
- 89 - 
 maintain true to this identity at all costs? In one sense, this seems right. Some ideal must guide 
the altruist, and it is to be expected that she will value this ideal and will not want to depart from 
it. One cannot deny this point, but Korsgaard’s example goes beyond simply wanting to maintain 
true to an ideal. Her hypothetical individual recognizes what her identity demands, but that alone 
does not motivate her. Instead, she must imagine what life would be like after turning her back 
on her identity. Only when she recognizes the extreme costs to herself of such a course of action 
does she decide to keep her identity. Once at this point in the deliberative process, she clearly 
lacks altruistic motivation, for her own self-interest is dictating her actions. Ultimately, then, 
Korsgaard’s normative argument has a strong egoistic element to it—that is how she gets to a 
complete picture of morality. As a self-proclaimed Kantian, her departure on this point is 
significant: it suggests that grounding morality in reason alone—the Kantian project—falls short 
of achieving its goal.  
Nagel is not a self-proclaimed Kantian like Korsgaard, but he nevertheless resembles 
Kant in the argument he sets forth in The Possibility of Altruism. As the title suggests, Nagel tries 
to show how altruistic motivation is at the very least a coherent concept. Unlike Korsgaard, he 
refuses to appeal to our interests: “The view presented here … is opposed … to any demand that 
the claims of ethics appeal to our interests: either self-interests or the interest we may happen to 
take in other things and other persons. The altruism which in my view underlies ethics is not to 
be confused with generalized affection for the human race. It is not a feeling.”64 What motivates 
altruism, on Nagel’s view, are objective rather than subjective reasons. And by objective reasons, 
Nagel means that they make no reference to the doer of an act and are universal.65  
                                                 
64 Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), 3. 
65 Ibid., 90-98. 
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 In response to Nagel’s theory, some ask incredulously where one finds these objective 
reasons. The criticism is similar to that leveled against Kant, namely, that ignoring objective 
reasons results in no error in rationality.66 To be fair to Nagel, he is only talking about the 
possibility of altruism. Nevertheless, it is a possibility that he is advocating hard for, because in 
his view a great deal is at stake. If there are no objective reasons, “Then morality is an illusion … 
and the sceptics are right.”67 Without a doubt, Nagel like Kant has difficulty putting to rest the 
skeptics’ doubts. To them, objective reasons are nowhere to be found, and at best can be 
explained as the figment of a few misguided philosophers’ imaginations. For the moment, we 
will put aside the question of deciding which side of the debate makes a stronger argument. In 
Part III we will be in a better position to evaluate the merits of Nagel’s theory of altruism after 
taking a closer look at human psychology, specifically human motivation.  
 
Conclusion 
Arguments about normative altruism today ultimately have their basis in the Augustinian 
tradition. The trend towards normative altruism grew out of Augustine’s intense mistrust of 
human nature. Self-love was problematical because, on the Augustinian/Protestant view, the self 
was hopelessly corrupt. Only a unique form of self-love concerned with heavenly well-being 
possessed moral worth. This position started to fall out of vogue during Enlightenment, when 
people increasingly started to question moral views grounded in religious faith. These doubts led 
to Kant’s ambitious project of trying to base traditional moral views in reason rather than in God. 
By making morality independent of all form of self-interest, including one’s self-interest in the 
afterlife, Kant justified morality without having to appeal to self-love. As a result, he opened up 
                                                 
66 Bernard Williams, “Egoism and Altruism,” 257-58. 
67 Nagel, “Universality and the Reflective Self,” in Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity, 207. 
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 the way for normative altruism. To be sure, his argument for normative altruism had a number of 
problems with it, such as explaining how reason alone can motivate moral—i.e., altruistic—
action. Altruism’s normative status remains in doubt today as contemporary philosophers 
consistently confront difficulties when trying to overcome the problems in Kant’s moral theory.  
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Part III 
The Problems with Normative Altruism  
“Too much altruism is oppressive and exacting.” 
  — Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, May 6, 1944  
 
Kant asserted that rationality provides objective reasons for moral action, regardless of 
inclination, which in effect enshrined altruism as a normative ideal. Yet Kant had difficulties 
explaining how rationality motivates altruism, and those who carry on his theory today either 
encounter the same problems or opt for minimizing the altruistic element in his theory. Thus, in 
spite of normative altruism’s rise, it stands on shaky ground. Of course, just because Kant 
encountered difficulties in explaining how to motivate altruism in others, a coherent explanation 
of the process still may be out there. I, though, am going to suggest that the nature of altruistic 
motivation gives us good reason to doubt altruism’s status as a normative ideal. The reason why 
is that, for certain individuals, experiencing altruistic motivation is an impossibility. Demanding 
altruism of them essentially involves demanding the impossible, which is out of place in our 
views on normativity. A related problem is that normative altruism hinders moral discourse by 
excluding from it a significant portion of the population. Given these shortcomings, altruism fails 
as a normative ideal. But, in making this claim, it by no means follows that altruism is simply a 
myth. In fact, evidence for altruism’s existence abounds. Instead of continuing to focus on 
altruism’s normative side, a more fruitful approach lies in seeing it primarily in descriptive 
terms. 
 
Two Conceptions of Altruism 
Up to this point our focus has been on normative conceptions of altruism. Most debates about 
altruism (or the related concepts of benevolence, charity, self-love, and selfishness) in Western 
thought have centered on whether or not morality demands altruism. The culmination of these 
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 debates came in the form of Kant’s assertion that altruistic motivation is an essential part of 
morality. In other words, Kant and those subscribing to his ethical theory argue that one ought to 
be altruistic. The influence of such a view is evident in the moral connotations bound up in the 
word altruism. Say altruism and inevitably words like “good,” “moral,” and maybe even “saint” 
come to mind. Most discussions of altruism carry with them the assumption that it is something 
that one ought to do, except in the case of a rare dissenter who insists that altruism is pernicious.1
 There is of course another way to speak about altruism. Instead of asking whether one 
ought to be altruistic, one may ask whether altruism exists, and if so when and where. This 
second question understands altruism in a descriptive manner. It is this type of conception of 
altruism present in the sciences. Scientists could care less about the moral status of altruism; they 
just want to know if a certain creature exhibits it. This impartial approach to altruism is rare in 
everyday discourse, where descriptive conceptions of altruism tend to be subordinated to the 
moral aspects of the term. If I read in the newspaper about an individual who fights off a bear to 
save the life of a stranger, calling that person an altruist rarely carries the same dispassionate 
meaning as saying that the person speaks Italian, is six foot one, and lives in Vermont. The term 
altruist has descriptive power, but the term also invokes moral connotations that tend to push out 
all else. In a culture where normative altruism has such widespread influence, one often has to 
consciously think about altruism differently in order to arrive at a descriptive conception of it.  
 What follows below is an attempt to sort out these two different conceptions of altruism. 
Both descriptive and normative altruism are controversial. The assertion that altruism exists 
                                                 
1 E.g., Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, trans. R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 258, 
265; “Why I am Destiny,” Ecce Homo, trans. R.J. Hollingdale (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), 4; “Preface,” On 
the Genealogy of Morals, trans. Douglas Smith (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 5; Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra: A Book for None and All, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Penguin Books, 1978), IV, 7; 
“Expeditions of an Untimely Man,” Twilight of Idol in Twilight of the Idols/The Anti-Christ, trans. R.J. Hollingdale 
(New York: Penguin Books, 1990), 35; and Ayn Rand, The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism (New 
York: New American Library, 1964), 27, 34. 
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 elicits many evolutionary biologists’ ire just as normative arguments for altruism infuriate 
advocates of egoism such as Friedrich Nietzsche and Ayn Rand. The goal is to cut through the 
strong emotions, look at the arguments on both sides, and determine whether altruism makes 
sense on a descriptive level, a normative level, or both. 
 
Evidence for Altruism on a Descriptive Level 
We will begin by looking to see if altruism actually exists in the world. Although an important 
question in itself, whether or not altruism exists also pertains to normative debates on the subject. 
The complete absence of altruism in the world would count against a normative argument for it, 
by suggesting that altruism is impossible. After all, it would make little sense to buy into the idea 
that one ought to altruistic if such an ideal proves beyond one’s capabilities. On the other hand, if 
we do find evidence for altruism, we will be assured that it is possible, at least in certain 
situations. 
 Defenders of normative altruism do have reason to be initially encouraged because 
evidence keeps coming in suggesting that altruism is a very real phenomenon. Regardless of 
one’s normative views, the growing consensus in psychology and behavioral biology is that 
human beings and many species of animals demonstrate altruistic behavior. Furthermore, 
examples of altruism in human interactions and in nature turn out not to be aberrations but rather 
part of a consistent pattern of behavior. For some time, the overwhelming evidence for altruism 
was seen as a threat to the evolutionary paradigm. How could there be room for altruism when 
nature is at its heart a fierce battle where only the fittest survive? The apparent clash between 
altruism and Darwin’s theory leads to the rejection of the former by some evolutionary 
biologists, who offer in its place ingenious theories to explain all forms of cooperative behavior 
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 in terms of self-interest. But even now in the field of evolutionary biology the consensus is 
starting to shift towards allowing a place for altruism. Rather than a mere hope or dream, 
altruism proves to be a real and inescapable part of life. 
 Throughout most of Western history the issue of altruism has arisen in the context of 
philosophical discussions. That began to change in the 20th century when psychology joined the 
altruism debate, bringing with it a new approach aimed at objectively testing for the 
phenomenon. One psychologist in particular, Daniel Batson, has dedicated much of his career to 
trying to answer the question of whether or not altruism exists. He conducted a series of 
experiments during the 1980s, in which he manipulated conditions so as to test for the presence 
of altruism.2 In designing these experiments, Batson faced the challenge of having to set them up 
in a way that would reveal the participants’ underlying motivations.  
 Despite the objection that it is impossible to decipher an individual’s true motivation, 
Batson forged ahead with his work. Supernatural powers in mind reading would be ideal for 
determining people’s motivations, but on Batson’s view we still can get by with more modest 
means. In life, when we want to know why an individual acted the way she did, we look to 
situations that disentangle her potential sources of motivation from each. Certain situations 
preclude all sources of motivation except one, leaving us relatively certain about an individual’s 
reason for action. Batson gives the following example to illustrate this strategy: 
Suzie and Frank work together. One morning, music-loving Suzie is unusually 
attentive to homely but well-heeled Frank. “Why?” Frank wonders, “Is it because 
my prayers have been answered, and Suzie is smitten by my charms? Or is she 
broke and wanting me to take her to the concert this weekend?” Frank’s dilemma 
is to determine the nature of Suzie’s motivation; he wants to know her ultimate 
goal. As matters stand, however, Frank lacks the information to make a clear 
inference—though wishful thinking may provide one. Now imagine that Suzie 
comes back from lunch, opens her mail, and finds that her father has sent her two 
                                                 
2 Daniel C. Batson, The Altruism Question: Toward a Social-Psychological Answer (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1991). 
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 tickets to the concert. If she coolly passes Frank on her way to invite John, then 
Frank can infer with considerable confidence—and chagrin—the ultimate goal of 
her earlier attentions. He knows her motive.3
 
The same logic used by Frank is applicable when determining whether or not someone is acting 
altruistically. An individual may help another either out of altruistic or egoistic reasons. To find 
out the answer, “we must vary the helping situation in a way that disentangles the confounding 
of the benefit to other and the benefits to self.”4 It is this approach that guides Batson in his 
experiments.   
 Batson admits that ultimately it is impossible to be 100 percent sure that someone’s 
motivation is altruistic. Even if an experiment eliminates one self-benefit, another may still lurk 
behind it and serve as the source of motivation. Although this point is important to recognize, its 
consequences are not as catastrophic to Batson’s project as they may seem. The same lack of 
absolute certainty, Batson points out, exists in science. Scientists can never test a theory in all 
possible situations, and thus some situations always remain untested. Nevertheless, after a large 
number of tests in which varying conditions validate each other, scientists conclude that a theory 
holds universally.5 Following the scientific method, Batson formulates a hypothesis— 
“Empathic emotion evokes altruistic motivation to have the other’s need reduced”6—and then 
tests this hypothesis under a wide range of varying conditions. If time and again the experiments 
show evidence of altruism, Batson argues, then we can reasonably conclude that altruism does 
indeed exist.   
 Batson carried out too many experiments to go through them all here, but we shall look at 
one to get the general flavor of his work. The experiment described here tested for altruism, 
                                                 
3 Ibid., 65. 
4 Ibid., 66. 
5 Ibid., 66-67. 
6 Ibid., 90. 
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 specifically keeping in mind the objection that helping is a means of “aversive-arousal 
reduction.” According to some psychologists, people help because they want to eliminate the 
pain they feel from seeing someone else in pain. To test this claim, Batson designed an 
experiment in which the participants would observe a girl named Elaine receive minor shocks 
(simulated, of course), before then being offered an opportunity to take her place. One group, in 
the easy-escape condition, could leave and would not have to watch Elaine endure continued 
shocks if they refused to take her place. The other group, in the difficult-escape condition, would 
have to continue to watch Elaine after opting not to take her place. If people merely help to avoid 
witnessing someone else’s pain, then those in the easy-escape condition should help much less. 
After all, they can avoid the pain of watching Elaine by simply leaving. What Batson found, 
however, went against the aversive-arousal reduction hypothesis. Regardless of whether 
participants were in the easy- or difficult-escape condition, those induced to feel empathy for 
Elaine overwhelmingly demonstrated helping behavior.7 Clearly, then, this experiment, along 
with others replicating it, answered one objection to altruism. Of course, other objections still 
remained. According to some psychologists, individuals feeling empathy help so as to gain 
rewards or to avoid punishments unique to empathy. Taking these objections into account, 
Batson performed further experiments testing for altruism. Over and over again, the results came 
back the same: participants experiencing empathy on average demonstrated altruistic behavior.8  
 One limitation of Batson’s experiments was that they only tested for altruism on a very 
low level. This limitation was unavoidable, since designing an experiment with potentially 
severe costs to its participants raised ethical concerns. Although the results would be extremely 
interesting, few would consent to an experiment that positioned participants along the side of a 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 116-17. 
8 Ibid., 128-74. 
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 road with a baby on it and observed how they would react to a car racing towards the helpless 
infant. Batson understandably never designed any experiments with cars careening towards 
babies, but in one he did raise the costs perceived by participants, albeit slightly. In a study 
similar to one discussed above, participants were informed that they would receive “Clearly 
painful but not harmful” shocks rather than minor shocks if they filled in for Elaine. The result 
was a significant drop in participants choosing to act altruistically.9 The change in behavior is 
perhaps disappointing but surely not surprising. Simply put, when the costs go up, people help 
less.    
 Although altruism is rare in cases where an individual faces the prospect of great personal 
loss, extreme examples of altruism still exist. One group in which one would expect to find a 
high number of altruists is among those who rescued Jews during the Holocaust. These 
individuals put their lives in danger to save, in many cases, total strangers. Obviously, the 
reasons driving such actions differed from person to person. It is therefore too rash a claim to say 
that all the rescuers acted out of altruistic motivations. Yet even with this caveat, these 
individuals provide us with good reason to suspect the presence of altruistic motivation within 
them, given their past sacrifices. For this reason, a number of researchers interested in altruism 
have interviewed rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust so as to better understand what drove 
them to act the way they did.  
 Attempting to decipher individuals’ motivation through interviews carries with it certain 
problems. First of all, the researcher is almost entirely dependent on rescuers’ own accounts of 
why they decided to help. On occasion, third parties may vouch for or against rescuers’ stories, 
but even they lack insight into the underlying motivations driving rescuers’ actions. This 
inability to independently verify rescuers’ accounts of their actions opens the door to self-serving 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 124-26. 
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 portrayals of events—always a possibility, even among the noblest of individuals. Second, 
because the actions under consideration occurred in the past, the researcher is unable to 
manipulate conditions so as to isolate altruistic motivation. The endless variables in play means 
that any analysis of rescuers’ actions will lack the sort of scientific rigor found in laboratory 
experiments, such as those Batson carried out.    
 Despite the shortcomings of the interview method, those interested in altruism still must 
use it if they are to learn anything about altruistic motivation in cases of extreme sacrifice. 
Fortunately, there are ways to minimize errors in evaluations of others’ accounts of what 
motivated them. Obviously, responses following a consistent pattern provide stronger evidence 
for a certain type of motivation than a few well-chosen testimonies. Also, those explanations of 
motivation that do little to glorify the individual’s reasons for acting are less open to doubt. With 
a cautionary approach, then, personal accounts of sacrifice can provide insight into the nature of 
altruistic motivation. 
 Three researchers well known for using this approach are Kristen Renwick Monroe and 
Samuel and Pearl Oliner. In separate studies,10 Monroe and the Oliners interviewed a significant 
number of rescuers of Jews during the Holocaust, with the explicit goal of better understanding 
why some people are altruistic. What they found were varying sources of motivation, some of 
which appear to be genuine altruism. The motivations of some rescuers clearly were not 
altruistic. Specifically, those in communities committed to helping its Jewish population often 
spoke of not wanting to let their community down. These individuals thus helped in part so as to 
avoid incurring a sense of guilt.11 Others, however, described their motivation in a way 
                                                 
10 Monroe, The Heart of Altruism: Perceptions of a Common Humanity; and Samuel P. Oliner and Pearl M. Oliner, 
The Altruistic Personality: Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe (New York: Free Press, 1988). 
11 Samuel P. Oliner, “Extraordinary Acts of Ordinary People: Faces of Heroism and Altruism,” in Altruism & 
Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al, 126. 
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 congruent with altruism. On their account, they did not explain their decision to help as a 
deliberate act driven by their own wants and desires. Instead, helping came naturally to many 
rescuers, who needed little time to reflect on the potential costs involved in helping.12 As one 
Italian rescuer recalls events, the decision to help was, in many respects, a non-decision:  
It was all something very simple. Nothing grandiose was done. It was done 
simply without considering risk, without thinking whether it would be an 
occasion for recognition or to be maligned, it was in effect done out of 
innocence. I didn’t think I was doing anything other than what should be done, or 
that I was in any special danger because of what I was doing. Justice had to be 
done. Persecution of the innocents was unacceptable.13
 
This particular rescuer evokes ideas of justice in explaining his reasons for acting, which was not 
uncommon in rescuers’ accounts.14 What is somewhat surprising, though, is the significant 
number of rescuers who described their decisions in amoral terms. A German rescuer named 
Otto puts it this way: “I had no choice. I never made a moral decision to rescue Jews. I just got 
mad. I felt I had to do it. I came across many things that demanded my compassion.”15 This 
rescuer is one of many who saw their actions as “normal”—in fact, so normal that describing 
their actions in moral and religious terms struck them as out of place. This same sentiment comes 
across again and again in interviews, here in the words of another German rescuer, Margot: “You 
don’t think about these things. You can’t think about these things. It happened so quickly.”16 She 
resolutely denies doing anything praiseworthy,17 for on her view helping was simply a reflex, an 
unconscious decision. From the perspective of an outside observer, their acts were extraordinary, 
but for the rescuers themselves they were anything but.  
                                                 
12 Monroe, 208-213. 
13 Samuel P. Oliner, “Extraordinary Acts of Ordinary People: Faces of Heroism and Altruism,” in Altruism & 
Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 127. 
14 Ibid., 127-28. 
15 Monroe, xi. 
16 Ibid., 211. 
17 Ibid., 209. 
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  This common view among rescuers that their actions were normal and required little 
deliberation strongly suggests that they acted altruistically in the strictest sense of the word. 
Because helping was in so many cases a reflex rather than a conscious choice, there was little 
time for calculations of costs and benefits to enter their mind. Upon seeing Jews in need, rescuers 
immediately recognized that it was imperative to allay this need without a subjective desire 
motivating them. We have reason to believe their motivational accounts are true due to the 
consistency of the testimonies. Words and phrases like “normal,” “natural,” “nothing special,” 
“without thinking,” and “never gave it a thought” come up again and again in interviews with 
rescuers. Furthermore, describing an action as unconscious is not the strategy normally employed 
to garner praise. In the self-glorifying genre of political memoirs, for instance, the reader often 
comes across descriptions of events in which the politician recalls feeling the full angst of a 
decision but nevertheless overcame it to make the right choice. Of course, a skeptic can always 
level the claim that rescuers exhibit false modesty, so as to make themselves look ever the more 
saintly. Perhaps. But if their responses are indeed a strategy to raise themselves up in others’ 
eyes, it is an odd and counterproductive one. By characterizing their actions as unconscious and 
natural, rescuers give the impression that they were lucky rather than morally good. For this 
reason, the evidence strongly supports an altruistic interpretation of the rescuers’ actions. If they 
truly wanted to glorify themselves in their descriptions, they would emphasize the conscious and 
difficult nature of their choice to help others in need. Instead, rescuers describe in an unassuming 
manner feeling a natural impulse to help those in need, and in the process provide a glimpse into 
the essence of altruism.  
 Rescuers’ accounts of why they acted shed light on the nature of altruistic motivation, yet 
questions still remain on how it works. Batson showed that altruism starts with first being able to 
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 empathize with others in need, and unsurprisingly many of the rescuers speak of understanding 
the pain the Jews endured when others often did not. So altruists feel empathy, but another 
question remains: What predisposes people to empathy and, consequently, altruism? Common 
sense beliefs point to the community, family, and religion people grow up in. These social 
structures are in a position to cultivate empathy and other-regarding actions, especially during 
one’s formative years. Aware of these hypotheses, Monroe looked for evidence supporting them 
in her study on altruism. When interviewing rescuers, she would ask them questions about their 
background: Did they come from a prominent family, accustomed to aiding others in the 
community? Was their family religious? Did they grow up in a small, close-knit community, or 
rather a more metropolitan setting? The information rescuers gave about their backgrounds did 
not give way to any discernible patterns. They came from a hodgepodge of different types of 
communities, families, and religious backgrounds that in no way distinguished them from the 
rest of population. Monroe therefore could not pinpoint any specific sociocultural factor as a 
source of altruism.18 The only thing altruists all shared with each other was their worldview that 
helping people was a normal and an expected part of life.19 Of course, Monroe’s conclusions do 
not entirely rule out sociocultural factors as a source of altruism. Future studies may indeed 
reveal that one or a number of sociocultural factors make altruistic behavior more likely. At the 
moment, however, there simply is no clear-cut evidence to support this claim.  
 Evidence that biology is a source of altruism, on the other hand, is much stronger. A 
growing number of studies suggest that altruism is ingrained into human beings. We now know, 
for instance, that identical twins (siblings sharing the same genes) are more likely to exhibit 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 121-36. 
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 similar levels of altruistic inclination than are fraternal twins.20 Particularly compelling 
discoveries about altruism have been coming out of neurobiology. Scientists in the field have 
succeeded in pinpointing a specific part of the brain, the prefrontal cortex, as the center for pro-
social behavior, including altruism.   
 The story most famously illustrating this point is one familiar to every introductory 
psychology student—that of Phineas Gage. In 1848, Gage was in Vermont doing railroad work 
as a construction foreman. While pounding spikes into the ground, gunpowder under one 
suddenly caught fire and set it flying through Gage’s head. The blow knocked him to the ground, 
but to everyone’s surprise and bewilderment he survived—in fact, by the end of the day he was 
walking and talking! Initially, the accident appeared to have left Gage unharmed. With time, 
though, it became clear that Gage had changed. Before the accident, he was a well-mannered and 
socially adept individual known for his hard work; after the accident, he was irascible, 
capricious, and aloof to others. The railroad spike, though leaving intact his motor and speaking 
skills, had taken away his social skills.21
 The railroad spike had the effect it did because it damaged areas of the prefrontal cortex 
in Gage’s brain.22 By examining individuals with brain injuries similar to Gage’s, 
neurobiologists have determined that proper functioning of the prefrontal cortex is essential for 
the ability to empathize, plan for the future, and adapt to changing social settings. These social 
skills that most take for granted are lost or severely impaired after suffering an injury to the 
                                                 
20 J.P. Rushton and D.W. Fulker, “Altruism and Aggression: The Heritability of Individual Differences,” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology 50 (1986): 1192-98, cited in Melvin Konner, “Some Obstacles to Altruism,” in 
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21 Antonio Damasio, Descartes’ Error: Emotion, Reason, and the Human Brain (New York: Penguin Books, 1994), 
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22 Ibid., 31-33. 
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 prefrontal cortex.23 The prefrontal cortex obviously does not explain everything about the 
complex phenomenon of social interaction. Nevertheless, it is safe to say that this area of the 
brain provides the foundation for basic social behaviors such as altruism.24    
  Our search for evidence of altruism thus far has focused on Homo sapiens, but we now 
will turn briefly to instances of altruistic behavior in animals. Although certainly an intriguing 
topic, altruism in animals is more than a pleasant diversion in this study about human views on 
altruism. The presence of altruism in species other than our own strongly suggests that it does 
indeed have a biological basis. More than a quirk specific to human beings, altruism turns up 
throughout nature.  
 A combination of lab experiments and observations of animal behavior has produced 
persuasive evidence that altruistic behavior is common in animals. In an experiment that 
masochistic psychologists could only dream of, albino rats in a cage watched as another rat 
dangled and writhed helplessly in the air. By pressing a bar, the rats in the cage could lower their 
conspecific and relieve its distress. Results showed that rats pressed the bar more often when a 
fellow rat was hanging in front of them.25 Another experiment involved monkeys that had to 
choose between receiving a larger portion of food and protecting one of their conspecifics from 
being shocked. The monkeys were placed in a cage with two chains that delivered food when 
pulled. One chain delivered twice as much food as the other, but this same chain also delivered a 
shock to a monkey in full view of the one pulling the chain. Two-thirds of the monkeys 
undergoing this experiment preferred the nonshock chain delivering less food. There were even 
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 some monkeys that, after seeing their conspecific shocked, refused to pull either chain, 
effectively starving themselves for days on end.26 In both experiments, rats and monkey acted 
altruistically in the sense that they sacrificed their own fitness to increase the fitness of a 
conspecific.  
 As we said in the Introduction, this definition of altruism typically is used when talking 
about animal behavior because of the difficulties involved in deciphering their motivations. 
Some scientists, nevertheless, have ventured into the murky area of animal motivation, and have 
come away with some interesting findings. Particularly relevant to the matter at hand is the 
finding that many species of animal exhibit empathy. Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B.M. de 
Waal explain exactly how it works: “empathy relies on the fact that conspecifics are emotionally 
interlinked. The emotional state of one individual has the potential to elicit a similar state in 
nearby individuals.”27 This close emotional link amongst members of a species prompts them to 
aid those in a state of distress.  
The way a species responds to distress depends largely on where it falls on the 
evolutionary spectrum. The most primitive type of response involves emotional contagion, in 
which the sight of distress creates a similar state in the observer. Gripped by its own distress, the 
creature undergoing emotional contagion tends to experience largely self-focused emotion. A 
more advanced response to distress comes in the form of empathy. Empathy differs from 
emotional contagion because, though experiencing a state similar to the creature in distress, the 
observer’s emotion remains other- not self-focused. The final and most advanced response to 
                                                 
26  S. Wechkin, J.H. Masserman, and W. Terris Jr, “Shock to a Conspecific as an Aversive Stimulus,” Psychonomic 
Science 1 (1964): 47-48; and J.H. Masserman, S. Wechkin, and W. Terris, “‘Altruistic’ Behavior in Rhesus 
Monkeys,” American Journal of Psychiatry 121 (1964): 584-85, cited in Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B.M. de 
Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and the Possibility of Empathy in Animals,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, 
ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 294-95. 
27 Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B.M. de Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and the Possibility of Empathy 
in Animals,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 286. 
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 distress is cognitive empathy, a late behavioral development in evolutionary history that only 
appears in the great apes.28 Cognitive empathy consists of not only sharing a distressed state with 
another animal but doing so by cognitive means, “as when the distress of the [observed animal] 
is displaced spatially or temporally, when the situation of distress is unfamiliar, or when the 
object of distress is unfamiliar.”29 In other words, cognitive empathy involves more than an 
instinctual reaction to observed pain. An animal rather cognitively works through some divide 
between itself and the creature it observes so as to experience the distress the other is going 
through.  
We know that great apes, such as chimpanzees and bonobos, are capable of cognitive 
empathy because of their ability to adopt other creatures’ perspectives. In experiments, apes can 
watch an animal perform a task, and then use that knowledge to perform the same task when 
given an opportunity. Evolutionarily less developed monkeys, on the other hand, fail to carry out 
the task under similar conditions.30 Markedly different than their ancestors, great apes have a 
unique knack for taking on a perspective that is foreign to them. To no surprise, then, people 
have observed apes in even unfamiliar situations working towards the relief of other creatures’ 
distress. A curious incident involving a female bonobo named Kuni and a bird serves as one such 
example: 
One day, Kuni captured a starling. Out of fear that she might molest the stunned 
bird, which appeared undamaged, the keeper urged the ape to let it go. Perhaps 
because of this encouragement, Kuni took the bird outside and gently set it onto 
its feet, the right way up, where it stayed looking petrified. When it didn’t move, 
she threw it a little, but it just fluttered. Not satisfied, Kuni picked up the starling 
with one hand and climbed to the highest point of the highest tree where she 
wrapped her legs around the trunk so that she had both hands free to hold the 
bird. She then carefully unfolded its wings and spread them wide open, one wing 
in each hand, before throwing the bird as hard [as] she could towards the barrier 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 297-98. 
29 Ibid., 287. 
30 Ibid., 298. 
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 of the enclosure. Unfortunately, it fell short and landed onto the bank of the moat 
where Kuni guarded it for a long time against a curious juvenile. By the end of 
the day, the bird was gone without a trace or feather. It is assumed that, recovered 
from its shock, it had flown away.31
 
Kuni adopted, albeit a bit awkwardly, the bird’s perspective in its efforts to help it. Kuni’s 
behavior was by no means an aberration, but one of many examples demonstrating great apes’ 
capacity for cognitive empathy.  
It is important to understand how empathy works in the great apes because, as human 
beings’ closest ancestors, they help shed light on our own motivations. To recap, great apes 
experience an advanced emotional state known as cognitive empathy, which in turn gives way to 
altruistic motivation. When human beings act altruistically, essentially this same process is at 
work. Of course, human beings are more advanced in their cognitive reasoning, but that does not 
change the fundamental similarities of the altruistic behavior exhibited by the two species. 
Rather than being a phenomenon a few nutty philosophers made up, human altruism has a strong 
biological basis, shared by our closest ancestors.  
To be more exact, human altruism springs out of an emotional heritage shared, at least in 
part, by a wide range of organisms. Before cognitive empathy appeared in the great apes, less 
developed states of empathy directed animals’ reactions to distress, which stay with us today. 
Cognitive empathy does not replace these more primitive states, but instead they exist together in 
human beings.32 Emotional contagion, for instance, is evident in a child’s response to a traumatic 
event, in which he retreats to his mother for comfort. Although this emotional state continues to 
be a part of the child, with time he also develops more advanced ones such as cognitive 
                                                 
31 F.B.M. de Waal, Bonobo: The Forgotten Ape (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), 156, quoted in 
Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B.M. de Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and the Possibility of Empathy in 
Animals,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 297. 
32 Stephanie D. Preston and Frans B.M. de Waal, “The Communication of Emotions and the Possibility of Empathy 
in Animals,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 287. 
- 108 - 
 empathy33—the state most closely associated with altruistic motivation. The development of 
empathy and altruism in human beings mirrors a similar development in nature as a whole.   
The evidence we have gone through so far—from interviews with rescuers of Jews in 
Nazi Europe to experiments on lab rats—all points to the widespread existence of altruism in 
both human beings and animals. Empirically, altruism seems to have a strong biological basis. 
How, though, do we explain it theoretically? Evolutionary theory, which structures the field of 
biology, has the appearance of being inimical to the concept of altruism. After all, on Darwin’s 
view life consists of a fierce struggle for limited resources, in which the losers perish. The 
organisms that survive are those programmed to act in a way furthering their own survival and 
reproductive success. In such a competitive world, what room is there to be altruistic? 
None whatsoever, say some biologists. They reject altruism because they see it as entirely 
incompatible with Darwin’s theory. Richard Dawkins argues forcefully for this position in his 
book The Selfish Gene. As the title implies, Dawkins takes the view that selfishness characterizes 
all aspects of life. Genes that do the best job of replicating themselves necessarily will come to 
dominate in the world. It is these sorts of “selfish” genes that drive life at all levels of existence. 
From this groundwork, Dawkins goes on to make the bold claim that “Disinterested altruism [is] 
something that has no place in nature, something that has never existed before in the whole 
history of the world.”34 Altruism only comes about when human beings rise above their 
biological nature or, in Dawkins’s words, “rebel against the tyranny of the selfish replicators.”35
Obviously, Dawkins has some explaining to do. As we have already seen, much of the 
behavior in nature certainly looks altruistic. Dawkins admits that there is quite a bit of 
                                                 
33 William B. Hurlbut, “Empathy, Evolution, and Altruism,” in Altruism & Altruistic Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et 
al., 318. 
34 Dawkins, 201. 
35 Ibid. 
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 cooperation in nature, but he stresses that it is not altruistic. Drawing on computer formulations 
of the prisoner’s dilemma, Dawkins shows that organisms that cooperate end up faring best. If an 
organism avoids conflict and the waste in resources and energy it involves, and instead chooses 
to cooperate—at least with those organisms also willing to do so—it will thrive and have 
reproductive success.36 Apparently helpful actions are thus in reality sophisticated forms of 
selfishness. Dawkins stresses this point when talking about parents in the animal kingdom that 
dotingly watch out for their offspring. A bird, for instance, exerts enormous energy building a 
nest and feeding its young. It acts in such a way, says Dawkins, because its offspring carry 50 
percent of it genes, and taking care of them contributes towards the continuation of its genes. Of 
course, the bird is not consciously thinking about all of this when it cares for it young. Rather, 
genes programming such behavior have been effective in replicating themselves, and as a result 
they continue to exist today and influence the bird’s actions.37 Mama bird’s actions turn out to be 
a bit more complex than they first appear. 
The fact that family members share genes with each other goes a long way towards 
explaining why helping behavior is so common between them. But Dawkins is certainly not out 
of the woods yet. Biological factors aside, we often exclude helping behavior between related 
individuals from discussions of altruism because of the close bonds they have with each other. If 
Dawkins is going to truly demonstrate his sweeping claim that altruism has no place whatsoever 
in nature, he will have to explain why there exists helping behavior between creatures with no 
kin ties. This task proves to be much more daunting for Dawkins’s selfish gene theory. One 
option not open to Dawkins is simply denying the existence of altruistic action between non-
                                                 
36 Ibid., 202-33. 
37 Ibid., 109-22. 
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 related organisms because, as we have already seen, such behavior is quite common. Dawkins 
recognizes this point, forcing him justify his theory in light of such action. 
One example of altruism that Dawkins considers is the behavior of different species of 
birds, such as dunnocks and reed-warblers, that unwittingly care for and feed young cuckoos. To 
be sure, such birds are not the good Samaritans of the bird world, searching out young hatchlings 
in need of help. Rather, their behavior is due to a sly biological adaptation that cuckoos have 
developed: cuckoo eggs resemble those of other species of birds and, when laid in the other 
birds’ nests, they often take care of the cuckoos just as if they were their own offspring.38 
Although an analogous situation in a human context would be treated as a case of being 
hoodwinked rather than genuine altruism, from a biological perspective it is clearly altruism. In 
giving valuable limited resources to care for the cuckoo that could easily be used to increase their 
own young’s chances of survival, a cuckoo’s foster parents decrease their own fitness at the 
expense of the cuckoo’s.      
According to Dawkins, cuckoos’ ability to get other species of birds to care for them 
represents a case of exploiting selfish genes so that they act in an altruistic way. Cuckoos 
emulate stimuli to which other birds respond to in ways that, in most circumstances, increase 
their fitness. So hard wired into a dunnock, say, is responding to hatchlings with their mouths 
gaping open by feeding them. A gene or genes leading to such a behavior in general is successful 
in replicating itself, since in most cases the hatchlings that the dunnock sees are its own, which 
possess half of its own genes. By increasing the survival rate of what is usually the dunnock’s 
offspring, such genes increase their own survival rate. The strategy, though, is general enough to 
allow the cuckoo to take advantage of it. As a result, the dunnock finds itself drawn inexorably to 
caring for the cuckoo. In describing the dunnock’s behavior, Dawkins writes that “‘Fooled is the 
                                                 
38 Ibid., 248. 
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 wrong word to use. Its nervous system is being controlled, as irresistibly as if it were a helpless 
drug addict, or as if the cuckoo were a scientist plugging electrodes into its brain.”39  
Dawkins’s explanation certainly seems sound, but it does nothing to change the fact that 
a dunnock caring for cuckoos still exhibits altruism. Moreover, such behavior has a firm genetic 
basis, and is by no means an aberration. Of course, evolution helps to explain the replication of 
genes in terms of fitness, but that does not mean that genes have a “motive” to increase fitness 
and that those failing to maximize this goal are somehow “wrong.” It is clear that Dawkins must 
cede some ground with regards to his claim that altruism has no place in nature. In his focus on 
genes as the driving force of life, he pushes aside and downplays altruism at the level of the 
organism. Dawkins himself recognizes that the gene’s perspective is one thing and the 
organism’s another,40 which makes it all the more surprising why he extrapolates from the 
characteristics of genes to make rash claims about altruism’s (non-)existence in nature. Even if 
genes are “selfish” as Dawkins says, they still can predispose organisms to act altruistically. 
Altruism can arise incidentally from genes that on the whole lead to behaviors that increase 
fitness. Perhaps some altruistic behaviors, through evolutionary pressure, will give way to more 
efficient behaviors from the perspective of fitness. But such a result is far from inevitable or even 
likely. As Jeffrey Schloss writes, “it turns out that natural selection is not sufficient to 
micromanagerially prevent all altruistic behavior from emerging.”41 Being closely tied to 
cooperation, which has significant benefits in evolutionary terms, altruism’s existence should not 
come as a surprise. Altruism is just as much a part of nature as the competition driving Darwin’s 
theory. 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 249. 
40 Ibid., 46-47, 254. 
41 Jeffrey P. Schloss, “Emerging Accounts of Altruism: ‘Love Creation’s Final Law?’” in Altruism & Altruistic 
Love, ed. Stephen G. Post et al., 222. 
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 Motivational Barriers to Normative Altruism 
Altruism appears to be real, but of course this fact alone is not sufficient for concluding that 
altruism is normative. Lots of other things exist—cruelty, lasciviousness, lying—that we do not 
consider to be normative. For altruism to be normative, it must meet the three criteria laid out in 
the introduction: it is (1) something we value, which is (2) able to motivate, and whose (3) 
motivation can be translated to other actors. We have made the reasonable assumption that 
altruism is something we value, so the focus of this section will be on seeing if altruism meets 
the two criteria pertaining to motivation, (2) and (3).  
 To determine whether altruism succeeds as a normative ideal, it is first necessary to 
analyze altruistic motivation in detail. What makes altruism distinctive is how it motivates 
action, rather than the form such action takes. It is impossible to say that any act per se is 
altruistic without knowing its underlying motivation. Even the seemingly altruistic act of 
sacrificing one’s life to save another’s is not altruistic when the underlying motive is to attain 
glory. For this act or any other to be altruistic, the motivation of the actor in question must take a 
certain form—namely, it is directed towards improving the welfare of others rather than one’s 
own. 
 There has been much debate and confusion over the possibility of altruistic motivation. 
Even after going through all the various evidence in the section above, someone may persist in 
raising the following objection: “Don’t all actions begin with a desire, and aren’t all the desires 
that I act on my desires, which then means that all my actions realize a desire of mine and are in 
my self-interest?” The defender of altruism has to take this objection seriously. Before accepting 
empirical evidence for altruism, first it is necessary to demonstrate that altruistic motivation is 
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 logically coherent. If it turns out that all motivation begins with subjective desires, we would 
have good reason to conclude that altruism is impossible.  
 To avoid this conclusion, it is necessary to provide an account of altruistic motivation 
that, at the least, is logically possible and, optimally, is plausible and recognizable. But before 
jumping into altruistic motivation, we first have to look at the most familiar kind of motivation, 
egoistic motivation or motivation based on subjective interests. Such motivation, in a nutshell, 
consists of having a certain need or desire, which encourages one to take whatever action 
necessary to bring about the satisfaction of this need or desire. Put another way, if an actor has a 
desire d and knowledge that action a will satisfy d, the actor’s egoistic motivation takes the form 
of her thinking, “I ought to do a.” Egoistic motivation, then, only operates given certain 
premises—presence of a desire and knowledge of how to satisfy that desire.  
 So in egoistic motivation, a desire sets the process in motion, eventually leading to an 
ought directing action. Yet it is also possible to imagine the ought coming first, which, I am 
going to suggest, is how altruistic motivation functions. Altruistic motivation begins with the 
perception that a specific action ought or, more emphatically, needs to be done. Take the 
following example: a library patron sees a book teetering and about ready to fall on a librarian. 
The patron perceives that the harm about to befall the librarian ought to be averted. What exactly 
the altruist perceives and motivates her is, from her perspective, a brute fact: although certain 
events precede the fact, much of its content—in particular, the ought—has no recognizable basis 
in anything else. Unlike egoistic motivation, there is no preceding desire that gives rise to the 
ought. The altruistic ought arises seemingly out of nowhere.42 But, despite its enigmatic nature, 
the altruist’s perception of the need to act is just as real to her as the teetering book she sees.  
                                                 
42 This line of thinking follows David Hume’s idea that it is impossible to go from “is” to “ought,” or, in other 
words, to derive a moral conclusion from non-moral premises, which he discusses in his Treatise of Human Nature, 
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  The ought in altruistic motivation has a superficially mysterious quality to it, yet there is 
no reason to conclude that it represents some objective moral law ordering the cosmos. A helpful 
analogy is found in comparing what the altruist perceives to an instinct. The analogy is imperfect 
because the demands motivating an altruist probably have a learned as well as biological basis. 
Nevertheless, the comparison with an instinct captures the idea that the altruist cannot point to 
any specific cause for the ought she perceives—it is simply there and demands action. Of course, 
hundreds of thousands of years of evolutionary development explain how instincts—and, as has 
been suggested, how altruism—arose. But it still remains the case that an individual’s current 
perceptions alone fail to provide an apparent cause for instinctual or altruistic motivation. In that 
sense, the altruistic ought or the instinctual ought strikes those experiencing it as disconnected 
from the rest of reality, seemingly springing out of nothingness to motivate them. 
 This analogy with instinct is consistent with the intuitive belief that altruism only works 
when it comes natural to an actor, rather than after a deliberate choice.43 Once one has to stop, sit 
back, and reflect on the costs and benefits of being altruistic, altruistic motivation no longer 
seems to be at work. Someone who frames altruism in cost-benefit terms misses the entire point 
of altruism—sacrificing for another in spite of the costs.  
 Although altruistic motivation works naturally, almost instinctually, deliberation still 
plays a role in the altruist’s decision making process. This point becomes clear after an altruist 
initially perceives that an action needs to be done. In this initial perception, the concept of self—
                                                                                                                                                             
2nd ed., ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), III, i, 1. Of course, there are debates about what 
Hume exactly means in this passage. Alasdair MacIntyre argues that Hume does not deny the possibility of deriving 
“ought” from “is,” but rather cautions us to be careful when making such a move. On MacIntyre’s interpretation, 
Hume spends most of Part III of the Treatise showing that one makes the transition by deriving ought from human 
needs, interests, and desires (see “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’” The Philosophical Review 68 (1959): 461-66). 
Regardless of the accuracy of MacIntyre’s interpretation, it is important to recognize that the substantive point he 
makes does not draw into question our conception of the altruistic ought. Oughts can be traced back to desires, but 
the altruistic ought remains unique because no desire precedes it.     
43 Colin Grant, Christianity and Altruism, New Studies in Christian Ethics, ed. Robin Gill (United Kingdom: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001), xix. 
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 the altruist’s sense of self, that is—is completely absent; in other words, there is no I. The 
perception simply takes the form, “Such and such an action needs (or ought) to be done.” For the 
altruist, whether she or someone else performs the action is, at least initially, irrelevant—it just 
needs to be done. If an actor sees it as essential that she perform the action in question, she is 
primarily focused on herself rather than the need of another, and thus her motivation fails to be 
altruistic. It is not until the altruist realizes that she is in the best position to allay the need that 
she thinks, “I need (or ought) to do such and such an action.” Sometimes this realization may 
arrive simultaneously with the perception that a certain action needs to done, such as when a 
child besides us reaches his hand towards a fire. Normally in this case deliberation does not 
precede our action because by reflex we pull the child’s hand away from the fire. In other 
situations, however, the altruist has to deliberate before deciding whether she in the best position 
to take the action in question. Moreover, even after concluding that she is in the best position to 
help, she still often has to deliberate on which action to take. Rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, 
for example, had to deliberate on whether they were in the best position to save those in danger, 
as well as on which course of action would best realize this goal.      
 Having traced out what altruistic motivation looks like, we can return to the question of 
whether altruism meets the two motivational criteria for normativity. The second criterion 
stipulates that a normative ideal, in this case altruism, must be able to motivate. Altruism 
certainly appears to meet this criterion. We have shown that egoistic motivation does not 
necessarily encompass all varieties of human motivation, demonstrating that altruistic motivation 
is at least a logical possibility. More importantly, we also provided evidence strongly supporting 
the possibility of altruistic motivation in human beings. The most basic level of evidence is its 
intuitive appeal. The account of altruistic motivation given strikes us as plausible and, for many 
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 of us, closely resembles some of our own motivations. Such evidence, arrived at via “armchair” 
theorizing, is important, yet by itself proves unsatisfactory. In the end, the philosopher or 
scientist wants a theory that makes non-trivial predictions supported by empirical evidence. Our 
theory of altruistic motivation does make such predictions, namely, that there should be 
examples of individuals furthering others’ interests even when they lack a subjective desire to do 
so. We have already seen that numerous experiments and case studies in the fields of biology and 
psychology confirm this prediction. All the evidence points towards altruism’s existence and, by 
consequence, its possibility.  
 A skeptic may challenge this conclusion, raising the objection that it is impossible to be 
completely sure that altruistic motivation actuated the rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe, the 
participants in Batson’s experiments, or any other “altruist” we may want to consider. From one 
point of view, the skeptic is right: one always has reason to object because, no matter how much 
empirical evidence one adduces for a theory of altruistic motivation, one cannot in the strictest 
sense prove it. The skeptic’s objection always holds due to the invalid form characterizing 
arguments from induction, as are used in the scientific method. The formalization of such an 
argument illustrates this point. So if we take P as standing for “A theory t is true” and Q as 
standing for “There are observations x, y, and z,” an argument from induction has the following 
form: 
(1) If P, then Q 
(2) Q 
(3) So P 
 
As any student into introductory logic knows, this argument is not valid, which gives the skeptic 
reason to question the truth of conclusion P. This objection against altruism’s existence, 
however, could be leveled against any theory appealing to empirical evidence—quantum 
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 mechanics, relativity, evolution, or any other widely accepted scientific theory.44 In this light, the 
skeptic’s objection to altruism loses its teeth, as long as one accepts the scientific method. Given 
the evidence—numerous instances of helping behavior without any related egoistic desires—
altruistic motivation best explains such actions. It is safe to conclude, then, that altruistic 
motivation exists and is indeed possible. That is, altruism meets the second criterion for 
normativity.  
 The third criterion is the last and most difficult obstacle that a normative argument for 
altruism has to overcome. To meet this criterion, an actor must be able to translate the altruistic 
motivation she experiences to others. The form that altruistic motivation takes makes it difficult 
to translate to others, at least on a consistent basis. Altruistic motivation starts out with the 
perception of a brute, instinct-like fact. It is the sort of fact that eludes explanation—you either 
get it or you don’t. So among individuals who do perceive such facts, an altruist can easily 
translate her motivation to others. But when confronted with individuals who deny perceiving 
such a fact, the altruist has little to which she can appeal. The altruist’s perception—a certain 
action needs to be done—is irreducible. Unlike with egoistic motivation, the altruist cannot link 
her motivation with a preceding desire because it has no basis in desire. In fact, she cannot 
appeal to desires or interests at all: even if such a strategy motivates them, their motivation will 
be egoistic, not altruistic, in nature. How, then, can the altruist make her motivation 
understandable and real to non-altruists? Frustrated, we can imagine her posing the emphatic 
question, “But can’t you see it?!” She inevitably will find any negative responses to her question 
befuddling, since from her point of view the altruistic ought is real and patently obvious.  
One last and perhaps promising path open to the altruist is getting non-altruists to 
empathize with others, in the hope that this exercise will give rise to altruistic motivation within 
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 them. Batson used this method quite successfully in his experiments on altruism. He consistently 
found that individuals were more likely to act altruistically after empathizing with others and 
coming to understand their needs. Empathy makes sense as a tool for motivating altruism, since 
one first has to understand the needs of others before taking action to help them. Through 
empathy, it may in fact prove possible to make altruistic motivation real to others.  
Despite its promise, empathy falls short of being a solution to altruism’s normative 
problems. To be sure, human beings are constituted psychologically in such a way that empathy 
creates a propensity for altruism. Yet, at the same time, nothing about empathy guarantees 
altruism. The same knowledge that allows one to know how to further others’ interests can also 
be used to inflict harm on them. Since empathy provides insight into what would be the most 
cataclysmic to others’ desires and interest, the door is open for using it in a malevolent way. The 
cruelest torturers, for instance, are those that truly understand their victims’ suffering, and with 
such knowledge make their pain especially acute. The torturer’s use of empathy illustrates a 
general point: nothing about the experience of empathy entails altruistic motivation. The altruist, 
then, remains unable to communicate to others the pesky altruistic ought she perceives. Either 
they see it or they don’t, which is where debates about altruism’s normativity necessarily end. 
The altruist’s inability to communicate her motivation to others forces her to concede that 
altruism fails at a normative level.  
 Hard-line defenders of altruism’s normative status will resist making this concession. On 
their view, non-altruists do perceive the altruist’s reasons for action—they just refuse to act on 
them. Kant and, to a certain extent, Nagel take this view. They argue that human nature is 
structured in such a way that, regardless of one’s subjective desires, one cannot fail to perceive 
the altruistic ought. This argument, though correct in many respects, needs qualification. Without 
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 a doubt, some individuals do perceive the altruistic ought by virtue of their nature. (Thus, 
something along the lines of Nagel’s objective reasons probably do exist.) But those arguing for 
normative altruism want to make a stronger claim: all, not some, individuals perceive this ought. 
In Kantian terms, the reasons on which the altruist acts are categorical, which means that they are 
capable of motivating all individuals irrespective of contingent characteristics about them.  
This defense of normative altruism is problematical because it fails to take seriously the 
disagreement existing over altruistic motivation. In claiming that non-altruists are guilty of 
ignoring altruistic motivation without exception, those backing normative altruism peremptorily 
discount how others perceive motivation. Certainly, some individuals fail to act on altruistic 
motivation either out of weakness of will or the presence of a stronger motivation. Yet others 
deny experiencing altruistic motivation at all. “We perceive no altruistic ought,” they steadfastly 
avow. Either these individuals are sincere in their claims, or they are part of a massive 
conspiracy theory against altruistic motivation. The latter position, which defenders of normative 
altruism in effect hold, tilts the argument unfairly in their favor. These believers in normative 
altruism give privileged status to their perceptions, while dismissing those of their opponents.  
Such an argumentative strategy has its basis in a particularly flawed view of human 
nature. Those defending normative altruism take human nature to be homogenous with respect to 
experiencing altruistic motivation, and then they try to shove everyone into this narrow box. This 
characterization of human nature, however, is increasingly untenable in light of discoveries in 
neurobiology, as we have already seen. Neurobiologists have found that differences in cognitive 
structures affect the way individuals are motivated. These studies make a very basic but 
important point: human nature varies greatly, not least of all in the area motivation. Not all 
- 120 - 
 individuals can experience altruistic motivation. That is no reason to demonize these individuals; 
rather, it is reason to reject the common sense belief that altruism is normative.   
 
Changing the Way We Talk about Altruism 
After analysis, the concept of altruism looks noticeably different. We put to rest the notion that 
altruism is a mere chimera, adducing a wide range of evidence for its existence. We also found 
problems with the view that altruism is normative. Because of the unique form that altruistic 
motivation takes, an altruist often finds herself unable to motivate others to altruism. These 
motivational barriers to altruism have the effect of making it impossible for certain individuals to 
be altruistic. A normative view of the altruism ultimately proves unpalatable because it demands 
altruistic action of those incapable of it. Together, these conclusions can be summed up in the 
following claim: altruism is a descriptive phenomenon that fails on a normative level. 
 This claim is controversial, especially the element concerning normativity. Although not 
universal, beliefs about altruism’s normative status are deeply ingrained and widely held. Given 
such strong beliefs, instead of rejecting normative altruism one may choose to rethink our 
conception of normativity. The requirement that moral ideals must be able to motivate others, 
without qualification, sets the bar for normativity especially high, perhaps unreasonably so.  
 Two possible revisions for our conception of normativity come from the naturalist and 
communitarian camps. To start with the naturalists, some suggest that we should drop the 
requirement that moral claims possess the ability to motivate everyone. In other words, a given 
ideal does not have to provide categorical reasons to be normative.45 Since no reasons appear to 
motivate all individuals at all times—if so, where are they?—only a misguided conception of 
normativity demands such reasons. Although an initially appealing view, it has a problematic 
                                                 
45 See, e.g., Peter Railton, “Moral Realism,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 201-204. 
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 consequence: it allows for normative claims that do not motivate individuals, and by 
consequence are impossible for them to carry out. If someone completely lacks motivation to 
perform a certain action, they lack the ability perform it. By demanding the impossible at times, 
this naturalist view of normativity intuitively strikes us as unjust. Furthermore, such a view 
dramatically alters moral discourse. On our conception of normativity, motivating others is a 
necessary part of moral discourse, and thus it succeeds only when its participants find reasons for 
an action real and valid. A naturalist, on the other hand, at times will accept normative claims 
that fail to provide others with reasons for action. Normativity, instead of being practical without 
qualification, now only proves practical when it is convenient for the naturalist. Instances thus 
arise when moral discourse is utterly irrelevant and useless. If there is no hope of providing 
reasons to motivate, why even make a normative argument? In such a situation, any attempts at 
moral discourse inevitably will take on the quality of a fiat. By reducing moral discourse in such 
a way and severely restricting normativity’s practical side, the naturalist’s revision of normative 
views ultimately proves untenable. So though altruism could be normative on the naturalist’s 
account, the problems plaguing such an account of normativity provide little reason to change 
our views on altruism.   
 The revision offered by the communitarian is more promising, as it tries to facilitate and 
enrich moral discourse. For the communitarian, conceptions of normativity are social constructs, 
existing in a specific community at a specific time. The normative views of a community are 
dependent on a vast array of beliefs, assumptions, and traditions present within it. Only those 
steeped in this cultural background truly can understand the normative views arising out of it. 
Conceptions of normativity, then, are tied and necessarily limited to the communities in which 
they exist. This way of understanding normativity directly gives way to a more modest 
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 motivational requirement: normative claims still have to motivate others but they only apply to 
individuals in one’s community. Since, on this picture, moral discourse occurs among 
individuals with shared values, it stands a better chance of successfully motivating others to 
action.  
 Although the communitarian conception of normativity is less stringent, it makes little 
room for normative altruism. For altruism to be normative in a society, perception of the 
altruistic ought would have to be prevalent throughout it. Biological differences in individuals, 
even in relatively homogenous communities, alone seem to preclude this possibility. A 
community could try to overcome the biological obstacles by inculcating altruism, perhaps 
through emphasizing empathy. Yet this approach will be unable to avoid the difficulties involved 
in moving from empathy to altruistic motivation. These various points suggest that altruists are 
not concentrated in certain communities, but rather are sprinkled throughout them. Some of the 
evidence we have seen for altruism also backs up this view. In Monroe’s study of altruists, she 
found no correlation between altruism and the type of community one grows up in, which led her 
to the conclusion that communities do not play a major role in encouraging or discouraging 
altruism. In the apparent lack of a community where the altruistic ought is accepted without 
question, the communitarian is unable to make room for a normative conception of altruism. But 
even if there were some community of altruists where altruism is normative, at the very least we 
do not live in such a community. Without a shared sense of the altruistic ought, appeals to 
normative altruism make little sense in our moral discourse.   
 If one persists in invoking normative altruism, it has the effect of severely hindering 
moral discourse. It is this aspect of normative altruism, above all others, that proves to be the 
death knell of arguments in its favor. An altruist is unable to provide any real reasons to motivate 
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 the non-altruist to altruism. When debating the issue of altruism, the altruist and non-altruist are 
doomed to shouting past each other, unable to engage each other on the same level. This inability 
to meet others where they are points to the supreme irony about normative arguments for 
altruism: their lack of empathy. When telling others that morality demands altruism, one fails to 
understand that such motivation may in fact prove impossible for them. Perhaps that helps to 
explain why philosophers in ivory towers are the most fervent proponents of normative altruism, 
rather than, say, the rescuers of Jews in Nazi Europe discussed above. In interviews, these 
rescuers shrunk from the idea of lording altruism over others. It seems that those who empathize 
with others and work to allay their needs—in short, those who are altruistic—find themselves 
too busy to go around making impossible demands of others.  
 By demanding the impossible, altruism fails as normative ideal. In what state, then, does 
that leave morality? Despite altruism’s insurmountable shortcomings, other avenues are open for 
pursuing moral discourse. Hume offers a promising suggestion in his Enquiries. Here he appeals 
to people’s interests to motivate them to be generous, polite, kind, and in general moral. It is 
foolish to choose a life of vice over one of virtue, given the tremendous goods promised by the 
latter. Those who reject the moral life are missing out on incredible happiness. By filling them in 
on their loss, Hume hopes to encourage them to live differently. Obviously, those who heed his 
arguments will not act altruistically because they are acting out of self-interest, but they at least 
will imitate the actions of the altruist—which is nothing to sneeze at. Hume is optimistic that 
desires and interests can successfully serve as the basis for motivating others and reaching 
agreement on evaluative matters.46
                                                 
46 Hume, Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Moral, in Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and 
Concerning the Principles of Morals, 3rd ed., ed. L.A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1975), 9, II. 
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  Hume’s approach certainly has its limits, as people’s desires, interests, and needs vary 
greatly from each other, making effective moral discourse unlikely among people with radically 
different natures. But, at the very least, this strategy is not doomed before the start in the same 
way normative arguments for altruism are. The prospect of motivating someone to altruism 
initially blind to the altruistic ought is bleak. In such an instance, there is little point in engaging 
in moral discourse—what difference will it make? The prospects are better for a strategy that 
appeals to interests and desires. Even if an individual lacks the desire to carry out a certain 
action, the possibility exists of bringing about that desire within her. Nothing guarantees success 
in this approach, but the social nature of human beings certainly helps it along. The general 
desire to be in harmony with one’s fellows drives moral discourse, as it provides a venue for 
working out disagreement on evaluative matters. For that reason, appeals to human interests and 
desires hold particular promise when engaging in moral debate, much more so than appeals to 
normative altruism. 
 A shift away from normative altruism does not in any way mean that we have to stop 
valuing altruism. Indeed, even when viewed from a non-normative perspective, altruism still can 
continue to fascinate us and inspire admiration. This perspective simply involves giving up the 
requirement that action must be altruistic to be moral. Recognizing its shortcomings as a 
normative ideal, hopefully we can talk about altruism in a more honest manner. We can start by 
affirming its existence at a descriptive level, while at the same denying it any normative status.  
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Conclusion  
“[T]hey say that there are some [laws] which are firm, perpetual, and immutable, which they call 
natural, which are imprinted on the human race by the condition of their very being…. Let them 
show me just one law of that sort—I’d like to see it.” 
  — Michel de Montaigne, “Apology for Raymond Sebond”  
 
After the assumptions behind normative altruism are made explicit, the concept loses much of its 
appeal. A normative conception of altruism forces us to believe that altruistic motivation is 
possible for all individuals, which scientific evidence suggests is unlikely. But, though there is 
good reason to reject normative altruism, its appeal nevertheless persists. One reason why is the 
extent to which normative views about altruism are ingrained into our culture. Also playing a 
role in our attitudes towards normative altruism is the underlying fear that, if we give up on 
altruism’s normative status, before long we will have to give up on normativity altogether. This 
troubling conclusion turns out to be largely unavoidable, regardless of how much we might want 
to deny it. 
The project of defining morality in terms of altruism attempts to preserve normative 
beliefs by giving them a firm foundation. This approach ensures that the content of morality is 
independent of an individual’s contingent characteristics, such as her desires. According to 
Kant’s specific argument for morality, rationality requires all of us to act altruistically. There is 
no sense in trying to deny reason’s demands, for they are categorical. Why Kant and so many 
others have been attracted to this conception of morality is easy to understand: by rendering the 
demands of morality universal, normative altruism deprives everyone of an excuse to deny these 
demands.1  
Moral discourse was in need of a strong foundation after eudaimonistic and divine law 
theories fell out of favor. How normative altruism became the preferred solution is a complicated 
                                                 
1 See Foot, “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” in Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral 
Philosophy, 171. 
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 story, full of twists and turns. MacIntyre provides a helpful summary of this revolutionary 
development in Western moral thought:  
The Greek moral tradition asserted—no doubt with many reservations at times—
an essential connection between “good” and “good for,” between virtue and 
desire. One cannot, for Aristotle, do ethics without doing moral psychology; one 
cannot understand what a virtue is without understanding it as something a man 
could possess and as something related to human happiness. Morality, to be 
intelligible, must be understood as grounded in human nature. The Middle Ages 
preserves this way of looking at ethics. Certainly there is a new element of divine 
commandment to be reckoned with. But God who commands you also created 
you and His commandments are such as it befits your nature to obey. So an 
Aristotelian moral psychology and a Christian view of the moral law are 
synthesized even if somewhat unsatisfactorily in Thomist ethics. But the 
Protestant Reformation changes this. First, because human beings are totally 
corrupt their nature cannot be a foundation for true morality. And next because 
men cannot judge God, we obey God’s commandments not because God is good 
but simply because He is God. So the moral law is a collection of arbitrary fiats 
unconnected with anything we may want to desire…. Kant[’s] … moral 
philosophy is, from one point of view, the natural outcome of the Protestant 
position.2
 
Obviously, noticeable holes run throughout the history we traced out. For one, there is no 
mention of Saint Thomas or any of a number of other medieval thinkers. Many influential 
Protestant figures are missing, too. The account, then, represents nothing more than a first pass at 
describing a complex development in the history of ideas. But, despite these caveats, the basic 
conviction remains the same: the Augustinian tradition’s despairing views on human nature 
provided the foundation for a belief in normative altruism, which Kant’s moral philosophy 
realized. In other words, the transition from the Kingdom of God to the Kingdom of Ends 
marked the rise of normative conceptions of altruism.  
 Our analysis of altruistic motivation revealed numerous problems with the primary 
conclusion of this development in moral thought. A normative conception of altruism makes the 
claim that altruistic motivation is a necessary part of moral action, but without honestly 
                                                 
2 MacIntyre, “Hume on ‘Is’ and ‘Ought,’” 467-68. 
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 considering whether all individuals are capable of it. Although altruistic motivation is possible 
for some individuals (in whom it functions similarly to an instinct), translating this motivation to 
others at times proves impossible. Those individuals immune to the normative force of 
arguments for altruism find themselves cut off from the possibility of acting altruistically or, in 
other words, of acting morally. This problematical result goes against a deep belief about 
normativity—ought implies can. Such a belief emphasizes the importance of making moral 
arguments accessible to others. A rejection of the ought-implies-can principle would scrap the 
requirement that moral reasons possess motivational force. The effect on moral discourse would 
be dramatic, as it would go from an inclusive search for answers to a practice of exchanging 
fiats. This unacceptable consequence forces us to reject normative altruism.    
 Our proposed alternative to normative altruism—basing morality on human needs, 
desires, and interests—attempts to find a conception of morality with more widespread 
motivational force. It quickly becomes apparent, however, that this approach also fails to be 
wholly satisfactory. Human needs, desires, and interests vary widely, and thus any argument 
appealing to them fails to have normative force with everyone—just as is the case with 
arguments for normative altruism. Any hope in universal values inevitably comes crashing down 
when we confront individuals who find our values to be entirely lacking in motivational force. 
No matter where we turn, true normativity eludes us. 
 It is difficult to imagine a moral theory that is able to fully make sense of those who find 
shared human values irrelevant to their own actions. Even scientific accounts of morality, with a 
strong factual basis, will leave us feeling that something is missing in the account. A promising 
new book by the Harvard biologist Marc Hauser suggests that there is a universal moral language 
innate in human beings, analogous to the universal grammar outlined in Noam Chomsky’s 
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 linguistic theory.3 This thesis is certainly interesting, and in many aspects it may turn out to be 
true. Nevertheless, such a theory cannot resolve the uneasiness of knowing that there are 
individuals who are indifferent to our moral beliefs. Morality’s drive towards social harmony 
prevents us from simply writing off those who refuse to buy into it as “depraved” or “irrational.” 
Such expressions are of course brandied around, but they ultimately do little to explain the 
problem of evaluative disagreement. Moral values are of such a transcendent nature4 that it is 
incomprehensible how some individuals can dismiss them out of hand. Although it would be 
convenient to abandon the view that morality is universal in nature, doing so would render it 
unrecognizable. After all, if moral values were such that they could be easily ignored, they would 
cease to capture our attention in the way that they do.  
 So even if we learn that different biological structures cause differences in moral views, 
disagreement in moral matters in all likelihood will remain a frustrating matter. Such a discovery 
will do little to change what our moral sensibilities tell us—namely, that our values hold 
universally. Certainly, it is easy to find a great deal of congruence among individuals’ values. 
Yet there will always be those—the Nietzsches and Napoleons of the world—who refuse to buy 
into shared moral values, and thus threaten their normative status. The hope for immutable, 
universal moral values ends in disappointment.   
 As we are faced with the longing for universal values and the realization that such values 
do not exist, perhaps the best moral theory available to us is one that, though not truly normative, 
is best able to approximate normativity. In this regard, a Humean approach has a distinct 
advantage over a Kantian one, since generating desires in others is always a possibility in a way 
                                                 
3 Marc Hauser, Moral Minds: How Nature Designed Our Universal Sense of Right and Wrong (New York: 
HarperCollins Publishers, 2006). 
4 For a discussion of the transcendent, absolute value that moral terms attempt to capture, see Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
“Lecture on Ethics,” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 3-11. 
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 that generating altruistic motivation is not. Simply put, the former approach holds out better 
prospects for communicating values, motivating others, reaching agreement, and in general 
enjoying success in moral discourse. Knowing that complete success is beyond any moral theory, 
we have to content ourselves with one that achieves more modest goals. 
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